USA. v. Parker, 01-4109

Citation262 F.3d 415
Decision Date04 June 2001
Docket NumberNo. 01-4109,01-4109
Parties(4th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KYMBERLI PARKER, Defendant-Appellant. Argued:
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.

(CR-00-374-DKC)

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Widener wrote the opinion, in which Judge Traxler and Judge Gregory joined. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] COUNSEL ARGUED: Sean Robert Day, College Park, Maryland, for Appellant. James Marton Trusty, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stephen M. Schenning, United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

On November 8, 2000, Kymberli Parker was convicted by a jury on a single count of knowingly providing ammunition to a convicted felon, her brother Tracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 922(d)(1). She now appeals, raising several issues. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we affirm.

I.

On March 8, 2000, ATF agents observed Kymberli Parker, age 23, make a purchase at the Realco Gun Shop in Forestville, Maryland, return to her automobile, and speak on a cell-telephone. The agents were conducting a surveillance of the store in an effort to prevent guns and ammunition purchased in that State from being taken into Washington, D.C. ATF agents next observed a meeting of Kymberli and Tracy at which Kymberli transferred to her brother the merchandise from the store, and he paid her for it. When agents then attempted to stop Tracy Parker's vehicle, he resisted, assaulted an agent, and was shot before he was arrested. After Tracy Parker was arrested, the agents searched his vehicle and found the 50 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition purchased for him by his sister.

Early the next day, because the vehicle observed at the gun store was registered to Kymberli Parker, six or seven ATF agents went to her home some time around 5:30 a.m. in order to question her and to look for evidence. They did not have a warrant. Shortly after the agents arrived, Parker's grandmother came out of the house on her way to work. Believing the grandmother to be Kymberli, ATF agents ordered her from her car, apparently at gunpoint, and handcuffed her. The agents assert, and the district court found, that Kymberli's grandmother consented to the agents' request that they be admitted to the house. The grandmother denied this and maintained that agents took her keys without her consent. The district court also credited the testimony of Kymberli's grandfather, who testified that he met the agents at the open front door of his house and admitted them at their request.

The officers then gathered at the kitchen table with the grandfather and Kymberli's aunt, who also lived at the home. Kymberli's grandfather eventually signed a form consenting to a search of his residence. Although the agents denied it, Kymberli's grandfather testified at a suppression hearing and at trial that he signed only after ATF agents said that if he refused they would get a warrant, bring in their dogs, and tear up the house. A search of the family's home and automobiles revealed no contraband.

Shortly after the agents entered the house, they asked to see Kymberli, who was then in her bedroom in the home's basement, having earlier been awakened and upset by a telephone call from her mother explaining that her brother had been shot. Kymberli was clothed in a nightshirt and put on a robe before joining the agents and her grandfather and aunt in the kitchen. Additional agents and sheriff's deputies entered and left the house at different times. The grandmother was eventually taken out of handcuffs and readmitted to the home.

After 20 minutes or so in the kitchen, the agents asked to speak with Kymberli privately, and her aunt pointed out to the agents a bedroom for this purpose. The district court found that two agents escorted Parker to the room. The door to the room was closed or nearly closed during the interview, which lasted approximately 30 minutes. One agent sat on a chair, and at least one agent stood against a wall of the 9' x 11' room, while Kymberli sat on the bed. During the interview, Kymberli's aunt entered the room twice to speak briefly to her, and Kymberli did not leave the room or request to do the same. An agent, testifying at the suppression hearing, said that had Kymberli attempted to do so, she would not have been allowed to leave the house, but would have been allowed to leave the bedroom. Parker was not handcuffed, and at some point during the interview she apparently was informed that she was not under arrest. It is undisputed that Parker was not given a Miranda warning. Eventually, an agent wrote out a statement, which Parker reviewed and signed, in which she confessed to the elements of the crime of knowingly providing ammunition to a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(d)(1), a crime for which she was indicted on July 31, 2000.1

On September 28, 2000, the district court held a hearing on Parker's motion to suppress her statements. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district court ruled that because the events took place outside of Kymberli's presence, and it was not shown that she knew of the events at the time she confessed, evidence about how the agents came to be admitted into the house was irrelevant to the statements Parker challenged, and this evidence was not allowed in evidence at trial. The district court also found that the agents had consent to enter and to search the home. Finally, the district court found that although Parker was not given a Miranda warning, she was not entitled to a Miranda warning because she was neither under arrest nor in custody to the extent that a Miranda warning was necessary.

