259 A.2d 364 (Me. 1969), Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority

Citation259 A.2d 364
Opinion JudgeDUFRESNE,
Party NameRose WARREN v. WATERVILLE URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY.
AttorneyJerome G. Daviau, Waterville, for plaintiff. Lester T. Jolovitz, Waterville, for defendant.
Judge PanelBefore WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, MARDEN, DUFRESNE, WEATHERBEE and POMEROY, JJ.
Case DateDecember 03, 1969
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine

Page 364

259 A.2d 364 (Me. 1969)

Rose WARREN

v.

WATERVILLE URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

December 3, 1969

Jerome G. Daviau, Waterville, for plaintiff.

Lester T. Jolovitz, Waterville, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, MARDEN, DUFRESNE, WEATHERBEE and POMEROY, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Justice.

The plaintiff's complaint seeks from the defendant, Waterville Urban Renewal Authority (Authority), damages for its alleged tortious interference with tenancy contracts existing between the plaintiff and her tenants prior to the Authority's taking in eminent domain proceedings of plaintiff's land and buildings devoted to the business of renting apartments.

Certain aspects of the Authority's condemnation of plaintiff's property were reviewed by this Court in the cases of Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 1965, 161 Me. 160, 210 A.2d 41 and Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 1967, Me., 235 A.2d 295.

In the early stages of this separate litigation claiming damages for tortious interference with plaintiff's tenancy contracts, the Authority on October 8, 1965 moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.C.P., on the ground that it failed to state a claim against the Authority upon which relief can be granted. Thereafter several amendments were made and allowed to the original complaint and the plaintiff availed herself of the discovery process to promote evidentiary support

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for her claim. The Authority's motion to dismiss was not actively pressed until on November 14, 1968, by agreement of the parties, a justice of the Superior Court took the same under advisement with their mutual understanding that the defendant's original answer and motion to dismiss were to be considered as addressed to the plaintiff's complaint as amended. On December 12, 1968 this justice of the Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss for the express reason that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The docket entries reveal the plaintiff's subsequent procedural activity. First, a motion dated January 8, 1969 was filed with the Clerk on January 10, 1969 wherein the plaintiff requested the court 'to vacate and/or modify the Judgment of Dismissal.' The motion recited the grounds for relief which we need not consider and, in the notice served upon the...

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