Magana v. Hofbauer

• Decision Date: 25 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-2107,99-2107
• Citation: 263 F.3d 542
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2001) Richard Magana, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gerald Hofbauer, Respondent-Appellee. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 542

263 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2001)

Richard Magana, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gerald Hofbauer, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 99-2107

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: April 25, 2001

Decided and Filed: August 28, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit, No. 98-72839, Bernard A. Friedman, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Richard Magana, Newberry Correctional Facility, Newberry, Michigan, pro se.

Vincent J. Leone, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; MOORE , Circuit Judge; O'MALLEY, District Judge. ^*

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner-Appellant Richard Magana appeals the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Magana was convicted by a jury in Michigan state court of two drug offenses and sentenced to two mandatorily consecutive terms of ten to twenty years' imprisonment. Magana's sole claim in his habeas petition is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea negotiation process. Magana claims that his trial attorney advised him to turn down the government's plea offer based upon the attorney's erroneous belief that the maximum to which Magana could be sentenced upon conviction was two ten-year concurrent sentences. Magana asserts that if his trial attorney had correctly informed him that, if convicted, he would receive two statutorily mandated ten-to-twenty-yearconsecutive sentences, he would have accepted the government's plea offer. For the following reasons, we REVERSE the district court's judgment.

I. JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction to hear Magana's appeal from the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2253.

II. BACKGROUND

Magana was charged in September 1991 with three counts: possession with intent to deliver more than 50 but less than 224 grams of cocaine; conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver more than 50 but less than 224 grams of cocaine; and possession with intent to deliver marijuana. Either "immediately" before or the day of trial, Magana's attorney, Rudolph Wartella received an offer to plea bargain from the Michigan state prosecutor. Ginther Hr'g at 6. Prior to that time, no plea offer was forthcoming from the prosecutor's office. Id. Wartella conveyed to Magana that the state offered to dismiss one cocaine count in exchange for Magana's guilty plea to the other one. Wartella stated that it was his understanding that if Magana pleaded to one cocaine count, he would receive a ten-year sentence. Id. He also told Magana that he would receive, at most, a ten-year sentence were he to be convicted at trial. Id. at 11. Because Wartella did not believe that the plea bargain offered Magana any benefit over going to trial, he advised Magana to reject the plea offer. Id. at 7. Magana then rejected the plea.

Following a jury trial, Magana was convicted of the two cocaine charges and acquitted on the marijuana charge. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 35. He was sentenced, pursuant to Michigan Comp. Laws ("M.C.L.") §333.7401(2)(a)(iii), to two mandatorily consecutive terms of ten to twenty years' imprisonment. That statute states that a person who possesses with intent to deliver more than 50 but less than 225 grams of a controlled substance "is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years." M.C.L. §333.7401(2)(a)(iii). According to M.C.L. §333.7401(3), a term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) "shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony." M.C.L. §333.7401(3) (emphasis added).

After his conviction and sentencing, Magana filed a motion with the Michigan Court of Appeals seeking an evidentiary hearing, known as a Ginther hearing, and a new trial based on his assertion that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for advising him to reject the plea offer. The Michigan Court of Appeals granted the motion for the Gintherhearing and remanded to the trial court. People v. Magana, No. 166749 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 1994) (order granting motion and remanding).

The trial court conducted the Ginther hearing on May 2, 1994. At that hearing, Wartella and Magana each testified as to his understanding of the plea bargain and the potential sentences involved in accepting the plea offer versus going to trial. Magana asserted that, had his trial counsel informed him that his sentences would run consecutively if he was convicted, he would have pleaded guilty. Following the hearing, the trial court held that Magana's trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective because Magana could not prove that, but for his counsel's faulty advice, he would have accepted the plea.People v. Magana, No. 91-2347-FH (Macomb Cty. Cir. Ct. May 5, 1994).

Magana then filed a motion for peremptory reversal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court committed plain error by denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the motion "for failure to persuade the Court of the existence of manifestly reversible error warranting peremptory relief without argument or formal submission." People v. Magana, No. 166749 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1994) (order denying motion). Thereafter, Magana appealed the trial court's decision. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Magana had not suffered prejudice from his counsel's failure properly to advise him of his potential sentence should he go to trial, and then remanded the case to the trial court for further findings on a claim of entrapment. People v. Magana, No. 166749 (Mich. Ct. App. April 23, 1996). Following the trial court's rejection of Magana's entrapment claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, People v. Magana, No. 166749 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1996), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, People v. Magana, No. 107641 (Aug. 29, 1997).

Having exhausted his state remedies, Magana filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. The district court denied Magana's petition. According to the district court, "[p]etitioner's counsel testified at the Ginther hearing that it was his understanding, and he informed Petitioner accordingly, that each of the cocaine charges carried potential sentences of ten to twenty years and that those two sentences could not run consecutively." J.A. at 39. The district court also concluded that "[p]etitioner ... testified that he was aware that each of the cocaine-related charges carried potential sentences of up to twenty years incarceration." J.A. at 42. Because Magana "provided no credible evidence which shows that the state court's conclusion was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent," id., the district court denied Magana's petition for habeas relief.

Magana then filed a motion in the district court seeking a certificate of appealability for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court denied the certificate of appealability. Thereafter, Magana filed a notice of appeal with this court, which was construed as a motion for a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. §2253. We granted a certificate of appealability on Magana's sole claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

When a district court's decision to deny habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254 is appealed to this court, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Palazzolo v. Gorcyca, 244 F.3d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 2001).

Because Magana's petition for habeas corpus relief was filed in June 1998, after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), which amended 28 U.S.C. §2254, AEDPA governs our review of the state court decisions in this case. According to the amended version of 28 U.S.C. §2254, we may not grant a writ of habeas corpus "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1)resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)-(2). The federal court must presume that all determinations of factual issues made by the state court are correct unless the defendant can rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).

The Supreme Court has clarified that the phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of" in 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) have independent meaning. Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1918 (2001). In order for a state court to render a decision "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the state court must "appl[y] a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or "confront[] a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of" the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrive at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring). An "unreasonable application of" clearly established Federal law may occur, in contrast, when "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. 1495. An unreasonable application of law is not, according to the Supreme Court, merely incorrect; rather, "that application must also be...