Carrigan v. California State Legislature, 16189.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1959
• Docket Number: No. 16189.,16189.
• Citation: 263 F.2d 560
• Parties: Mrs. Grace CARRIGAN, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE; Industrial Accident Commission of The State of California; Zenith National Insurance Company; and Dr. F. K. Amerongen, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

263 F.2d 560 (1959)

Mrs. Grace CARRIGAN, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE; Industrial Accident Commission of The State of California; Zenith National Insurance Company; and Dr. F. K. Amerongen, Appellees.

No. 16189.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

January 28, 1959.

Certiorari Denied April 27, 1959.

Grace Carrigan, Sunland, Cal., appellant, in pro. per.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Bonnie Lee Hansen, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of Cal., for Cal. State Legislature & Industrial Accident Commission.

Hassen & Chernow, Alex S. Chernow, Los Angeles, Cal., for Zenith Ins. Co. Overton, Lyman & Prince, Carl J. Schuck, Lawrence J. Larson, Ried Bridges, Los Angeles, Cal., for Dr. F. K. Amerongen.

Before BARNES, HAMLIN and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied April 27, 1959. See 79 S.Ct. 901.

STANLEY N. BARNES, Circuit Judge.

On May 22, 1958, Mrs. Grace Carrigan, in propria persona, filed a complaint in the district court against the defendants named above in the caption.

This complaint was entitled:

"Complaint. An action in equity, because the Workmen\'s Compensation and Insurance Division of the Labor Code of the State of California, maintained in effect by the State of California, is so inequitable and deficient as to constitute a fraud, maintained in the name of law, against the people of the State of California, in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Said inequitable law is so deficient in protecting and enforcing the property and property rights of injured workmen and their dependents, that said law was the means of depriving plaintiff\'s injured husband and his dependent, plaintiff, of their property and property rights of full and complete medical care, equitable compensation payments and a settlement to which plaintiff\'s husband was entitled because of diminished earning capacity, — in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The depriving of said property and property rights of plaintiff\'s injured husband and his dependent plaintiff, by fraud, and in a fraudulent manner, was possible and was committed under said very deficient and inequitable law, by defendants, in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. An action for United States District Court Order to restore to plaintiff\'s husband and his dependent, plaintiff, their said property and property rights, and for other equitable relief. For United States District Court Order to declare and to delete certain sections of said law as unconstitutional. For United States District Court Order to incorporate other provisions which will make said law equitable, and effective in protecting and enforcing the property and property rights of injured workmen and their dependents, and therefore make said law equitable and constitutional. And for damages from defendants for said deprivation, and for distress of plaintiff\'s injured husband and his dependent, plaintiff."

The complaint named only Mrs. Grace Carrigan as plaintiff — in the heading showing appearances of counsel; in the title of the action; in the body of the complaint alleging the jurisdictional facts,¹ and elsewhere throughout the complaint. Mrs. Carrigan signed the complaint as the plaintiff.² Below her signature there appears the following:

"Mrs. Carrigan has read to me the part of the complaint about medical care for me, and about the back money coming to me, and about the settlement, and for all benefits for any future disability, and I hereby ask the court for all of these.

Date: May 21, 1958

(Signed) Milo G. Carrigan."³

Most, although not all, subsequent documents, whether prepared by defendants and directed to Mrs. Carrigan or prepared by Mrs. Carrigan and directed to her opponents, refer to but one plaintiff,⁴ although the husband adds a note to many, saying he desires Mrs. Carrigan "to handle the case in Court because I feel she understands the procedure."

The minutes of the district court of July 7th, 1958 and July 14th, 1958 show only that Mrs. Carrigan appears for herself, "in pro. per."

On July 7th, 1958, the district court heard the motion of defendants Dr. Frederick K. Amerongen and Zenith National Insurance Company to dismiss the complaint and informally granted the motion to dismiss.

On July 14th, 1958, the court granted the motion of defendants California State Legislature and Industrial Accident Commission of the State of California to dismiss. This was ordered dismissed "without prejudice," on three grounds:

(1) That plaintiff had not established jurisdiction;

(2) That plaintiff had not complied with Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; and

(3) That plaintiff "cannot appear as attorney for your husband."

Formal orders of dismissal in favor of Dr. Amerongen and Zenith National Insurance Company were entered that same day.