Parker's two-day jury trial began on November 7, 2000. Kymberli, who had completed two years of college, admitted twice visiting her brother when he was incarcerated but denied ever knowing what crime he had been convicted of. She was convicted on a single count of the unlawful sale or transfer of ammunition to a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(d)(1).

II.
A.

We first consider this appeal of the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. Miss Parker argues that she was in custody for Miranda purposes during her interview with ATF agents, and, because the warnings were not given, her statements should have been suppressed.

We review the district court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress for clear error. United States v. Rusher , 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions on a motion to suppress. United States v. Rusher , 966 F.2d at 873.

In order to protect the right granted by the Fifth Amendment that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," U.S. Const. amend. V, the Supreme Court in Miranda adopted prophylactic procedural rules that must be followed during custodial interrogations. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). In general, any statements elicited from a suspect in violation of these rules are inadmissible in the prosecution's case-inchief. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam). Absent formal arrest, Miranda warnings only apply "where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody.'" Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). An individual is in custody for Miranda purposes when, under the totality of the circumstances, "a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a `degree associated with formal arrest.'" Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).

The facts in this case do not demonstrate that Parker's freedom of action was curtailed to such a degree. The district court found that Parker was told she was not under arrest. She was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and the agents did not draw their weapons in her presence. She was also in her own home during the questioning, and one of her relatives, at the relative's request, entered the interview room on two occasions during the questioning. She was not forced to enter the room with the officers, and she was never told that she was not free to leave.

The fact that one of the agents testified at the suppression hearing that they likely would have arrested Parker had she attempted to end the interview and leave the house does not successfully undercut the holding of the district court that Parker was not under the functional equivalent of arrest during questioning. Custody determinations do not depend on the subjective views of either the interrogating law enforcement officers or of the person being questioned, but depend instead the objective circumstances of the interrogation. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. at 323. The agent's unarticulated views at the time Parker was being questioned is of little weight. The relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man would have understood the suspect's position at the time. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 442. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err when it declined to suppress Parker's statements for failure to administer Miranda warnings.

B.

Parker next maintains that the district court committed reversible error when it ruled inadmissible evidence that agents handcuffed her grandmother in the home's driveway after the agents had apparently pointed their guns at her. Parker also maintains that the jury should have been able to hear her grandmother's testimony that agents, without consent, took her house keys for the purpose of breaking into the house. Parker argues this information would have been relevant, under Fed. R. Evid. 401, to the voluntariness of her confession in that it would...

To continue reading

Request your trial
64 cases
  • U.S. v. Uzenski
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • January 13, 2006
    ...a district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo on a motion to suppress. United States v. Parker, 262 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.2001). Moreover, the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing party below. Unite......
  • United States v. Giddins
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • June 6, 2017
    ...a degree associated with formal arrest.’ " United States v. Hashime , 734 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Parker , 262 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2001) ) (further internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). It is an objective inquiry, and essentially asks "whethe......
  • USA v. HARGROVE
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • November 19, 2010
    ...is obtained during a custodial interrogation and without first advising the accused of his Fifth Amendment rights); United States v. Parker, 262 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.2001) (“Absent formal arrest, Miranda warnings only apply where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as ......
  • United States v. Tangtong, Criminal No. 7:18-cr-0002
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • November 27, 2018
    ...custody of their Fifth Amendment rights prior to interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); United States v. Parker, 262 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2001). The threshold issue the court must determine is relatively straightforward - whether the interview of Tangtong in his......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT