Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc.

• Citation: 26 F.3d 220
• Decision Date: 06 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-2227,93-2227
• Parties: 128 Lab.Cas. P 11,121 AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. PRECISION VALLEY AVIATION, INC., Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Page 220

26 F.3d 220

128 Lab.Cas. P 11,121

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. PRECISION VALLEY AVIATION, INC., Defendant, Appellant.

No. 93-2227.

United States Court of Appeals,

First Circuit.

Heard April 6, 1994.

Decided June 7, 1994.

E. Scott Smith, with whom Michael J. Minerva, Jr., and Ford & Harrison, Atlanta, GA, were on brief, for appellant.

Jerry D. Anker, Washington, DC, for appellee.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

This case took wing when the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), a labor organization, sued defendant-appellant Precision Valley Aviation, Inc. (Precision) to compel arbitration of a grievance initiated by the union on behalf of certain probationary employees (all pilots). The district court ordered Precision to arbitrate the dispute. Precision now seeks to test the substance of the district court's order. We do not reach that destination: the absence of appellate jurisdiction defeats the main thrust of the appeal, and what remains does not require us to extend our flight much beyond takeoff.

I. A Chronology

This appeal is enveloped in a jurisdictional fog. We attempt to clear the air by chronicling the events that frame the jurisdictional issue.

1. August 17, 1993: The district court, acting on a motion for summary judgment, entered a final judgment in ALPA's favor on count 1 of its complaint. At the same time, the court dismissed count 2 of the complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The second part of the court's order is immaterial to this appeal.

2. August 30, 1993: Precision attempted to move for reconsideration, but failed to comply with an applicable local rule. ¹ Consequently, the clerk of court refused to accept the defective pleading (which we shall refer to as the noncompliant motion) for filing.

3. August 31, 1993. The district court, acting at ALPA's request, entered an amended judgment clarifying the original judgment. On the same date, Precision filed a notice of appeal.

4. September 1, 1993: The district court entered an "Order of Refusal of Pleading," endorsing the clerk's refusal to place the noncompliant motion on record.

5. September 9, 1993: Precision served a new motion for reconsideration of the August 17 judgment. This motion satisfied the requirements of the local rules.

6. September 10, 1993: Precision filed the September 9 motion in the clerk's office. It also requested a stay of judgment pending appeal. On the same date, Precision withdrew its first notice of appeal.

7. September 22, 1993: The district court entered an order declining to reconsider the final judgment and denying Precision's request for a stay. The court stated that a motion for reconsideration should have been served on or before August 27, and that Precision's efforts were, therefore, untimely. The court erred in identifying the end date; taking into account the special directives of the Civil Rules, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) (explaining principles governing computation of periods of 10 days or less), the 10-day period for filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), did not expire until August 31.

8. October 7, 1993: Precision filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 22 order (having served the motion a day earlier). In this motion, Precision pointed out the court's computational error and contended that the noncompliant motion met the applicable time constraints.

9. October 12, 1993: Although acknowledging its computational error, the district court nevertheless remained steadfast and denied Precision's October 7 motion. The court noted that the noncompliant motion did not conform to Local Rule 11(b) and was, therefore, a nullity. The September 9 motion also lacked force, as that motion was neither served nor filed within the requisite 10-day period.

10. October 13, 1993: The court entered a further judgment commemorating the October 12 order, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. See Fiore v. Washington County Comm. Mental Health Ctr., 960 F.2d 229, 233 (1st Cir.1992) (en banc).

11. November 5, 1993: Precision filed its notice of appeal, seeking to challenge (a) the August 17 judgment, (b) the September 22 order, and (c) the October 13 judgment.

II. Analysis

A.

In civil cases in which the United States is not a party, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days following the entry of final judgment. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1). The requirement for punctual filing of a notice of appeal is obligatory and jurisdictional. See Browder v. Illinois Dep't of Correction, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560-61, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978); Feinstein v. Moses, 951 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1991). Precision filed notice of the instant appeal on November 5, 1993--far more than thirty days after the entry of the August 17 judgment. ² Thus, the threshold issue is whether some idiosyncratic feature of the case breathed life into the (apparently tardy) notice of appeal.

