Baltimore Co v. United States

Decision Date09 April 1923
Docket NumberNo. 305,305
Citation43 S.Ct. 425,261 U.S. 592,67 L.Ed. 816,58 Ct.Cl. 709
PartiesBALTIMORE & O. R. CO. v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. John F. McCarron and Geo. E. Hamilton, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Mr. Justice SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Railway Company filed its petition, under the Dent Act (March 2, 1919, c. 94, 40 Stat. 1272 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115 14/15 a-3115 14/15 e]), to recover compensation for constructing temporary barracks for the use of United States troops under an 'implied agreement' alleged to have been entered into by it with the United States, in December, 1917, through Col. Kimball, Expeditionary Quartermaster of the War Department, at Locust Point, Baltimore, Maryland, acting under the authority of the Secretary of War. The Court of Claims, after a hearing on the merits, and upon its findings of fact, dismissed the petition (57 Ct. Cl. 140).

The material facts shown by the findings are these: The Railroad Company owned at Locust Point, a suburb of Baltimore, eight piers, which were guarded by its civilian employes. At the request of Col. Kimball, who was in charge of the expeditionary depot at Baltimore and of the supplies arriving for shipment to Europe, the company, in October, 1917, leased one of these piers to the Government. Two of the other piers with much other property belonging to the company were destroyed or damaged by a fire supposed to be of incendiary origin. Thereupon Col. Kimball and the president of the company separately requested the Secretary of War to send a guard; the vice president of the company offering to supply a wrecking train as quarters for them. Two companies of the National Guard were sent to Locust Point, with sufficient tentage. They were quartered for a time in the wrecking train furnished by the company. Their duty was primarily to protect the government property and the piers leased by it, sending patrols throughout the railroad yard to guard cars containing its property, and generally to guard all the piers and property at Locust Point. The company, however, also maintained the civilian guards and a fire department for all of its property, whether leased or not. Later, the wrecking train having been moved away by the company, the troops moved into tents. The weather during the fall and winter was very cold and inclement. Most of the soldiers were Baltimoreans and were frequently visited by their relatives. There was some sickness among them. Their relatives complained to the railroad officials of hardships they had to undergo in the tents; and these officials were anxious to make them as comfortable as possible. Several times in very cold weather Col. Kimball remarked to the company's agent at Locust Point, whose duty it was to confer with him on railroad matters, that the troops ought to have better quarters. On one occasion this agent suggested fitting up an unused transfer shed belonging to the company, standing near the pier that had been leased to the Government. Col. Kimball agreed that it would be a fine thing to make the men as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, ask that this work be done; and nothing was said about compensation. This agent having taken up with the company's officials the matter of fitting up the transfer shed, its chief engineering draftsman was directed to see as to the adaptability of the transfer shed for barracks. He made blue print plans for remodeling the shed; which he showed to the officer in command of the troops, to learn whether, in his opinion, they would satisfactorily house the troops. This officer, which not undertaking to approve the plans, suggested the amount of facilities that would be required. Nothing was said to him, however, about expense or compensation for the work. The construction of the temporary barracks was completed in the latter part of December; and the troops moved in. Two more piers were afterwards leased by the company to the Government. The barracks were occupied by the troops until May, 1919 and the piers were returned to the company in June, 1919. No government officials connected with the work at Locust Point had any authority to order the construction of the temporary barracks; and no orders were given by any of them for such construction. The subject of compensation was not mentioned in any conversations between these officers and the railroad officials until more than a week after the barracks had been completed, when the chief draftsman told the officer in command of the troops that he thought the Government should reimburse him for some of his trouble.

The Court of Claims made no finding as to the amount expended by the company in constructing the temporary barracks; the company having, as the court stated, submitted no evidence to establish the different items of its claim. In the absence o a finding as to the amount of the expenditures, as to which the company had the burden of proof, the judgment of the Court of Claims might be properly affirmed upon that ground. Crocker v. United States, 240 U. S. 74, 82, 36 Sup. Ct. 245, 60 L. Ed. 533. However, as the Government does not here question the amount of the claim, we pass to its further consideration upon the merits.

Upon the findings of fact we conclude that the petition was rightly dismissed, without reference to the amount of the claim, for two reasons:

1. The Dent Act authorizes the award of compensation for expenditures connected with the prosecution of the war when they were made by the claimant upon the faith of an 'agreement, express or implied,' entered into by him with an officer or agent acting under the authority of the Secretary of War or of the President, and such agreement was not executed in the manner provided by law. 40 Stat. 1272, 1273; American Smelting Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 75, 79, 42 Sup. Ct. 420, 66 L. Ed. 833. The act was intended to remedy irregularities and informalities in the mode of entering into such agreements; not to enlarge the authority of the agents by whom they were made. To entitle the claimant to compensation under such an agreement it is essential that the officer or agent with whom it was entered into should not merely have been holding under the Secretary of War or the President, but that he should have been acting within the scope of his authority. It was not intended, for example, that an officer in one branch of the military service or one of inferior rank could bind the Government by an agreement as to matters relating to an entirely different branch of the service or within the control of his superior officers, as to which he had no authority whatever; or that an agreement into which he entered, although beyond his authority, should become binding upon the Government because it was made in the form of an express agreement not executed within the legal manner or of an implied agreement merely—that is, that his authority should be enlarged by the irregularity or...

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