Caraballo Seda v. Javier Rivera, Civ. No. 01-1446(JAG).

Citation261 F.Supp.2d 76
Decision Date09 May 2003
Docket NumberCiv. No. 01-1446(JAG).
PartiesErick CARABALLO SEDA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Francisco JAVIER RIVERA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Pablo Landrau-Pirazzi, Ivan M. Castro-Ortiz, Eliezer Aldarondo-Ortiz, Claudio Aliff-Ortiz, Aldarondo & Lopez Bras, Hato Rey, PR, for plaintiffs.

Johanna M. Emmanuelli-Huertas, Pedro Ortiz Alvarez Law Offices, Ponce, PR, Jacqueline N. Font-Guzman, Grisselle Gonzalez-Negron, Faccio & Pabon Roca, San Juan, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GREGORY, District Judge.

On December 20, 2001, plaintiffs employees of the Southwestern Consortium1 ("the Consortium"), brought suit against Francisco Javier Rivera, Mayor of the Municipality of Hormigueros and President of the Consortium's Board of Mayors ("the Board"); the Municipality of Hormigueros; Isidro Negron, Mayor of the Municipality of San German and Member of the Board; the Municipality of San German; Juan Crespo, the Consortium's Human Resources Manager; Rafael A. Montalvo Vazquez, the Consortium's Executive Director; and the Consortium (collectively "defendants"), alleging political discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, deprivations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights, and supplemental state law claims. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), arguing that the Workforce Investment Act ("WIA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2945, provides an exclusive administrative procedure for discrimination claims precluding plaintiffs § 1983 claim. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies defendants motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Consortium is a non-profit partnership between several municipalities, namely Hormigueros, San German, Maricao, Cabo Rojo, Sabana Grande, Guanica, Yauco, Guayanilla, Lajas and Penuelas. (Docket No. 45 at 4.) Following the Puerto Rico general elections on November 7, 2000, Popular Democratic Party ("PDP") mayoral candidates were elected to the municipalities of Hormigueros, San German, Sabana Grande, Guanica, Guayanilla, Lajas, and Penuelas. (Id. at 6.) In Maricao and Cabo Rojo, the New Progressive Party ("NPP") incumbent mayor was reelected, and in Yauco the NPP candidate won the elections. (Id.) As a result of the change in power in the various municipalities, PDP affiliates controlled the Board. (Id.) The newly elected PDP mayor of Hormigueros, Francisco Javier Rivera, became president of the Board. (Id.) Soon after becoming president, he dismissed the incumbent Executive Director and appointed Rafael Montalvo Vazquez. (Id. at 7.) Following these events, particularly since January 26, 2001 and until September 30, 2001, defendants discharged or did not renew plaintiffs' contracts with the Consortium. (Id. at 8-24.)

On December 20, 2001, plaintiffs brought suit arguing that the defendants' sole purpose in those personnel decisions was to politically discriminate against them in violation of the First Amendment and of Puerto Rico Law. (Id. at 26.) They further argue that the defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.) Plaintiffs claim defendants violated § 2938(a)(2) of the WIA. (Id. at 8.)

On August 21, 2002, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the WIA's administrative procedure provides exclusive remedies for discrimination claims. (Docket No. 96.) Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the WIA's statutory language does not expressly preclude a § 1983 claim, nor does it imply congressional intent to do so. (Docket No. 99.)

DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review of a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant can assert that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action. When deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the Court "may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as the depositions and exhibits submitted...." See Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir.1996).

Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) are subject to the same standard of review. Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1994); see Torres Maysonet v. Drillex, S.E., 229 F.Supp.2d 105, 107 (D.P.R.2002). Dismissal is proper pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim only if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory." Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.1990)). The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. See Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 51; Torres Maysonet, 229 F.Supp.2d at 107. The Court need not credit, however, "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like" when evaluating the Complaint's allegations. See Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996).

When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Plaintiffs are responsible for putting their best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support their claim. Id. at 23 (citing Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiffs must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." See Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988).

When the Court determines that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, "it must dismiss the case and not make any determination on the merits of the same." Faura Cirino v. U.S., 210 F.Supp.2d 46, 50 (D.P.R.2002).

B. Section 1983 claim

To prevail in a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived them of their federal constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities. See, e.g., Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.1996). It is well-established that political discrimination restrains freedom of belief and association, core activities protected by the First Amendment. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 354, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Padilla-Garcia v. Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2000).

The inquiry of whether plaintiffs rights are enforceable under § 1983 centers on congressional intent. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). Congress can foreclose a remedy under § 1983 either by forbidding it expressly in the statute itself, or "impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983". Id. (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994)). In this context, there is a strong presumption that Congress intended to allow such suits and the burden of establishing the contrary rests on the defendants. Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65, 70, n. 5 (1st Cir.1992). See Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 721 (5th Cir.1987). Likewise, plaintiffs ordinarily need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing a suit under § 1983. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Unless statutorily mandated, "application of the exhaustion doctrine is not a jurisdictional requirement, but within the discretion of the district court". Accion Social de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Viera Perez, 831 F.2d 365, 369 (1st Cir.1987)(internal citations omitted.) Whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required prior to bringing a § 1983 suit should be answered by reference to congressional intent. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).

C. Foreclosure of a § 1983 claim in the WIA and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
1. Express foreclosure

The first part of our inquiry is whether Congress foreclosed recourse to § 1983 in the WIA statute itself. Stowell, 976 F.2d at 67. Defendants claim that § 2938(a)(2) of the statute provides the remedial scheme for discrimination by programs operating under the WIA. (Docket No. 96 at 2.)

a. The WIA statute

Section § 2938(a)(2) provides that no individual shall be subjected to discrimination due to his or her political affiliation or belief. This provision, however, does not specify any grievance procedures to be followed nor does it state that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing suit under § 1983.

Defendants argue that the authority given to the Secretary to issue regulations pursuant to § 2938(e) evinces congress' intent to foreclose a § 1983 cause of action for non-discrimination claims. (Docket No. 92 at 7.) They contend that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted because § 2938(e) requires that the regulations adopted ensure that complaints "are processed in a manner that avoids duplication of effort." 29 U.S.C. § 2938(e). (Docket No. 92 at 2; Docket No. 112 at 2.) The only way to avoid such a duplication in a political discrimination case, they argue, is to give the Civil Rights Center ("CRC"), an office within the Department of Labor created under WIA, sole jurisdiction and require the exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Docket No. 112 at 2-3.) Section 2938(e) establishes that the regulations "should adopt standards for determining discrimination and procedures for enforcement", yet it does not state that the administrative procedures must be exhausted nor that these procedures are the exclusive remedy available to § 2938 complainants.

Defendants further contend that § 2938's lack of specific language with regards to other remedies available to complainant, such as that present in other ...

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