U.S.A. v. State, s. 00-5342

Citation260 F.3d 587
Decision Date27 April 2001
Docket NumberNos. 00-5342,6514,s. 00-5342
Parties(6th Cir. 2001) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Community Rehabilitation Agencies of Tennessee, Inc., Proposed Intervenor-Appellant, People First of Tennessee, Intervenor-Appellee, v. State of Tennessee, Defendant-Appellee. People First of Tennessee, on behalf of its members; Bonnie Chaffee, by her next friend, Crystal Goodman; Dowell Harris, by his next friend, Rocky Akin; Effie Estelle Pippin, by her next friend, Frances Hamblen; Sandra Jo Proctor, by her next friend, Evelyn McCormack; Cynthia Dawn Sommerville, by her parents and natural guardians, Jeff and Kathy Sommerville; Kevin Troupe, by his next friend, Charles Hall; Juanita Wright, by her next friend, William A. Goodman, Jr., Mary Ann Avery, by her next friend, Jason Elam; Audriniece Hollister, by her next friend, Ethyl Ervie; Kenneth Lee; Eddie Jones; Larry Wayne Vaughn; Charles Wilhoite; Carolyn Britt; Rebecca Workman; Jenny Belle Greenwood; David Balthrop; Terry Beaty; United States of America, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Clover Bottom Developmental Center; Don Sundquist, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Tennessee; Julie Bratcher, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Clover Bottom Developmental Center; Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation; Tennessee Department of Health; Rusty Seibert, in his official capacity as Assistant Commissioner of TennCare; Comcare, Inc.; Fredia S. Wadley, M.D., in her official capacity as Commissioner of Health; Greene Valley Developmental Center; Nat T. Winston Developmental Center; O. Stephen Roth, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Clover Bottom Developmental Center; Robert Erb, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Greene Valley Developmental Center; Pete Davidson; Ben Dishman; Thomas Sullivan; John Ferguson, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Finance and Administration, Defendants-Appellees, Community Rehabilitation Agencies of Tennessee (CMRA), Proposed Intervenor-Appellant. Arg
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] William M. Barrick, WEED, HUBBARD, BERRY & DOUGHTY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants.

Judith A. Gran, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Dianne Stamey Dycus, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, Kevin K. Russell, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Before: NELSON and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; FEIKENS, District Judge. *

OPINION

FEIKENS, District Judge.

The above captioned cases have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. Community Rehabilitation Agencies of Tennessee (CMRA) appeals the decisions of the two district courts that denied its petitions to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Because CMRA's petitions are untimely and it has not advanced any substantial right to intervene, its appeals are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

CMRA is an association of nonprofit agencies that provide services to retarded persons and those with mental disabilities in community placements. These services include case management, residential medical support, supported living, transportation, day services, and other services. CMRA represents the interests of the community-based service provider industry in legislative, executive, and judicial matters. CMRA has 75 members, including most of the community agencies in the State of Tennessee. The vast majority of these community agencies is nonprofit, formed in local communities, and receives funding from the State and federal government.

CMRA appeals the decisions of Judge Robert L. Echols in People First of Tennessee v. Clover Bottom Developmental Center and Judge Jon P. McCalla in United States v. State of Tennessee, that denied its motions to intervene in the present litigation. 1 The two cases have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. The underlying lawsuits were brought by the United States and private plaintiffs against the State of Tennessee regarding the operation of its mental health system. In each case, CMRA alleged in its petition that the State of Tennessee had violated the constitutional and statutory rights of individuals who are mentally retarded and developmentally disabled. It attempted to intervene as of right and permissively in both cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and 24(b). CMRA only appeals the decisions that denied them the ability to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).

We will rely on the ample factual background provided in previous opinions in these two cases to describe the events leading up to CMRA's attempt to intervene. See United States v. State of Tennessee, 181 F.3d 105 (Table), 1999 WL 357785 (6th Cir. 1999); People First of Tenn. v. Arlington Developmental Ctr., 145 F.3d 1332 (Table), 1998 WL 246146 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. State of Tennessee, 925 F. Supp. 1292 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); People First of Tenn. v. Arlington Developmental Ctr., 878 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. Tenn. 1992).

II. ANALYSIS

CMRA contends that it was improperly denied the right to intervene in the two cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), an outsider may intervene as of right:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

The criteria that must be satisfied before intervention as of right will be granted are: (1) timeliness of the application to intervene, (2) the applicant's substantial legal interest in the case, (3) impairment of the applicant's ability to protect that interest in the absence of intervention, and (4) inadequate representation of that interest by parties already before the court.See Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997).

A district court's denial of intervention as of right is reviewed de novo, except for the timeliness element, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 1990)).

A. Timeliness

CMRA contends that now is the appropriate time to intervene and that it filed its motions timely because it learned shortly prior to bringing its motions that its interests were not being represented by the existing parties. We have identified several factors to be established in determining whether a request for intervention is timely:

(1) the point to which the suit has progressed; (2) the purpose for which intervention is sought; (3) the length of time preceding the application during which the proposed intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the original parties due to the proposed intervenor's failure, after he or she knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case, to apply promptly for intervention; and (5) the existence of unusual circumstances militating against or in favor of intervention.

Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989). "The determination of whether a motion to intervene is timely should be evaluated in the context of all relevant circumstances." Jansen, 904 F.2d at 340. We will find an abuse of discretion only when left with the "definite and firm conviction that the court ... committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors" or where it "improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard." Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

1.Stage of the Proceeding

CMRA contends that the district judges abused their discretion when they denied the motions to intervene. CMRA argues it did not become aware of its independent interest to intervene until the implementation of the settlement agreements required its members to provide community-based services to individuals without a guarantee of sufficient payment by the State of Tennessee. CMRA cites to Grubbs and Linton v. Commissioner, 870 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1989), for the proposition that intervenors can timely appeal during the remedial stages of a consent decree. See Grubbs supra; Linton, supra.

We have recently stated that the time of intervention is not the determining factor but rather that "all circumstances" must be examined to determine the substantive progress that has occurred in the litigation. See Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 475 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The propriety of intervention in any given case, however, must be measured under 'all circumstances' of that particular case.") (citing NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366, 93 S. Ct. 2591, 2603 (1973)). If the litigation has "made extensive progress in the district court before the appellants moved to intervene" then this factor weighs against intervention. Id.

In these cases, there was very little for either district judge to do when CMRA filed its petitions for intervention. InPeople First, Judge Echols had conditionally approved the initial settlement; the parties had prepared the Community Development Plan required by him. He had approved this plan, and the motion for final approval of the settlement was already pending before him. In United States v. Tennessee, Judge McCalla had approved several remedial orders to bring the mental health system into compliance with the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997) and had...

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