State of Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 24
| Decision Date | 06 March 1922 |
| Docket Number | No. 24,24 |
| Citation | 42 S.Ct. 261,258 U.S. 158,66 L.Ed. 531 |
| Parties | STATE OF TEXAS v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. Original |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Tom. L. Beauchamp and C. M. Cureton, both of Austin, Tex., for complainant.
Mr. Solicitor General Beck, of Washington, D. C., for Railroad Labor Board.
Mr. Patrick J. Farrell, of Washington, D. C., for Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. Alfred P. Thom, of Washington, D. C., for Association of Railway Executives, amicus curiae.
This is a bill in equity brought in this court by the state of Texas against the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Railroad Labor Board. The relief sought is, first, a declaration that the main provisions1 of titles III and IV of the Transportation Act of 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 469, 474, are unconstitutional and void secondly, an annulment of all action heretofore taken thereunder, by either defendant, in respect of railroad carriers in Texas; and thirdly, an injunction restraining the defendants from taking any further action thereunder in respect of those carriers. The right of the state to bring the suit, our power to entertain it, and the merits of the case made by the bill are all challenged by motions to dismiss.
In the bill and supporting brief the defendants are spoken of as citizens of states other than Texas, and this is treated as bringing the suit within our original jurisdiction. But both defendants are sued as corporate entities created by the United States for governmental purposes; and, if that be their status,2 they are not citizens of any state,3 but have the same relation to one state as to another. So, to entertain the suit, we should have to find some ground of jurisdiction other than the one suggested. But we need not stop to consider the possible grounds whereon a state may invoke our original jurisdiction, because an examination of the bill discloses insuperable obstacles to our entertaining it on any ground.
The provisions of titles III and IV which are drawn in question are all in terms confined to matters pertaining to railroad carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and evidently were enacted in what Congress regarded as an exercise of its power to regulate such commerce.
Those relating to the Railroad Labor Board—they are in title III—may be summarized as clothing the Board with authority to entertain and decide disputes between carriers and their employes in respect of wages, grievances, rules or working conditions; as directing that all parties to such a dispute be accorded a hearing either in person or by counsel; and as requiring that the decisions be entered in an appropriate record and that they and all violations of them be given such publicity as the Board may indicate.
The provisions relating to the Interstate Commerce Commission these are in title IV—may be summarized as investing the Commission with a substantial measure of control or supervision over interstate rates and fares; over the removal of any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference or prejudice, as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and in interstate commerce on the other, arising from intrastate rates and fares; over the removal of any undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce caused by intrastate rates and fares; over the division of the carriers of the country into territorial groups for valuation and rate making purposes; over what shall be regarded as a fair return on the aggregate value of the property of the carriers in each group; over the maintenance and use of certain reserve and contingent funds to be set apart from any revenues in excess of such fair return; over the construction and acquisition of new lines and the extension and abandonment of old ones; over the pooling of traffic or earnings; over the consolidation of carriers; over the issue of stocks, bonds and other securities by carriers, and over making the same person a director or officer of more than one carrier. These provisions contemplate and require in respect of most of the matters recited that the state wherein the carrier's line lies shall be notified and accorded a hearing before a finding or order is made by the Commission.
Other statutes prescribe that orders of the Commission, other than for the payment of money as reparation, may be enforced in the District Courts at the suit of the United States, or may be annulled, set aside or suspended in the District Court at the suit of any aggrieved party in interest, but that all suits of the latter class shall be brought against the United States as the principal defendant.
The bill is of unusual length, 65 printed pages. Much of it is devoted to the presentation of an abstract question of legislative power—whether the matters dealt with in several of the provisions of titles III and IV fall within the fleld wherein Congress may speak with constitutional authority, or within the field reserved to the several states. The claim of the state, elaborately set forth, is that they fall within the latter field, and therefore that the congressional enactment is void. Obviously, this part of the bill does not present a case or controversy within the range of the judicial power as defined by the Constitution. It is only where rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of judicial cognizance, are being, or about to be, affected prejudicially by the application or enforcement of a statute that its validity may be called in question by a suitor and determined by an exertion of the judicial power. Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50, 73, 18 L. Ed. 721, et seq.; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246; Stearns v. Wood, 236 U. S. 75, 78, 35 Sup. Ct. 229, 59 L. Ed. 475.
The portion of the bill particularly directed against the action of the Railroad Labor Board alleges, in effect, that the Board, proceeding under title III, has heard and decided divers disputes over working conditions and wages between carriers in Texas and their employes; that conformably to these decisions the working conditions have been changed and the wages of the employes materially raised; and that as a result the operating expense of the carriers has been greatly increased, necessity for a larger operating income has arisen, rates and fares have been raised accordingly, and producers, shippers, and consumers have been and are being injuriously...
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