Wells Fargo Bank v. Kincaid

Decision Date15 March 1968
Citation260 Cal.App.2d 120,66 Cal.Rptr. 832
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesWELLS FARGO BANK, a corporation, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. Helen KINCAID and Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., Defendants, Cross-Defendantsand Respondents, Estelle Latta, Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant. Civ. 24097.

Peter A. Huppert, San Francisco, for appellant.

Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher, Vincent J. Mullins, Gerald J. O'Connor, San Francisco, for respondent, Helen Kincaid.

Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, E. Judge Elderkin, San Francisco, for respondent, Wells Fargo Bank.

DEVINE, Presiding Justice.

Wells Fargo Bank, as trustee of an Inter vivos trust, has commenced this action for declaratory relief and for instructions. Defendants are Helen H. Kincaid (and Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, her assignee of part of whatever interest she may have) and Estelle Latta. Defendant Latta cross-complained against plaintiff and Helen Kincaid.

Helen Kincaid is the beneficiary under a power of appointment which was exercised by Lydia Hopkins. The trust was created by Lydia Hopkins' mother, Mary K. Hopkins, who was the widow of Timothy Hopkins. Timothy Hopkins acquired the estate from Mark Hopkins. There is no issue (at least for purposes of this appeal) as to the fact that the property presently in trust came to Timothy Hopkins as part of the estate of Mark Hopkins, or as converted assets thereof.

The superior court rendered summary judgment against appellant Latta, who laid claim to the properties of the trust, on the grounds that her cross-complaint is barred by the statute of limitations and that she was foreclosed by laches and by estoppel.

This is the claim of Estelle Latta, in substance: Mark Hopkins, the noted railroad magnate and financier, hereafter called the 'real Mark Hopkins,' never married and died intestate in San Francisco in 1878. His estate never has been administered according to appellant. Estelle Latta is an heir of a brother of the real Mark Hopkins. The brother was an heir of the intestate capitalist. She and others claiming with her are entitled to the property which is the subject of this lawsuit. What happened to deprive her and her coheirs of their patrimony was that a second Mark Hopkins, an imposter, who was unrelated to the real Mark Hopkins, was allegedly married to Mary Frances Sherwood Hopkins. Upon the death of the real Mark Hopkins, this woman caused distribution of a large amount of the estate of the real Mark Hopkins to her. Through her it has come ultimately into the subject trust fund.

Appellant asserts in her brief that she had 'recently' uncovered the fraudulent scheme by which the alleged wrong described above was perpetrated by distribution of the estate of the real Mark Hopkins in 1883. She asserts that various distributees concealed the fraud. She seeks impressment of a trust.

It is to be observed that in the early stages of the litigation in which appellant sought to upset the distribution of the Mark Hopkins Estate, appellant's theory was not that there was an imposter Mark Hopkins, but that The Mark Hopkins was not really married to Mary Frances Sherwood Hopkins, to whom there was distributed, in 1883, the properties which are the source of the trust fund which is the subject of this suit. (See Latta v. Western Investment Co., 9 Cir., 173 F.2d 99, 101.)

Applicability of Summary Judgment Procedure

Appellant misconceives the purport of a motion for summary judgment, saying that the court (presumably, the trial court and perhaps the Court of Appeal, too) 'should only determine whether the Contentions raise any triable issues of fact which are not barred by the asserted affirmative defenses.' (Emphasis supplied.) This is not the law of summary judgments (as distinguished from procedure relating to pleadings only, such as demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings). (Hardware Mutual Ins. Co. of Minnesota v. Valentine, 119 Cal.App.2d 125, 259 P.2d 70.) On motion for summary judgment the court goes beyond mere Contentions of the parties as expressed in the pleadings, and examines the affidavits containing matters which are within the personal knowledge of the affiants to decide whether the stated facts (which are taken as true) show that a good cause of action exists upon the merits or that there is a good and substantial defense. (Code Civ.Proc. § 437c; Hicks v. Bridges, 152 Cal.App.2d 146, 313 P.2d 15.) The purpose of the summary judgment is to dispose of cases and defenses which are unmeritorious in substance and fact which, by considering the pleadings only, might remain in court to the harm or harassment of parties and to the disadvantage and expense of the public, and in particular of other litigants. Of course, if there is even one triable issue of fact, summary judgment cannot be rendered. (Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal.2d 553, 122 P.2d 264.) If an action or defense is barred by the statute of limitations as established by affidavits which are not met by sufficient counter-affidavits, summary judgment is proper. (Reiner v. Hermann, 79 Cal.App.2d 543, 180 P.2d 385; Hayward Union High School District of Alameda County v. Madrid, 234 Cal.App.2d 100, 125--128, 44 Cal.Rptr. 268.) The same is true when the defense is that of res judicata. (Dryer v. Dryer, 231 Cal.App.2d 441, 446, 41 Cal.Rptr. 839, and cases cited therein.)

The Statute of Limitations

In order to escape the bar of the three-year statute of limitations in cases based on fraud (Code Civ.Proc., § 338, subd. 4), app...

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4 cases
  • People v. One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette Convertible
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 10 Julio 1969
    ...suggested by the pleadings. (Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp., a 271 Cal.App.2d ---, ---, 76 Cal.Rptr. 680; Wells Fargo Bank v. Kincaid, 260 Cal.App.2d 120, 123, 66 Cal.Rptr. 832; Dryer v. Dryer, 231 Cal.App.2d 441, 446, 41 Cal.Rptr. 839; Saunders v. New Capital for Small Businesses, Inc.......
  • Trotter v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 13
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • 28 Abril 1983
    ...The statute would have tolled only if Trotter's claim had been unbarred when the union filed suit. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Kincaid, 260 Cal.App.2d 120, 66 Cal.Rptr. 832, 835 (1968). Trotter argues that under California law the union's collection suit is barred after four years, and therefor......
  • Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 9 Noviembre 1977
    ...decisive facts, the question of limitations is one of law, amenable to disposition by summary judgment. (Wells Fargo Bank v. Kincaid (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 120, 123, 66 Cal.Rptr. 832; Graham v. Bank of California (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 438, 440, 17 Cal.Rptr. 279.) Before the advent of section......
  • Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales, S.F. 22914
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 23 Enero 1973
    ...v. Strong (1943) 22 Cal.2d 540, 544--545, 140 P.2d 386; Eureka v. Gates (1902) 137 Cal. 89, 94, 69 P. 850; Wells Fargo Bank v. Kincaid (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 120, 124, 66 Cal.Rptr. 832; Bank of America v. Vannini (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 120, 127, 133, 295 P.2d 102.) The only exception to this ......

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