Ove v. Gwinn

Decision Date04 April 2001
Docket NumberDEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,No. 00-56233,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,00-56233
Citation264 F.3d 817
Parties(9th Cir. 2001) MARICA OVE; JOHN BROWN; JASON FORREST, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,, v. CASEY GWINN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CITY ATTORNEY OF SAN DIEGO; WILLIAM KOLENDER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SHERIFF OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY; SAN DIEGO COUNTY; CITY OF SAN DIEGO; AMERICAN FORENSIC NURSE, LLC; FAYE BATTISTE OTTO; PATTY KASTEN; HELEN SAMSON; THERESE SANSOUCIE; CHICAGO INSURANCE COMPANY,
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Counsel Mary Frances Prevost, San Diego, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

David L. Brodie, San Diego, California; Josephine M. Chow and Thomas C. Corless, Breidenbach, Buckley, Huchting, Halm & Hamblet, Los Angeles California; Melinda W. Ebelhar, Glendale, California; Deborah A. McCarthy, Senior Deputy, San Diego County Counsel, San Diego, California, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-00-00594-JTM

Before: Warren J. Ferguson and Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges, and Charles R. Breyer,* District Judge.

Silverman, Circuit Judge

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, RICO, unfair business practices, and battery claims. The claims arise from blood tests taken after plaintiffs' arrests for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the §§ 1983 claim because plaintiffs failed to allege a constitutional violation. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the RICO claim because plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite elements. Finally, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

I. Background and Proceedings

Between late 1998 and early 1999, San Diego police arrested plaintiffs Ove and Forest, and San Diego County sheriff's department arrested plaintiff Brown, for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Ove, Forest, and Brown consented to blood tests. Plaintiffs' blood samples were drawn by American Forensic Nurses ("AFN") employees Samson, Kaston, and Sansoucie. San Diego City and County contracted with AFN to withdraw blood as directed by law enforcement from persons arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence.

After criminal charges were brought against plaintiffs, they filed motions to suppress their blood test results under California Penal Code §§ 1538.5. Brown's motion was granted, and his case dismissed. Ove's motion was taken off calendar, and Forest's motion was denied. Subsequently, Ove pleaded nolo contendere and Forest pleaded guilty to violating California Vehicle Code §§ 23152(a).1

On March 23, 2000, Ove, Forest, and Brown filed a complaint in district court alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and RICO, battery, and unfair business practices. The complaint alleged that defendants "conspired and arranged for the use of employees in the withdrawal of blood who were not licensed, qualified, or permitted to draw blood or handle syringes under California law and, more particularly, under California Vehicle Code §§ 23158."2Plaintiffs asked for general specific, and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and class certification.

On June 19, 2000, the district court granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed without prejudice the §§ 1983 complaint holding it barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court dismissed the RICO complaint with prejudice for failure to allege any financial loss to business or property and for failure to allege a causal connection between an injury and illegal activity. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Plaintiffs appeal.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291. Dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000). Review is limited to the contents of the complaint. Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco, Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998). While all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, id. at 1085, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Met. Water Dist. of S. Cal., 159 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998). We may affirm the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim on any basis supported in the Record. Romano v. Bible , 169 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1999).

A district court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998).

III. Analysis
A. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983

Plaintiffs contend that the district court improperly held that Heck barred their §§ 1983 complaint. We agree. However, we affirm the district court's dismissal on alternate grounds because plaintiffs failed to state a §§ 1983 claim.

1. Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a §§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). Therefore, a"district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. at 487. However, the Court pointed out that if a "plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." Id. (footnotes omitted).

The Court offered an example of a lawsuit that would not be barred by the Heck doctrine:

For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the§§ 1983 plaintiff's still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988), and especially harmless error, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-308 (1991), such a §§ 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful. In order to recover compensatory damages, however, the §§ 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable injury, see Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986), which, we hold today, does not encompass the "injury" of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned).

512 U.S. at 487 n.7.

The Court visited this issue again in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). In Edwards, an inmate brought a §§ 1983 lawsuit challenging the procedures used in his prison disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of good-time credit. He alleged that the hearing officer concealed exculpatory witnesses, and refused to asked certain questions to specified witnesses. He sought damages for depriving him of good-time credits without due process, not for depriving him of good-time credits undeservedly as a substantive matter. The Court held that the Heck principle applied because the procedural defect complained of would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary action.

Respondent's claim . . . assert[s] that the cause of the exclusion of the exculpatory evidence was the deceit and bias of the hearing officer himself. He contends that the hearing officer lied about the nonexistence of witness statements, and thus "intentionally denied" him the right to present the extant exculpatory evidence. A criminal defendant tried by a partial judge is entitled to have his conviction set aside, no matter how strong the evidence against him. The due process requirements for a prison disciplinary hearing are in many respects less demanding that those for criminal prosecution, but they are not so lax as to let stand the decision of a biased hearing officer who dishonestly suppresses evidence of innocence.

Id. at 647 (citations omitted).

In other words, if the plaintiff in Edwards proved the truth of the allegations of his complaint, there is no way that the revocation of the good-time credits could stand. The civil lawsuit, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary hearing. Accordingly, the Court held that the complaint was barred by Heck.

Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is apparent that the plaintiffs' lawsuit, even if successful, would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Ove and Forest's DUI convictions.3 Their lawsuit concerns the way in which their blood was drawn. But blood evidence was not introduced against them. No evidence was introduced against them. They pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, respectively. 4 Their convictions derive from their...

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