Wade v. Knoxville Utilities BD
| Decision Date | 06 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-5210,00-5210 |
| Citation | 259 F.3d 452 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2001) Johnnie Wade, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Knoxville Utilities Board, Defendant-Appellee. Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
George T. Underwood, Jr., THE LAW OFFICE OF GEORGE T. UNDERWOOD, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant.
Edward G. Phillips, Adrienne L. Anderson, KRAMER, RAYSON, LEAKE, RODGERS & MORGAN, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: GUY, BOGGS, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff, Johnnie Wade, appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, the Knoxville Utilities Board (KUB), on his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101. Plaintiff also contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to amend the complaint to add new claims for disability discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliatory discharge. After careful review of the record and the arguments presented on appeal, we find no error and affirm.
Plaintiff, an African-American male, was hired into KUB's four-year lineman apprentice program in October 1990. Although he was promoted to a second-year apprentice position, plaintiff and several others were notified in October 1992 that they would not be promoted to a third-year position because of poor attendance and other problems. In January 1993, plaintiff injured an ankle when he was hit with an electric cart driven by another employee. Although defendant's investigation was unable to substantiate the claim, plaintiff believed that the accident was intentional and racially motivated.
Upon his return to work in April 1993, plaintiff exhibited behavior that caused KUB to be concerned about his mental condition. Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Jeff Greenwood, a psychiatrist, for counseling. Dr. Greenwood diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from paranoia, treated him with anti-psychotic medication, and excused him from work. On April19, 1993, plaintiff filed the first of three charges with the EEOC. This charge alleged race discrimination and harassment during his employment, including incidents of racially offensive language and fliers, derogatory comments and pranks, and the denial of training and promotions.
After being released to work by Dr. Greenwood, plaintiff returned to KUB on May 4, 1993. Plaintiff's behavior that day and the next concerned his supervisor and led to a leave of absence to continue treatment. In June 1993, Dr. Greenwood reported that plaintiff had responded to medication and could return to work as a lineman apprentice. He also indicated that plaintiff was taking 10 mg. of Stelazine at bedtime, which "may have some subtle sedative side effects," but that plaintiff had "no apparent impairment from his medication and may work in his former sensitive job on high power lines."
KUB requested a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Dr. Kenneth Carpenter, a board-certified psychiatrist, diagnosed plaintiff as having Schizophreniform Disorder and Paranoid Personality. He observed that plaintiff had difficulty with thinking and concentration, as well as continued feelings of persecution, and recommended that he be placed on a different work crew in a less safety-sensitive position for six months. Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel at the time, asked for a third opinion. The third doctor concluded that plaintiff should not work with high voltage while taking the medication. Plaintiff was offered other work in the Properties Department, which he viewed as a demotion and refused.
In November 1993, Dr. Greenwood removed plaintiff from the medication and released him to work. Plaintiff returned to work as a second-year lineman apprentice and was promoted to a third-year position in February 1994. Over the next several months, however, Bill Norton, the manager of the program, received verbal reports of several near accidents that were attributed to plaintiff's mental lapses or inattention.
In July 1994, Norton consulted with Dr. Carpenter about plaintiff, who concluded that plaintiff should not remain in the lineman program but could handle a less safety-sensitive position in the meter tester apprentice program. Plaintiff was offered a transfer to a meter tester position, in the final year of the three-year program, with no loss of pay. To accomplish the transfer without bidding the position, the transfer was specifically requested and granted as an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In September 1994, the EEOC issued its determination that there was no evidence of discrimination. Notably, this determination concerned plaintiff's claims up to and including the transfer to the meter tester program. Plaintiff, however, did not file suit within 90 days.
