Green v. Jones

• Decision Date: 28 April 1924
• Docket Number: 342
• Parties: GREEN v. JONES
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

261 S.W. 43

164 Ark. 118

GREEN v. JONES

No. 342

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 28, 1924

Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; John E. Martineau, Chancellor reversed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

W. E Green and others brought this suit in equity against J Walker Jones and others to restrain them from hiring out and leasing the convicts now confined in the penitentiary, and under the control of the defendants as a Board of Commissioners for the management of the State Penitentiary.

According to the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiffs are residents, citizens, and taxpayers of different counties in the State of Arkansas, and the defendants constitute the members of the Board of Penitentiary Commissioners and the clerk thereof. The complaint also alleges that the board, in violation of law, has entered into contracts with different persons for the hire and lease of convicts sentenced to confinement in the State Penitentiary.

It is also specifically alleged that the board had hired out and leased a great number of convicts to a corporation constructing a dam known as the Remmel Dam, located in Hot Spring County, Arkansas, and that the convicts have, for many months prior to the bringing of this suit, been employed by said corporation in the construction of said dam. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are without legal remedy in the premises, and that the hiring and leasing of said convicts is in violation of our statutes regulating and prescribing the methods of keeping and working convicts sentenced to confinement in the State Penitentiary.

A demurrer was first interposed to the complaint. Subsequently an answer was filed by the defendants in which they claimed that they had a right to lease the convicts to the corporation in question, and a copy of the lease contract was made an exhibit to the answer. Proof was taken to establish the allegations of the complaint and the averments of the answer.

The chancellor was of the opinion that the plaintiffs had no such interest in the matters complained of as to entitle them to maintain this action, and it was decreed that the complaint be dismissed for want of equity.

To reverse that decree the plaintiffs have duly prosecuted an appeal to this court.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

Webb Covington, for appellant.

Taxpayers have the right to resort to a court of equity to prevent a misapplication of public funds, such right being based upon the fact that they are equitable owners of such funds, and their liability to replace the funds in the public treasury to cover the deficiency which would be caused by the misapplication. 32 C. J. § 425; 101 U.S. 601; 89 Cal 215; 65 Colo. 443; 34 Conn. 105; 270 Ill. 304; 124 Ill. 123; 13 Ill. 336; 177 Ill. 97; 177 Ill. 194; 208 Ill. 328; 266 Ill. 443; 46 Ind. 96; 32 Ind. 244; 88 Ia. 579; 166 Mass. 347; 13 Mich. 540; 65 Minn. 176; 37 Mo. 250; 52 Mont. 378; 175 N.Y. 432; 85 Ark. 89; 123 Ark. 255. It is a violation of law to permit the convicts to be worked at places other than those mentioned in the statute. Crawford & Moses' Digest § 9693. The board has no discretion in the matter. The bringing of such a suit as this is not a suit against the State. 91 Ark. 537. The contention that the right to injunctive relief must be grounded upon financial injury is without merit. Citizens have a right to demand that officers obey the law, and, in case of an infraction, any citizen may invoke the help of the courts. 205 U.S. 230; 180, U.S. 208; 185 U.S. 125; 239 U.S. 121. The Attorney General having failed to act, plaintiffs have the right to maintain the suit.

J. S. Utley, Attorney General, John L. Carter and Wm. T. Hammock, Assistants, for appellee.

Appellants have no legal capacity to sue. Crawford & Moses' Digest, §§ 1089, 1095. They do not fall within the exceptions to the requirements of these statutes as set out in §§ 1091, 1092 and 1094, C. & M. Digest. See also 25 Ark. 304 and 41 Ark. 526. The chancery court had no jurisdiction, unless plaintiffs show an individual or property right personal to them as being trespassed, and that they have no remedy at law. See 43 Ark. 62; 82 Ark. 236; 93 Ark. 7. An injunction shall not be granted where plaintiff has a full, adequate and complete remedy at law. 20 Ark. 340; 48 Ark. 510; 92 Ark. 118. Plaintiffs' action was in a court of law. The action of plaintiffs is an attempt to control the discretion of the board, which may not be done, except it interferes with some individual right. 28 Ark. 455. A chancery court has no jurisdiction to restrain acts simply because they are criminal, where they do not injure or invade any property or civil right of the public. 81 Ark. 117; 85 Ark. 230; 98 Ark. 437; 98 Ark. 521; 99 Ark. 636.

OPINION

HART, J., (after stating the facts).

It may be stated at the outset that a State Penitentiary is necessarily a State institution, and that taxation for the support and maintenance of it may be levied upon the property situated within the State. The Legislature has full power to pass statutes relative to the custody, care and control of persons convicted of crime. Our Legislature has created a Penitentiary Commission and vested it with authority to manage and control convicts sentenced to the State Penitentiary under the provisions and regulations prescribed by the statute. Crawford & Moses' Digest, chapter 164, subdivision 13, and General Acts of 1921, p. 50.

The chancery court held that the plaintiffs had no legal capacity to bring the suit, and, on this account, dismissed their complaint for want of equity. This holding was based upon the opinion of the chancellor that the plaintiffs had no such special interest in the matter as would entitle them to bring the suit.

We think the learned chancellor erred in so holding. Section 13 of article 16 of the Constitution of 1874 provides that any citizen of any county may institute a suit in behalf of himself and all others interested to protect the inhabitants thereof against the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever. Under this section this court has uniformly upheld the jurisdiction of chancery courts, upon the application of citizens and taxpayers, to enjoin the collection of illegal taxes levied on their property.

As we have already seen, the Legislature has created the Penitentiary Commission and intrusted it with the duty of controlling and managing convicts sentenced to the State Penitentiary, and also of operating the State prison under the regulations prescribed by statute. Such a commission is merely an administrative board created by the State for carrying into effect the public policy of the State with regard to the management of its convicts as expressed by its legislation. The control and management of the State convicts and the operation of the State prison necessarily involves the expenditure of large sums of money, which can only be obtained by taxes levied upon the property situated in the State, or by profits derived from working the convicts in some way. The management and operation of the State Penitentiary may be wrongfully administered by the officers intrusted with its management, so as to make such administration an illegal burden and exaction upon the taxpayers of the State. The public policy of the State is to be determined from the acts of the Legislature regulating the management of the penitentiary; and if those intrusted herewith should violate the statutes designed to regulate their conduct in the premises, it will be readily seen that illegal taxation may be the result of such mismanagement and violation of the statute. The question is, not so much what has been done, as what can be done in the premises.

Each citizen and taxpayer has an interest, where his pecuniary or property rights are involved, in seeing that no administrative board like the one now under consideration shall discharge its duties in a manner violative of the statute creating it, and specifically defining the duties that it may perform as well as the things which it shall not do. This holding conforms to our previous decisions on the principles of law involved. Russell v. Tate, 52 Ark. 541, 13 S.W. 130; Griffin v. Rhoton, 85 Ark. 89, 107 S.W. 380, and Farrell v. Oliver, 146 Ark. 599, 226 S.W. 529.

In the first mentioned case it was held that the taxpayers of a town may maintain a suit in equity to prevent the misapplication of its funds, and that a chancery court has power in such a case to grant affirmative as well as injunctive relief.

In the second case cited the court held that a citizen and...