Curry v. Stevenson

• Decision Date: 07 May 1928
• Docket Number: No. 4642.,4642.
• Citation: 58 App. DC 162,26 F.2d 534
• Parties: CURRY v. STEVENSON.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

58 App. DC 162, 26 F.2d 534 (1928)

CURRY v. STEVENSON.

No. 4642.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Submitted April 4, 1928.

Decided May 7, 1928.

Foster Wood, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Geo. E. C. Hayes, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices, and SMITH, Judge of the United States Court of Customs Appeals.

ROBB, Associate Justice.

Appeal from a judgment in the Supreme Court of the District in an action by the appellee (plaintiff below) against the appellant (defendant below) for damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff through being struck by an automobile belonging to the defendant. At the close of the evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The motion was overruled, and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,500.

Evidence for plaintiff was as follows: Between 10:30 and 11 o'clock on the evening of May 25, 1924, plaintiff and his wife were crossing the intersection of Thirteenth and S Streets, Northwest, in this city, when an automobile making about 40 miles per hour and giving no warning ran into plaintiff, inflicting serious injuries. A Dr. Rogers, who saw the accident, testified that he followed the car "and stopped it at Eleventh Street and Rhode Island Avenue, Northwest, telling the driver he had run into a man; that the driver said he would drive back, but turned into a side street and disappeared." Dr. Rogers took the license number of the automobile and reported it at a police station. This automobile had been registered in the name of defendant. Thereupon plaintiff rested.

Defendant testified that he lived at No. 775 Fairmont Street, Northwest, in this district, and was the owner of the automobile in question; that about May 20, 1924, he gave the automobile to Julius Tryman "under an agreement to sell the car to him if the automobile was in satisfactory running condition; that Julius Tryman had the car the night of May 25, 1924; that police officers came to his (defendant's) home that night and inquired about the car; that he told the officers that Mr. Julius Tryman had the machine, giving them his address; that he (defendant) knew nothing about the accident and did not have the car that night; that he received no money from Mr. Tryman on account of this agreement referred to by him."

Tryman was called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and testified that he received the automobile from defendant about May 20, 1924, "under an agreement whereby he was to purchase the machine if it was in satisfactory running condition, and that he had the automobile on the night of the accident, May 25, 1924; that he was driving the automobile on that night, and returned turned home with the automobile about 10:30 p. m., and retired for the night, leaving the automobile parked in front of the Westmoreland Apartments, at which place he was employed and had his residence; that he was awakened on the night in question at an early hour in the morning by police officers flashing a "light in his face, but that he did not get up out of bed; that he told the officers he had the automobile; that he had not been in any accident; that the automobile was in front of the apartment the next morning, exactly where he had parked it the night before."

It has come to be the general rule that, in an action for injuries resulting from being struck by an automobile, proof that the automobile was owned by the defendant at the time of the accident establishes a prima facie case for the plaintiff. In other words, proof of defendant's ownership of an automobile that has been driven on the public highway warrants the inference that it was in his possession, either personally or through his servant, the driver, and that the driver was acting within the scope of his employment. Tischler v. Steinholtz, 99 N. J. Law, 149, 122 A. 880; Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 198 S. W. 854, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1123; Curry v. Bickley, 196 Iowa, 827, 195 N. W. 617; Rose v. Balfe, 223 N. Y. 481, 119 N. E. 842, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 238. Automobiles must be registered, and therefore public records afford evidence of ownership; but whether the car at the time of an accident was being operated by or for the owner is a matter peculiarly within his knowledge.

Where the prima facie inference arising from the fact of ownership is overcome by uncontradicted proof that in fact an automobile was not in the possession of the owner or his servant or agent, the question is one for the court, and not the jury. Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. Law, 754, 71 A. 296, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335, 131 Am. St. Rep. 677; Mahan v. Walker, 97 N. J. Law, 304, 117 A. 609; Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 233, 198 S. W. 854, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1123; Curry v. Bickley, 196 Iowa, 827, 832, 195 N. W. 617; Lotz v. Hanlon, 217 Pa. 339, 66 A. 525, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 202, 118 Am. St. Rep. 922, 10 Ann. Cas. 731; Berry on Low of Automobiles (2d Ed.), § 615, p. 694.

The prima facie inference that may be drawn from ownership is analogous to the prima facie inference of negligence that may be drawn from the happening of an accident of a certain class, where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Speaking of this doctrine, the court in Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 240, 33 S. Ct. 416, 418 (57 L. Ed. 815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905), said: "In our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the...