Williams, Jr. v. Coyle
| Decision Date | 14 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-3793,98-3793 |
| Citation | 260 F.3d 684 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2001) Lewis Williams, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ralph Coyle, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
John B. Gibbons, Cleveland, Ohio, Paul R. Donohue, LAW OFFICES OF PAUL C. DONOHUE, Westlake, Ohio, for Appellant.
Michael L. Collyer, Jon W. Oebker, Capital Crimes Section, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: KENNEDY, SUHRHEINRICH, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
MOORE, J. (pp. 37-60), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
Petitioner, Lewis Williams, Jr., was indicted and convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. After unsuccessful direct appeals and several state post-conviction proceedings, Williams filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After ruling that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (AEDPA), governed Williams's petition, the district court entered judgment dismissing the petition. The district court issued a certificate of appealability only on the question of whether Williams's petition was governed by the AEDPA. On Williams's appeal, we held that it was. See Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 1999). On his appeal of the denial of a certificate on the other issues he had raised in his petition, we issued a certificate of appealability on four issues. Those are, whether the district court erred by (1) denying Williams's request for an evidentiary hearing, (2) finding that the Ohio court's ruling on Williams's ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the law, (3) finding that the Ohio court's ruling on Williams's Bradyviolation claim as it related to the testimony of Anderson and Brooks was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the law, and (4) finding that the Ohio court's ruling on Williams's Eighth Amendment claim--that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the Ohio's death penalty statute--was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the law. In response to the Eight Amendment and Brady claims, the Warden, acting on behalf of the State, argues that Williams procedurally defaulted these by failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity. And, moreover, on the whole, Williams's claims, including the ones the Warden claims Williams defaulted, are without merit.
We agree that the district court's judgment should be affirmed. In spite of the Warden's assertions, however, we reach the merits of Williams's Eighth Amendment and Brady claims because it is unclear whether Williams procedurally defaulted them. On the issue of the evidentiary hearing, we believe Williams was in fact provided a federal evidentiary hearing, and is actually requesting a second federal evidentiary hearing. He has offered no argument to persuade us that he is entitled to a second such hearing. We reject Williams's Eighth Amendment jury instruction claim because Ohio's Supreme Court had ruled that the trial court's instruction was a correct interpretation of Ohio's death penalty statute. Likewise, we find the ineffective assistance of counsel claim without merit because Williams failed to establish that it was unreasonable for the state courts to find his trial counsel's failure to investigate and present further mitigating evidence was below the professional standards of the time. Finally, on the Brady claim, although the district court should not have applied the AEDPA's standards to that claim, it was correct to dismiss the claim as Williams failed to prove the existence of any exculpatory evidence or that the alleged evidence was material.
A general description of the factual and procedural background precedes our analysis, which will include additional background as necessary.
On February 1, 1983, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Williams for robbery, theft, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated murder with specifications in connection with the robbery and murder of Leona Chmielewski. 1 See Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 465-70. Williams pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial where he was represented by Floyd Oliver and Arthur Lambros.
At trial, the prosecution called as witnesses several of Williams's friends and relatives who were with him on the night of the murder. They testified they saw Williams standing in the doorway of Chmielewski's house as they were leaving the neighborhood. When they returned, about an hour later, they noticed that Chmielewski's door was open. Upon investigating, they discovered her body on the floor inside the doorway. At that point, they called the police. The police discovered that Chmielewski had been beaten around the head and neck and shot through the mouth. Additionally, her purse had been overturned and her wallet was missing. The police arrested Williams.
The prosecution also introduced evidence that (1) a partial shoe print on the nightgown Chmielewski was wearing at the time of her murder matched the print from the shoes Williams was wearing at the time of his arrest and (2) the jacket Williams was wearing at the time of his arrest contained a trace of lead powder, similar to that discharged from a gun. And, over Williams's objections, the prosecution called Michael Anderson and Brooks Navarro, two jail-house informants, to testify. They testified that, while in jail, Williams admitted to them he killed Chmielewski. According to Anderson, Williams told Anderson that he "stuck the gun in her mouth." Brooks testified that Williams told Brooks he was worried about the blood on his shoes. Williams attorneys cross-examined Anderson and Brooks, inquiring whether they currently had a deal with prosecution to exchange testimony for more lenient sentences or hoped the State would later consider leniency on account of their testimony. Each answered that while he did not have a deal with the prosecution, he did hope the state would remember his cooperation. Likewise, the prosecutor stated that he would likely take Anderson's and Brooks's cooperation into account. On October 7, 1983, the jury found Williams guilty of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, thereby making him eligible for the death penalty. The trial then proceeded to the sentencing stage.
At the sentencing hearing, Williams's counsel introduced mitigating evidence in the form of testimony from three witnesses--his father, his sister, and a family friend--and an unsworn oral statement from Williams. Williams's father and sister testified that Williams had a troubled childhood. The friend of the family also spoke of several events in Williams's childhood that indicated he was raised in a hostile environment. Williams made statements to a similar effect and also stated that he had been involved with the law on several occasions. Apparently counsel's strategy in introducing this evidence was to demonstrate to the jury that because of his upbringing, Williams did not have "much of a chance" in life. A fact which counsel apparently hoped would engender feelings of mercy from the jury. According to the district court, counsel was also attempting to show that the legal system had failed Williams.
At the close of the proceeding, the judge instructed the jury that under Ohio's Revised Code sections 2929.03 and .04, it could return one of three sentence recommendations--death or one of two life sentences--based upon whether it found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Any of these recommendations, the judge instructed, must be based on a unanimous decision. See J.A. at 2143-44. Williams's counsel did not object to the instruction. After deliberating, the jury recommended a sentence of death, which the court accepted. On November 10, 1983, the court entered its judgment that Williams was sentenced to death. See J.A. at 471.
Williams, represented by Oliver, appealed the judgment and sentence. On October 25, 1984, an Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v. Williams, No. 47853, 1984 WL 5289 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1984) (unpublished journal entry and opinion). Williams then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court where he was represented by Marilyn Damelio and Richard Gideon. Finding no merit, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on March 26, 1986. See State v. Williams, 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 490 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio 1986). Williams then applied for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The Court denied the application. See Williams v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 923 (1987).
Having exhausted his direct appeals, Williams turned his attention to state post-conviction proceedings for relief. In all, Williams filed five state post-conviction relief (PCR) petitions and took appeals from four of the five dismissals. Additionally, Williams filed an application for delayed reconsideration of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his case--as is required under Ohio's Murnahan rule. See State v. Murnahan, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (Ohio 1992).
Proceeding pro se, Williams filed his first petition for PCR on April 4, 1986. There, he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and what he now argues was a Brady violation. The trial court dismissed without opinion and Williams did not appeal. He filed a second PCR, related to the robbery, which was also dismissed. Again, Williams did not appeal.
Instead, represented by Robert Ingersoll, he filed his third petition for PCR on November 20, 1987. 2 In it he alleged, among other things, that he was deprived of effective counsel at the guilt and sentencing phases of his...
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