Ward v. Johnathan Motors, LLC (In re Ward)
Decision Date | 18 May 2018 |
Docket Number | 1170142 |
Citation | 264 So.3d 52 |
Parties | EX PARTE Joshua WARD (In re: Joshua Ward v. Johnathan Motors, LLC, et al.) |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Thomas C. Donald, Birmingham, for petitioner.
David E. Hodges, Birmingham, for respondents.
Joshua Ward petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Shelby Circuit Court to vacate its October 7, 2017, order setting aside a default judgment entered against Johnathan Motors, LLC, and its principal Jacques C. Chahla (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the dealership") and to enter an order reinstating the default judgment. We grant the petition and issue the writ.
On April 14, 2017, Ward filed a 12–count complaint against the dealership and fictitiously named defendants alleging, among other things, that on August 5, 2016, he purchased a vehicle from the dealership; that he made a down payment on the vehicle; that he made the first monthly installment payment on the vehicle; that he maintained full insurance coverage on the vehicle; but that on September 10, 2016, the dealership unilaterally voided the sale of the vehicle and unlawfully repossessed and converted to its own use the vehicle, the down payment, the monthly installment payment, and the personal property in the vehicle when it was unlawfully repossessed. The dealership was served by certified mail on April 19, 2017; the sufficiency of that service of process has not been challenged.
On August 14, 2017, Ward requested the clerk of the circuit court to enter a default against the dealership pursuant to Rule 55(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., based on the dealership's failure to answer or otherwise to defend in the case; the clerk subsequently made an entry of default in the case. On September 9, 2017, the trial court entered a default judgment against the dealership pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., and a hearing to determine the damages was set for November 21, 2017.
On October 3, 2017, the dealership moved the trial court to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., asserting that, although an entry of default had been made, no final judgment had been entered in the case because damages had not yet been determined, that it had a good and meritorious defense to the allegations asserted in the complaint, and that Ward would not suffer unfair prejudice if the default judgment was set aside. The dealership requested in the motion to set aside the default judgment that it be allowed 14 days in which to respond to the complaint.
On October 7, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting the dealership's motion to set aside the default judgment, but requiring the dealership to file an answer within seven days from the date of that order; the dealership did not file an answer within seven days as ordered.
On November 1, 2017, Ward moved the trial court to reconsider its order setting aside the default judgment, asserting that the dealership had not responded to the complaint as ordered and that the dealership had not met its initial burden of demonstrating the existence of the three factors set forth in Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., 524 So.2d 600 (Ala. 1988).
On November 12, 2017, the trial court denied Ward's motion to reconsider the order setting aside the default judgment. On November 13, 2017, the dealership filed an answer to the complaint. Ward thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order setting aside the default judgment, to enter an order reinstating the default judgment against the dealership, and to schedule a hearing on damages.
(Emphasis added.)
Ward asserts in his petition that the trial court erred in granting the dealership's motion to set aside the default judgment because, he says, the dealership failed to present in its motion any facts, evidence, or authority illuminating its reliance on the three-factor analysis set forth in Kirtland, i.e., a meritorious defense on the part of dealership, the lack of unfair prejudice to Ward if the default judgment is set aside, and culpability of the part of the dealership in failing to respond to the complaint. We agree.
As indicated, the trial court has broad discretion under Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., in deciding whether to deny or to grant a motion to set aside a default judgment. In exercising that discretion, the trial court must apply the three-factor analysis set forth in Kirtland. However, the law is well settled that " ‘ "in order to trigger the mandatory requirement that the trial court consider the Kirtland factors, the party filing a motion to set aside a default judgment must allege and provide arguments and evidence regarding all three of the Kirtland factors." ’ " Hilyer v. Fortier, 176 So.3d 809, 813–14 (Ala. 2015) (quoting D.B. v. D.G., 141 So.3d 1066, 1071 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), quoting in turn Brantley v. Glover, 84 So.3d 77, 81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) ).
In its motion to set aside the default judgment,...
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