Com. v. Hoffman

• Decision Date: 02 July 1970
• Citation: 266 A.2d 726,439 Pa. 348
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Charles HOFFMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 726

266 A.2d 726

439 Pa. 348

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Charles HOFFMAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 2, 1970.

Stewart J. Greenleaf, Public Defender, Harold B. Vikoren Asst. Public Defender, Doylestown, for appellant.

Ward F. Clark, Dist. Atty., Oscar S. Bortner, John J. Collins, Stephen B. Harris, Asst. Dist. Attys., Doylestown, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

POMEROY, Justice.

Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after a jury trial on an indictment charging him with the murder of one Francis Turbitt. His post trial motions were denied and judgment of sentence was imposed. Appellant then brought this appeal.

Turbitt's death resulted from injuries he sustained in a fight with appellant on the afternoon of July 9, 1966 at a tavern in Penndel, Pennsylvania. Prior to the fight appellant and seven other men had been engaged in a game of darts in the game room of the tavern. While they were so occupied, Turbitt had entered the game room from the barroom with the cuffs of his trousers rolled up over his ankles. At that time one or more of the group playing darts asked: 'Are you expecting flood waters?' and 'Oh, do you have water down in your cellar?' After these remarks, Turbitt went to the shuffleboard game table, sat down on it, rolled his pants up even further and asked the group if anyone was 'man enough to own up' to the remarks that had been made. Appellant then approached Turbitt and said, 'I was the one who said it. What are you going to do about it?' A slight scuffle ensued but was quickly broken up by the other dart players, two of whom escorted Turbitt outside and suggested that he go home. All eight then resumed the dart game.

About five minutes later, Turbitt reentered the game room with his pants rolled up even higher, jumped up and down a number of times and said something challenging to appellant. Appellant then left the dart game and quickly went over to Turbitt. Both men went through the swinging door between the game room and a small anteroom. Their heads were seen briefly through a small window in the swinging door by the other dart players, but soon disappeared. Within half a minute after they could no longer see the heads, the other dart players went into the anteroom where they found appellant half-standing, half-kneeling over Turbitt, striking him on the chest and arms. One of the other dart players grabbed appellant, pulled him away from Turbitt and pushed him back toward the others. Turbitt then rose up on one elbow and said something. Immediately, a foot-although no one who testified could identify to whom it belonged--come out and struck Turbitt in the neck. As a result of this blow, Turbitt fell back and commenced 'snoring.' All but two of the dart players then returned to the game room. The remaining two picked Turbitt up, carried him into the main part of the tavern and placed him on the seat in one of the booths. Turbitt remained there for about an hour until it was noticed that he was having difficulty breathing. An ambulance was then called and Turbitt was taken to the hospital where he died two days later without regaining consciousness.

According to the testimony of the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Turbitt, the only serious injury he had sustained was a massive hemorrhage between the skull and the brain which had forced the base of the brain down and through the foramen magnum, the large opening at the base of the skull through which the spinal cord passes. The resultant squeezing of this part of the brain, which contains all of the vital centers which control such essential activities as heart beat and respiration, had, according to the pathologist, rendered these centers incapable of performing their natural functions and had caused Turbitt's death. In the pathologist's opinion the massive hemorrhage had been caused by a series of blows, rather than a single blow, to the back of the head.

While the above facts were essentially uncontroverted, exactly what had occurred in the anteroom, while only Turbitt and appellant were there, was the subject of conflicting testimony. Consistent with the opinion of the pathologist that the hemorrhage had been caused by a series of blows to the back of the head, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of one Ernest Shade who had been at the tavern that afternoon and who had spoken with the decedent. Mr. Shade testified that while he was in his automobile preparing to leave the tavern's parking lot he had glanced back toward the anteroom, the exterior door of which was open and had seen Turbitt's head being 'banged' on the floor four or five times. He testified that he had not seen appellant actually causing Turbitt's head to rise and fall, and that upon seeing other men enter the anteroom he had driven away.

