Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 28 February 1933
• Citation: 184 N.E. 735,261 N.Y. 134
• Parties: JACKSON v. STATE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

261 N.Y. 134

184 N.E. 735

JACKSON

v.STATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 28, 1933.

Action by Arthur P. Jackson against the State. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (235 App. Div. 273, 257 N. Y. S. 308), reversing as matter of law a judgment of the Court of Claims for plaintiff, he appeals.

Reversed, and judgment of the Court of Claims affirmed.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Charles L. Earl, of Herkimer, for appellant.

John J. Bennett, Jr., Atty. Gen. (Harold P. Burke, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for the State.

O'BRIEN, Judge.

West Canada creek forms part of the boundary between Oneida and Herkimer counties, and its waters are spanned by the Comstock bridge which divides sections of a state highway traversing territory in these counties. Pursuant to section 19-a of the Highway Law (Consol. Laws, c. 25), the state superintendent of public works condemned the bridge as unsafe for travel by vehicles weighing more than four and a half tons and propelled at a rate of speed in excess of ten miles per hour. Notice to that effect was posted by his order, and under the statute the state thus assumed the obligation to supervise the maintenance of the bridge. During the time that the state was responsible for this maintenance, and while claimant was driving a car which with its occupants weighed less than four and a half tons and which was proceeding at a rate of speed less than ten miles per hour, the bridge collapsed, and plaintiff and the other passengers were injured. The Court of Claims and the Appellate Division have unanimously found on sufficient evidence that claimant's injuries were caused without negligence by him and by the sole negligence of employees of the state.

After the bridge was condemned and the notice was posted, no obligation to supervise its maintenance rested upon either county or upon either of the adjoining towns. Burrill v. Town of Russia, 230 App. Div. 774, 243 N. Y. S. 916, affirmed 261 N. Y. --, -- N. E. --. By section 19-a of the Highway Law, that duty devolved upon the state, but neither that section nor section 176 of the Highway Law confers upon the injured person any right to enforce his claim. Not until the bridge should be repaired would it become, by virtue of section 19-a, subdivision 6, a part of the highway for defects in which the state by section 176 assumes liability.

The question remains whether the Legislature intended by section 12-a of the Court of Claims Act, as added by chapter 467 of the Laws of 1929, to include this claim and others of a similar nature. It reads: ‘The state hereby waives its immunity from liability for the torts of its officers and employees and consents to have its liability for such torts determined in accordance with the same rules of law as apply to an action in the supreme court against an individual or a corporation, and the state hereby assumes liability for such acts, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the court of claims to hear and determine all claims against the state to recover damages for injuries to property or for personal injury caused by the misfeasance or negligence of the officers or employees of the state while acting as such officer or empyoyee. * * *’ The state thus provides for four things which shall result from the infliction of personal injuries due to the negligence of its officers and employees while acting as such officers or employees. It waives immunity from liability, it consents to have its liability determined in accordance with the rules of law applicable to individuals, it assumes liability, and it confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine such claims of liability. The provisions of section 12 of the Court of Claims Act (Laws of 1920, c. 922, formerly Code Civ. Proc. § 264) must, in view of the decisions, be deemed too narrow to cover claims of this character, but by section 12-a (as added by Laws of 1929, c. 467) those provisions must be regarded as extended, supplemented, and enlarged. The deficiencies pointed out in Smith v. State, 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841, 13 A. L. R. 1264, have been supplied. Section 12-a goes beyond the point of a mere waiver of immunity from suit. It waives immunity not only from suit, but also from liability. It is the positive and specific enactment, clearly expressed, which was suggested by Smith v. State, supra. By section 12, the defense of sovereignty in an action was removed. Suit was allowed, but liability was held not to have been waived. By section 12-a, liability, when proved by the rules of law applicable to individuals, has been affirmatively assumed and jurisdiction to determine whether such a liability has been proved is conferred upon the Court of Claims. In the assumption of liability and the creation of a remedy to enforce a liability, heretofore absent by reason of the sovereignty of the tort-feasor, the sovereign has not generously dispensed charity. Section 12-a constitutes a recognition and acknowledgment of a moral duty demanded by the principles of equity and justice. It includes only claims which appear to the judicial mind and conscience to be such as the Legislature may declare to be affected by a moral obligation and which the state should satisfy. Farrington v. State, 248 N. Y. 112, 115, 161 N. E. 438. It declares that no longer will the state use the...