On July 14th, 1958, the day the matter was finally and formally dismissed, Mrs. Carrigan filed below a document entitled: "Application for injunction against California State Legislature and Industrial Accident Commission of the State of California and for immediate payment of all equitable Relief," in which application was made "by plaintiff" for a three-judge court.⁵ On July 21, 1958, this application was denied by the district court by minute order.⁶

Thereafter, on August 5th, 1958, plaintiff Mrs. Grace Carrigan and Milo G. Carrigan filed an "application to appeal in a special manner to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."⁷

On August 13th, 1958, a document entitled "Notice of Appeal" was filed, Mrs. Carrigan appearing alone as counsel, but stating "Mrs. Grace Carrigan and Milo G. Carrigan are the parties appealing."

On August 13th, 1958, the court below entered the following order:

"It appearing to the Court that plaintiff\'s time to appeal from the dismissals in this case entered July 14, 1958 will expire this date; that the Clerk is holding a Notice of Appeal submitted by plaintiff without filing fee; and that plaintiff has filed a document entitled `Application to Appeal in a Special Manner to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,\'

"It Is Ordered that the Clerk file said Notice of Appeal without prepayment of the $5.00 filing fee, but that this direction to the Clerk is not a ruling on plaintiff\'s application to appeal in a special manner."

On September 5th, 1958, the court below entered the following order:

"It Is Ordered that Plaintiff\'s Application to Appeal in a Special Manner filed August 5, 1958 in the above-entitled case, be deemed an application to appeal in forma pauperis under Title 28, U.S.Code, Section 1915; and It Is Ordered that Plaintiff is hereby authorized to prosecute her appeal without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor.

"It Is Further Ordered that insofar as said Application to Appeal in a Special Manner requests permission to appeal on a typewritten record, it is denied for the reason that such application should be properly addressed to the Court of Appeals.

"It Is Ordered that the Clerk shall furnish a copy of this Minute Order to Plaintiff as a reply to the document filed August 12, 1958 by Plaintiff entitled `To Judge Harry West-over, and/or Judge Ben Harrison: What Has Been Done About Our Above-entitled Document?\'"

Thereafter, on September 8th, 1958, there was filed below a document entitled "Second Application to Appeal in A Special Manner to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to: Judge Harry Westover, or Any Immediately Available Judge."

In addition to the foregoing documents, there are in the Transcript of Record on this appeal some seventy-five pages of correspondence between the Clerk of the court and Mrs. Carrigan. We include in the margin an example of such correspondence, chosen at random, to indicate its character.⁸

As this Court remarked in a recent case, "It is not the function of this Court to supervise laymen in the practice of the law."⁹ Pointing out to a determined individual who appears in propria persona that the technicalities of legal procedure are matters few laymen are capable of understanding, and that their path is a perilous one, is a waste of judicial breath. Perhaps the easiest procedure in this case would be to dismiss the entire appeal as frivolous, and strike the briefs and pleadings filed by appellant, Mrs. Carrigan, as either scandalous, impertinent, scurrilous, and/or without relevancy.¹⁰ Undoubtedly such action would be justified by this Court. Were Mrs. Carrigan a licensed attorney, her conduct in this case would subject her to appropriate disciplinary action by both this Court and the lower court.¹¹ But we do not choose to suggest that course. Mrs. Carrigan, unguided rather than misguided, is entirely honest and conscientious in her belief that she is entitled to relief in the particular manner in which she proposes to obtain it. We prefer to attempt to wade through each document before us, carefully and patiently, and, we trust, in a kindly manner, and then follow and apply the law, substantive and procedural, which binds judges, lawyers, and non-lawyers alike.

We have read carefully plaintiff's "Appeal Brief," the "Reply Brief of Appellants" (sic) and, the one hundred eighty-eight page complaint.

Mrs. Carrigan fails to recognize that the issue presented on her appeal to this Court insofar as defendants California State Legislature and Industrial Accident Commission of the State of California are concerned is not whether she has expressed or is capable of expressing a meritorious cause of action against them jointly or individually. That is a matter on which we express no opinion one way or another. The sole question before us is whether the lower court was acting within its authority in dismissing her appeal — without prejudice.

The lower court gave three reasons for its action:

(1) Failure of plaintiff to show jurisdiction;

(2) Failure of plaintiff to comply with ...