26 S.W. 409 (Tex.Crim.App. 1893), Lynch v. State
|Citation:||26 S.W. 409, 32 Tex.Crim. 45|
|Opinion Judge:||[32 Tex.Crim. 49] SIMKINS, J.|
|Party Name:||LYNCH v. STATE.|
|Case Date:||April 19, 1893|
|Court:||Court of Appeals of Texas, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas|
For opinion of the court, see 22 S.W. 47.
fdissenting). I cannot concur in the decision rendered. I hold that under article 677, Cr. Code, requiring the court to distinctly set forth the law applicable to the case, it was the duty of the court to charge the jury that, if they believed defendant had purchased the horse, they should acquit defendant, though they might believe, when he purchased the horse from Butler, defendant knew that Butler had stolen it or acquired it unlawfully. It is not sufficient merely to charge that if defendant bought the property they should acquit, though Butler may have acquired the horse unlawfully. This charge would readily be understood by the jury as instructing them not to convict if Lynch bought the horse without knowing that Butler had stolen it, for they knew that a man may honestly buy stolen property, even though it has to be surrendered subsequently to the owner. But there are but few average juries who willingly let a man go apparently unwhipt of justice, who has colluded with a thief, and purchased his stolen property. It is seldom explained to the jury that, while the law regards the receiver as bad as the thief, it yet holds the two offenses distinct, and requires an indictment for receiving stolen property before one can be convicted therefor. But it is a common understanding among all the...
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