The EState Ray Belden v. Brown County
| Decision Date | 26 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 104,246.,104,246. |
| Citation | 261 P.3d 943,46 Kan.App.2d 247 |
| Parties | The ESTATE OF Jeffrey Ray BELDEN, Marie Gaston, Administratrix, and Marie Gaston, Survivor and Heir of Jeffrey Ray Belden, Appellants,v.BROWN COUNTY, Kansas; The County Commissioners of Brown County, Kansas; Lamar Shoemaker, Individually and as Sheriff of Brown County, Kansas; Brett Hollister; and Brandon Roberts, Appellees. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
1. Res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be pled in a defendant's answer. A defendant failing to assert an affirmative defense waives it.
2. A district court raising an affirmative defense on its own initiative commits error by doing so.
3. Judicial estoppel precludes a party from taking one position in a case to induce the court to act in a certain way and then taking a contrary or conflicting position in a related proceeding involving the same opposing parties. The doctrine generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.
4. Judicial estoppel operates not only within a single suit; it applies to positions taken in related proceedings.
5. Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion binds a party to a factual determination made in a case as an integral part of a judgment when the same issue comes up in a successive suit involving the same litigants. Collateral estoppel essentially recognizes that once a court has determined a material factual issue, a party may not secure a new determination contrary to that finding in later litigation.
6. When a party argues or offers evidence on an affirmative defense without objection from the opposing party that the defense had not been pled, the court may consider the defense.
7. Actionable negligence requires a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, harm to the plaintiff, and a causal connection between the breach and the harm.
8. A county maintaining a jail owes a duty of care to the inmates housed there. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1964) provides a sound, measured duty appropriate to that legal relationship.
9. Jails and other penal institutions stand in a special relationship with the persons they detain as outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A. And having taken legal custody of those prisoners in a manner that deprives them of normal opportunities for protection, such an institution is under a duty to take reasonable action to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm.
10. The duty a penal facility owes inmates includes taking steps to protect a self-destructive inmate from acting on those impulses. Facility employees are obligated to intervene if they know or have reason to know an inmate is endangered. Their actions need not exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances.
11. Under the reasonableness standard, penal institutions are not guarantors of their charges' safety or wellbeing. Liability is not strictly imposed for harm.
12. The contours of a duty, especially one shaped by reasonableness, must be cast to the particular circumstances of the case. But various considerations may inform that determination. There may be applicable statutes or regulations establishing a duty of care. Common practices or standards within an industry often bear on the scope of a duty owed. An entity's own policies and procedures may help measure compliance with a duty.
13. Whether a duty has been breached presents a question of fact and, therefore, typically is unsuited for summary disposition rather than submission to a jury. Causation—the connection between the breach and the injury—similarly is a question of fact usually reserved for the jury. Nonetheless in the absence of evidence establishing any basis for a reasonable jury to find for a plaintiff on breach of duty or causation, a court may grant summary judgment for a defendant.
14. Negligent hiring and retention derive from the same sort of employer conduct: either hiring an individual knowing he or she has characteristics that present an undue risk of harm to others given the nature of the job duties or retaining such an individual after learning of such characteristics.
15. Negligent supervision entails either inadequate oversight and review of an employee in the performance of his or her job duties or failing to control an employee with propensities that might pose a danger.
16. A claim based on negligent training depends upon establishing facts showing that more or better training would have prevented the harm.
17. While experts may offer opinions on ultimate issues in a case, they cannot properly provide legal conclusions. An expert witness may not express opinions in terms of the legal standard of care. Expert testimony in that form invades the province of the court to discern the governing law and to instruct the jury accordingly.
18. Affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to summary judgment must set forth evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial. It would be both contrary to statutory summary judgment procedures and nonsensical to suggest an affidavit could be used to defeat summary judgment by presenting opinion evidence that would be inadmissible in the trial of the case.
19. Immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75–6101 et seq. , for the provision of police and fire protection is considered and applied.
20. Immunities under the Kansas Tort Claims Act for performance of discretionary functions and for adoption or enforcement of policies protecting a person's health and safety are considered and applied.
21. Defense preclusion is a component of res judicata prohibiting a defendant from asserting a defense that was or could have been raised in past litigation. Defense preclusion is applicable in the same circumstances in which res judicata would prohibit a plaintiff from asserting a claim that was or could have been presented in past litigation.
22. Under the circumstances of this case and consistent with the doctrine of res judicata as applied in Kansas, a defendant may not assert a statute of limitations defense in this case because he raised the defense in an earlier federal court suit terminating in a judgment on the merits on various federal claims involving the same factual circumstances and the same litigants.
Robert R. Laing, Jr., of Kansas City, for appellants.Carolyn L. Matthews, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Wichita, and Wendell F. Cowan, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Overland Park, for appellees.Before GREENE, C.J., HILL and ATCHESON, JJ.ATCHESON, J.
On August 14, 2002, Jeffrey Ray Belden died by his own hand while in custody at the Brown County jail. Belden had been held there for about 7 weeks awaiting trial. He was 21 years old. Over the past decade, Belden's heirs and his estate, suing through Belden's mother Marie Gaston, have pursued civil litigation against Brown County, the county sheriff, and several jail employees on the basis they failed to take legally required precautions that would have prevented the suicide. The litigation started in federal court and asserted federal constitutional and state tort claims. After the constitutional claims were thrown out, the federal court dismissed the state law claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Belden's heirs and estate filed this case in Brown County reasserting the state claims. They sued Brown County through its board of commissioners, individual commissioners, Brown County Sheriff Lamar Shoemaker, Sheriff's Sgt. Brett Hollister, and Deputy Brandon Roberts. They alleged: a breach of the duty of care owed Belden as a pretrial detainee based on the events immediately preceding his suicide; legally inadequate jail facilities and procedures; and negligent hiring, training, and supervision of jail personnel.
On February 17, 2010, the Brown County District Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of those claims. Without a request from Defendants, the district court found that res judicata, based on the federal suit, required dismissal. The court erred. The district court also found that collateral estoppel applying particular factual findings in the federal litigation barred the state claims. That ruling was correct as to any liability theory dependent upon Defendants' actual knowledge that Belden was suicidal but erroneous as to those theories premised on grounds that Defendants should have known or were otherwise negligent. Finally, the district court alternatively ruled that the undisputed facts failed to support any basis for imposing tort liability on Defendants. The trial court erred in that determination on the breach of duty claim. The record contains disputed material facts that if resolved in favor of Belden's estate and heirs would allow a jury to return a verdict for them on that theory against Sgt. Hollister and Deputy Roberts. Brown County would be liable as a matter of law for a judgment entered on such a verdict.
We, therefore, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Given the duration of this litigation in two forums, the paper trail is a long one. The parties have walked that trail and know it well. In this opinion, we do not intend to detail in full the facts surrounding Belden's death or the history of the resulting legal proceedings. Rather, we will recite only those portions of the facts and the history salient to the determination that summary judgment should not have been granted on all claims. The parties will find the narrative of the underlying facts abbreviated. At the same time, the legal proceedings in both federal and state court and their interplay figure substantially in how the res judicata and collateral estoppel issues shake out. We devote more attention to the history of the litigation than might be typical in an appellate decision.
Belden was booked into the Brown County jail...
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