Appellant offers a variety of possible scenarios, all of which implicate Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). In terms, a motion to alter or amend a judgment, made under that rule, interrupts the running of the appeal period as long as it is "served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Thereafter, an order disposing of the motion restarts the appeal period. See Feinstein, 951 F.2d at 18; see also Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4). The rule's 10-day window is mandatory and jurisdictional. ³ See Vargas v. Gonzalez, 975 F.2d 916, 917 (1st Cir.1992); Barrett v. United States, 965 F.2d 1184, 1187 (1st Cir.1992). Thus, the period set for prosecuting a Rule 59(e) motion may not be extended. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) (explaining that the district court "may not extend the time for taking any action" under Rule 59(e)); see also de la Torre v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir.1994); Feinstein, 951 F.2d at 19; Rivera v. M/T Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152, 154 (1st Cir.1988).

This is not to say that a motion for reconsideration filed after the 10-day window closes is completely inutile. While such a motion will not extend the appeal period, the district court, so long as it still retains jurisdiction, may choose to grant the requested relief. See Jusino v. Zayas, 875 F.2d 986, 989-90 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1989) (discussing district court's inherent power to correct errors in its own decrees). Moreover, if such a motion is denied, the movant may seek appellate review of the denial. See Rodriguez-Antuna v. Chase Manhattan Bank Corp., 871 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989). We caution however, that a timely appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration brought other than in conformity with Rule 59(e) does not "resurrect [the appellant's] expired right to contest the merits of the underlying judgment, nor bring the judgment itself before [the court of appeals] for review." Id.

B.

It is against this tightly woven backdrop that we turn to appellant's asseverational array. Appellant's central claim is that, whatever its deficiencies might have been, the noncompliant motion was a timely-filed Rule 59(e) motion and, therefore, tolled the appeal period in respect to the August 17 judgment. We do not agree.

This initiative depends on the significance of the admitted defect in the motion--the motion plainly did not satisfy the requirements of the local rules--and the supportability of the lower court's response to it. Appellant attempts to shrug off the matter of noncompliance, contending, in effect, that Local Rule 11(b) is somewhat silly, and that the district court's slavish adherence to it sanctifies "an empty formality."

We think appellant presumes too much. Rules of procedure are vitally important in judges' efforts to manage burgeoning caseloads with some semblance of efficiency. Within wide limits, it is for courts, not litigants, to decide what rules are desirable and how rigorously to enforce them. See Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 584 (1st Cir.1994) ("The judge, not counsel, must run the court and set the agenda."). Valid local rules are an important vehicle by which courts operate. ⁴ Such rules carry the force of law, see 12 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 3153 (1973), and they are binding upon the litigants and upon the court itself, see United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862, 110 S.Ct. 177, 107 L.Ed.2d 133 (1989). Consequently, the court below acted appropriately in refusing to disregard Local Rule 11(b).

By like token, we do not discern any error in the court's application of the rule. District courts enjoy broad latitude in administering local rules. See United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir.1992); Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 46. In the exercise of that discretion, district courts are entitled to demand adherence to specific mandates contained in the rules. See, e.g., Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1197 (1st Cir.1994); Witty v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 517, 519 (1st Cir.1993); Jardines Bacata, Ltd. v. Diaz-Marquez, 878 F.2d 1555, 1560 (1st Cir.1989); see also Mendez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 900 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1990) ("Rules are rules--and the parties must play by them.").

In this instance, the local rules explicitly warn litigants that the court will "not accept any motions not in compliance with procedures outlined in [the local rules]." D.N.H.Loc.R. 11(a)(1). This provision, aposematic in and of itself, is reinforced by a further provision that clearly contemplates the striking of noncompliant pleadings. See D.N.H.Loc.R. 2(f). ⁵ Mindful of this profusion of red flags, we cannot say that the judge responded inappropriately to appellant's breach of Local Rule 11(b). See Clausen, 21 F.3d at 1197 (holding that a district court, sitting in New Hampshire, is entitled to enforce Local Rule 11(b) by refusing to accept a noncompliant motion for filing); see also Atlas Truck Leasing,...