Chambers v. McCaughtry
| Decision Date | 05 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-1959,00-1959 |
| Citation | 264 F.3d 732 |
| Parties | (7th Cir. 2001) LAVELLE CHAMBERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GARY R. MCCAUGHTRY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 97-C-289--Thomas J. Curran, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner LaVelle Chambers was convicted in Wisconsin state court in 1991 of one count of felony murder as party to a crime and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court imposed a term of fifty years' imprisonment on the felony murder charge and eight years' imprisonment on the felon in possession charge. The sentences were to run consecutively. After unsuccessfully appealing his conviction in the Wisconsin state courts, Mr. Chambers filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court. The court denied the writ. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
On November 18, 1990, Mr. Chambers and his friend, Eddie Brooks, were driving around in Brooks' car with the intention of committing robbery. As they were driving near North Avenue and 25th Street in Milwaukee, they noticed two men exiting the North Avenue Smoke Shop; these two individuals were pushing a safe. Brooks stopped the car. Both Mr. Chambers and he jumped out and accosted the men pushing the safe. The men told Brooks and Mr. Chambers that they had just broken into the smoke shop and that they had stolen the safe. They further indicated that the shop remained open and could be robbed of other items.
Brooks and Mr. Chambers ran into the smoke shop and stole various items--guns, money, and food stamps. As the pair was looking around the shop for other items to steal, a police scanner in Brooks' possession indicated that the police were being dispatched to the smoke shop.
As Brooks and Mr. Chambers left the shop, they noticed a dark blue police car located a short distance away on North Avenue. The officers in the car apparently spotted them, made a U-turn, and drove toward the store. Brooks and Mr. Chambers then ran west on North Avenue in an attempt to flee the scene. After approximately 100 yards, the pair split up and ran in different directions. Mr. Chambers hid under a porch and eventually was found and arrested by the police. While Mr. Chambers was hiding un der the porch, Brooks engaged the pursuing police officer in gunfire. A bullet shot by Brooks struck and killed Sergeant Michael Tourmo.
Mr. Chambers was tried for felony murder as party to a crime and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury convicted Mr. Chambers of both counts. He was sentenced to a term of fifty years' imprisonment on the felony murder charge and eight years' imprisonment on the felon in possession charge. The sentences were to run consecutively.
Mr. Chambers appealed his conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. He raised three arguments: (1) a juror was improperly excluded for cause during voir dire proceedings; (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of felony murder, party to a crime, when the felony was completed, and Brooks and he had separated before Brooks shot and killed the police officer; and (3) the jury instruction that "a crime is not complete until a successful escape is made"1 impermissibly directed a verdict against Mr. Chambers because the point of completion of a crime cannot be decided as a matter of law; rather, it is within the province of the jury to decide whether the death was caused while committing or attempting to commit a crime.
The state appellate court only addressed Mr. Chambers' second argument and found that sufficient evidence existed to convict him. Specifically, the state court determined that the "conduct undertaken by Chambers, as an accomplice to armed burglary, falls within the ambit of the felony murder statute." State v. Chambers, 515 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). The court held that the evidence only needed to show that Mr. Chambers committed one of the underlying felonies specified in the state felony murder statute; Wisconsin law does not require that a defendant have an intent to kill or directly cause the death of a third party. The state met this burden, the court concluded. See id. at 534-35.
On June 14, 1994, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review.
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review of his direct appeal, Mr. Chambers filed a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court. He again challenged the jury instruction given at his trial that, for purposes of felony murder liability, "a crime is not complete until a successful escape is made." Mr. Chambers contended that the instruction violated his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution because it relieved the state of its burden of proving all elements of the offense of felony murder, in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
The trial court denied Mr. Chambers' motion for postconviction relief because it found the petition to be "predicated on the same reasons set forth in his appeal which was decided against him." R.14, Ex.K at 2. This repetitiousness was dispositive, the court explained, because claims resolved against a defendant on direct appeal cannot be reasserted in a subsequent postconviction motion. Even if the claim were characterized as new, continued the court it was barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 517 N.W.2d 157 (Wis. 1994), which prohibits defendants from raising claims on collateral attack if they do not first raise them on direct appeal unless there are sufficient reasons for the defendant's failure to present the claim on direct appeal.
Mr. Chambers appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. He argued that the jury instruction violated his due process rights because it relieved the state of its burden of proving all elements of the offense of felony murder. Specifically, the instruction directed the jury to assume an essential element of the offense--that Mr. Chambers caused the death of Officer Tourmo while committing or attempting to commit the predicate offense of armed burglary.
The appellate court concluded that the trial court properly denied Mr. Chambers' motion. It found that the argument regarding the jury instruction was predicated upon the same factual basis as his contention on direct appeal that there was not enough evidence to convict him because he was not present when the murder occurred. Because this issue was adjudicated finally against Mr. Chambers on direct appeal, the state appellate court held, he could not again raise it. Moreover, even if the jury instruction challenge were construed as a new and independent claim, it was barred by Escalona-Naranjo because Mr. Chambers failed to show sufficient reason for not raising the argument on direct appeal.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court again denied review on April 6, 1999.
Mr. Chambers next sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254. Initially acting pro se, Mr. Chambers first filed his habeas petition on March 24, 1997. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice so that Mr. Chambers could pursue the postconviction relief in the Wisconsin courts that we have detailed above. On April 24, 1999, after he had exhausted his opportunities for state postconviction relief, Mr. Chambers refiled his petition and asserted that (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict him of felony murder and (2) the jury instruction that "a crime is not complete until a successful escape is made" violated his due process rights by relieving the state of its burden of proving all elements of the offense of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
The case was assigned to a magistrate judge, who recommended, on April 29, 1999, that the petition be denied and the action dismissed. The magistrate judge believed that the evidence used to convict Mr. Chambers under Wisconsin's definition of felony murder was sufficient, and, "to the extent that Chambers claims the Wisconsin courts improperly construed Wisconsin state law, such [a] claim cannot support federal habeas relief." R.11 at 11. The magistrate judge also rejected Mr. Chambers' second claim, characterizing the challenge to the jury instruction as one based upon an incorrect application of state law, again not a basis for federal habeas relief.
Mr. Chambers objected to this recommendation. The district court, upon considering Mr. Chambers' objections to the recommendation, declined to accept the magistrate judge's conclusions and ordered that the State file an answer along with transcripts of the state court proceedings. The district court remanded the case to the magistrate judge for a recommendation on the merits.
The magistrate judge then granted Mr. Chambers' request for appointment of counsel and set up a briefing schedule. After receiving the briefs, the magistrate judge again recommended that the habeas petition be denied and the action dismissed. Specifically, the magistrate judge disposed of Mr. Chambers' two claims in almost the identical manner as he had in the previous recommendation. The magistrate judge also noted, however, that Mr. Chambers' court-appointed counsel had created a third argument in his brief by placing a "slightly different twist" on the due process claim. R.26 at 12. Counsel contended that the jury instruction amounted to an ex post facto application of the state felony murder statute; the element of felony murder that requires that a death occur while the defendant was committing or...
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