Plaintiff worked in the meter tester apprentice program until March 27, 1995. On that day, plaintiff was asked to meet with Everett Noe, Manager of the Electric Meter Department, and Dennis Upton, Human Resources Manager, concerning complaints from several female coworkers that plaintiff's interactions made them feel uncomfortable. KUB considered the meeting to be a counseling session, not a disciplinary action, as no formal complaint had been filed. Plaintiff became agitated, demanded to know who had complained, and denied that he had harassed anyone. Plaintiff says Upton told him to "sit down and shut his damn mouth," while Upton claims he said he could not reveal the names because "it's the damn law." 1
Shortly after the meeting ended, plaintiff met Noe and Upton in the hallway and called Upton an "Uncle Tom." Upton, who is also African-American, called plaintiff back into his office, accused him of being insubordinate and, when plaintiff would not apologize, suspended plaintiff with pay for the rest of the day. When they spoke by telephone later in the day, plaintiff refused to apologize. The next day, March 28, 1995, plaintiff was seen in the emergency room of a local hospital. According to Dr. Greenwood, plaintiff was psychotic and refused medication. As a result, plaintiff was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital for treatment.
On June 4, 1995, plaintiff filed his second EEOC charge, alleging that he was falsely accused of sexual harassment in retaliation for filing the first EEOC charge. Several weeks later, plaintiff was approved by KUB to receive long-term disability benefits. Dr. Greenwood reported to KUB that plaintiff had schizophrenia with progressive decline and appeared to be permanently disabled. In October 1995, Dr. Greenwood indicated that plaintiff should apply for social security benefits. The district court noted that plaintiff was receiving social security benefits for his mental condition.
Plaintiff had no further contact with KUB until December 1996, when he asked to return to work. He presented a letter from Dr. Greenwood dated December 18, 1996, which stated: "From his appearance today [plaintiff] seems able to return to work at some capacity, though his illness has been recurrent and may require future periods of absence when symptoms might recur." However, a handwritten note at the bottom of the letter written by another doctor said that Dr. Greenwood had released plaintiff to return to his former job with no restrictions. Dr. Greenwood testified that the handwritten note, made by another doctor who had not treated plaintiff, did not comport with his opinion at the time.
KUB responded to plaintiff's request in a letter dated December 30, 1996, which outlined several conditions that would have to be met before plaintiff could return to work. The conditions included: (1) that plaintiff submit to a fitness-for-duty psychological examination by Dr. Carpenter; (2) that KUB complete its review of allegations of possible criminal conduct by plaintiff; (3) that plaintiff agree to complete additional course work that had been added to the meter tester program during his absence; and (4) that, if the other conditions were met, plaintiff meet with Upton to discuss disciplinary action for his conduct on March 27, 1995. 2
Dr. Carpenter conducted a fitness-for-duty evaluation in January 1997 and concluded that plaintiff should not be returned to the ongoing stress of a work environment. He observed that plaintiff was not taking his medication and opined that there was a "great likelihood that Mr. Wade will have more striking irrational behavior as time goes on." Dr. Carpenter also indicated that plaintiff's "extreme guardedness and vague thinking make him difficult to work with" and that, "with the stress back on the job, his symptoms will intensify and there will be further problems." Dr. Greenwood testified that he did not disagree with any of the conclusions in Dr. Carpenter's report. 3
Based principally on Dr. Carpenter's report, KUB decided not to have plaintiff return to work. On February 26, 1997, KUB representatives advised plaintiff and his attorney that plaintiff could not return to work, but would remain on inactive status until he was no longer eligible for long-term disability benefits. Plaintiff was also advised that his employment would be terminated as of June 30, 1997. Although KUB scheduled a due process pre-termination hearing, neither plaintiff nor his attorney attended. KUB prepared a notice of termination and cover letter dated April 11, 1997, but was unable to serve plaintiff personally. Plaintiff agreed to meet with Upton and Noe on April 15, 1997, but before they could give him the papers, plaintiff fell from the chair to the floor and claimed to have injured his back. Plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim for the fall, which KUB contested. 4 On April 11 1997, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on ...
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