Pena v. State, Case No. 2D17-4465
Citation | 259 So.3d 223 |
Decision Date | 09 November 2018 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D17-4465 |
Parties | Yorlan Espinosa PENA; Warner B. Barrantes; Sarah Hamadi; Robert L. Garcia; Randy Moreno; Peter W. Rodino ; Miguel Guzman; Michael R. Myzak; Maxwell S. Given; Max Gene Miller; Mark R. Dhondt; Mark S. Magitman; Lazaro Manuel Urquila Venta; Kevin Perez; Joseph Richard Diaz; Jesus A. Sanchez; Irving Hernandez ; Henry Guevara; Patrick J. Garry ; Gabriel L. Cuervo; Edwin Oscar Torres Vazqueztell; Daniel J. Barron; Cypriss A. Woodall; Claudia Graveran; Alexander M. Howard; Aimee Santana Perez; Geoffrey C. Hart; and Blas E. Aleman, Petitioners, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Louis Arslanian, Hollywood, for Petitioners.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Todd Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
The petitioners, drivers appearing in county court for civil traffic infractions, seek certiorari review of a circuit court order denying their joint petition for writ of prohibition, which sought review of the county judge's denial of the petitioners' motions to disqualify the county judge from presiding over their traffic cases. The circuit court denied the petition for writ of prohibition, concluding that the motions to disqualify the county judge were legally insufficient. We grant the petition for writ of certiorari because the motions were legally sufficient and the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying the petition for writ of prohibition.
In their motions to disqualify filed in county court, the petitioners asserted that they had a well-founded fear that they would not receive a fair proceeding before the county judge based on the following facts:
In addition to the above allegations, the motions also alleged that after counsel had inquired about the e-mails, his clients' cases were moved from their originally-scheduled docket to a special docket assigned to this particular county judge.
Attached to the motion to disqualify was an affidavit of counsel attesting to the facts alleged in the motion, as well as a copy of the e-mails between the county judge and the clerk's employee. The motion also described past traffic court rulings by the county judge:
The county judge denied the motions to disqualify "as legally insufficient."
In their petition for writ of certiorari filed in this court, the petitioners argue that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying their petition for writ of prohibition because their motions to disqualify the county judge were legally sufficient in that the facts as alleged gave the petitioners a reasonable fear of receiving an unfair trial before the county judge.
Because the petition for writ of prohibition filed in the circuit court sought review of the denials of the motions to disqualify by the county judge, the petition for writ of prohibition served a similar function as a direct appeal. Sutton, 975 So.2d at 1077-78. Therefore, the circuit court's denial of the petition for writ of prohibition is reviewable in this court by certiorari. See id. at 1079-80. Id. at 1080-81 (citation omitted) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 527 (Fla. 1995) ).
A party moving to disqualify a judge must file an affidavit in good faith stating fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial on account of the prejudice of the trial judge, alleging facts and reasons for the belief that prejudice exists. Gregory v. State, 118 So.3d 770, 778 (Fla. 2013) (citing § 38.10, Fla. Stat. (2011) ). A judge ruling on an initial motion to disqualify "shall determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged." Id. (quoting Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(f) ). "Whether the motion is legally sufficient requires a determination as to whether the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial." Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1274 (Fla. 2005) ). The fear must be objectively reasonable; a subjective fear is not sufficient. Id. (quoting ...
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