Appellant gave a quite different account. He testified that when he and Turbitt arrived in the anteroom, Turbitt swung his fist at appellant, but missed. Appellant then hit Turbitt causing him to fall backward, striking his head on the wall. When he bent down to help Turbitt up, he received a kick in the groin which caused him to fall into the position in which he was found when the other dart players entered the anteroom.

There was testimony that Turbitt, appellant, and all the other dart players had been drinking alcoholic beverages, mainly beer, but that none was drunk at the time of these incidents. Moreover, appellant testified that when he struck Turbitt he had done so without anger or passion. On this evidence, together with rather detailed medical testimony concerning Turbitt's condition and decline in the hospital, the jury returned its verdict.

On this appeal, appellant raises essentially four issues, only the last of which requires detailed consideration.

Appellant first challenges the propriety of the admission of certain evidence. Specifically, he contends that the detailed medical testimony of the three doctors and three nurses who treated Turbitt was repetitious, cumulative and prejudicial. In light of the rather singular injury sustained by Turbitt, we are of the opinion that a detailed account of his decline was appropriate to establish the relationship between the incident at the tavern and his death. Moreover, this testimony was not characterized by descriptions of gore or suffering which would tend to prejudice appellant; it was a factual description of his condition and emphasized his total lack of any feeling or response after his admission to the hospital.

Appellant also contends that the admission of two sections of the tile-covered concrete anteroom floor as physical exhibits was prejudicial. These exhibits, purportedly the section of the floor where Turbitt's head had been struck, were admitted only under the trial court's careful instruction that they were for the sole purpose of showing the composition of the floor. This was relevant, and we fail to see that it was prejudicial.

As a final evidentiary point, appellant complains that he was prejudiced by a photograph of Turbitt showing him in the company of a small child. The short answer to this point is that, although this photograph was marked for identification, and used by various witnesses to identify the decedent, it was neither admitted into evidence nor shown to the jury because of appellant's objections.

Appellant's second contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because the Commonwealth's attorney in his opening statement to the jury referred to appellant as a man with the 'heart of a sadist' ¹ and as a man with a 'sadistic' heart. In determining whether statements in a prosecutor's opening address are prejudicial, '(t)he important question is whether the prosecuting officer's remarks are merely assertions intended to inflame the passions of the jury, or statements that are fair deductions from evidence to be presented.' Commonwealth v. Meyers, 290 Pa. 573, 139 A. 374 (1927); Commonwealth v. Cannon, 386 Pa. 62, 69, 123 A.2d 675 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 898, 77 S.Ct. 139, 1 L.Ed.2d 90 (1957). The Commonwealth was seeking a conviction of second degree murder, one of the essential elements of which is malice. Commonwealth v. Finnie, 415 Pa. 166, 171, 202 A.2d 85 (1964). It argues that 'sadistic heart' and 'malicious heart' are essentially the same and that the statement was but a fair inference to be drawn from the evidence to be presented.

While we perceive a difference in the connotations of the two words which renders sadistic a more pejorative adjective than malicious, we believe no prejudice resulted from its use here, as the jury, by finding appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and not second degree murder, found he had not acted even with malice. In Commonwealth v. Meyers, Supra, we stated the standard for reversal in cases such as this as follows: 'Where, under all the circumstances of the case, the verdict rendered is a just one, the language of the prosecuting officer which will justify a reversal must be such that its unavoidable effect would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not fairly weigh in his behalf such circumstances of doubt, extenuation, or degree of guilt that may be present in the case, and thus make them unable to render a true verdict.' ² (290 Pa. 581, 139 A. 374.) The language used here did not rise to that standard.

The third of appellant's arguments is that he was prejudiced by the presence, in the jury room or 'lounge', of the justice of the peace who had presided at his preliminary hearing. The justice of the peace had been called for jury duty, had reported, and was not detected or removed for ten minutes. Appellant's counsel was informed of this incident before trial by the trial judge but neither moved for a continuance nor...