Rudd v. Hazard

CourtNew York Court of Appeals
Citation194 N.E. 764,266 N.Y. 302
PartiesRUDD, Dist. Atty., v. HAZARD.
Decision Date26 February 1935
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Proceedings by Thomas Brown Rudd, as District Attorney of Oneida County, for a peremptory order of mandamus against Frederick H. Hazard, individually and as Judge of Oneida County, acting in and for Oneida County in the Oneida County Court, to expunge from the minutes of the court the proceedings taken before the Special County Judge on an indictment against Joseph George and to proceed to trial on Joseph George's plea of not guilty. From an order of the Appellate Division (241 App. Div. 905, 271 N. Y. S. 1042), affirming an order of the Special Term denying the application, Thomas Brown Rudd, by permission, appeals.

Orders reversed, and motion for order of mandamus granted.

See, also, 259 N. Y. S. 18.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth department.

Thomas Brown Rudd, Dist. Atty., of Utica (Earle C. Bastow, of Utica, of counsel), for appellant.

Leo O. Coupe, of Utica, for respondent.

CROUCH, Judge.

On December 22, 1931, at a term of the Oneida County Court, duly appointed in accordance with sections 190, 191, and 192 of the Judiciary Law (Consol. Laws, c. 30), the respondent was arraigned before the county judge upon an indictment for assault in the first degree, and pleaded not guilty. At the close of that day the county judge adjourned the term to January 5, 1932, at his chambers. From December 23, until after December 31, 1931, he was outside the state of New York. On December 28, 1931, the respondent, accompanied by his own counsel and by the then district attorney representing the people, appeared before the special county judge, and thereupon the following proceedings were had: The district attorney read the indictment and asked respondent if he desired to change his plea thereto; the respondent through his counsel stated that he did desire to change his plea, and that he pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree. The special county judge then asked respondent if he had any legal cause to show why the judgment of the court should not be pronounced against him, to which respondent through his counsel replied that he had no legal cause to show, and thereupon the special county judge sentenced the respondent to be confined to the Oneida county jail for one year and to pay a fine of $250. The judgment further provided that execution of the jail sentence should be suspended upon payment of $500 to the complainant, who had been assaulted. The proceedings were entered in what purports to be the minutes of the Oneida County Court.

The authority of the special county judge so to act having been questioned, this mandamus proceeding was brought to compel the county judge to expunge from the minutes of the court the proceedings taken before the special county judge and to proceed to trial upon the original plea of not guilty. The application was denied at Special Term. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The appeal is here by permission of this court.

The special county judge has power to discharge the duties of the county judge ‘in cases of vacancy or inability’; and at all times he possesses all the powers and may perform the duties which are possessed and can be performed by a county judge ‘out of court.’ Laws 1849, c. 306, as amended by Laws 1851, c. 108; Const. art. 6, § 16; Seymour v. Mercer, 13 How. Prac. 564; Kinney v. Roberts & Co., 26 Hun, 166, 172, appeal dismissed, 89 N. Y. 601.

The application herein was based upon two contentions: (1) That the temporary absence of the county judge constituted neither vacancy nor inability; and (2) that, even though the contrary were true, the proceedings were invalid because they were necessarily had before the judge as such and not in open court at a regular or adjourned stated term thereof.

The decision below was that the absence of the county judge created inability within the meaning of the Constitution and statute; and that, ‘inasmuch as the record now before this Court shows that arraignment of Joseph George was taken before the County Court and entered upon its minutes and that his plea of guilty was ‘put in by the defendant himself in open court,’' the proceedings so had were legal.

We may assume, without so deciding, that, owing to the absence of the county judge, the special county judge was vested with the full power and authority conferred by law upon the county judge. Even so, we think his acts were beyond his jurisdiction, and hence invalid. The minutes of the court relied upon below as conclusively showing a session of the court before the special county judge conflict with the fact, also no doubt shown by the minutes of the court, that the November term had, on December 22, 1931, been adjourned to January 5, 1932, at the chambers of the county judge. There was and there could be no court session of the County Court for criminal business on December 28, 1931. Section 70 of the Civil Practice Act does not close the gap. That section had its origin in section 31 of the Code of Procedure in 1848. The County Court then was, and continued to be, solely a civil court until the Constitution of 1894. The Court of Sessions was the county criminal court. The original purpose of the section was, and, so far as appears, its only present purpose is, to give the county judge in certain matters powers which the Court of Chancery formerly possessed. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 575;Brown v. Snell, 57 N. Y. 286, 292, and see Const. 1846, art. 6, § 14.

In any event, the proceedings before the special county judge were such as could be had only at a session of a regular or adjourned stated term. Those proceedings consisted of arraignment, plea, and judgment. An arraignment must be ‘before the court.’ Code Crim. Proc. § 296. A plea of guilty must be put in ‘in open court (Code Crim. Proc. §...

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9 cases
  • People v. Santiago
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • December 31, 1975
    ...nature and definition of crimes and the procedure to be followed in the prosecution and punishment of defendants (Matter of Rudd v. Hazard, 266 N.Y. 302, 306, 194 N.E. 764, 766; People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions of Monroe County, 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386; Matter of Dodd v. Martin......
  • Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • November 20, 1979
    ...in all pretrial proceedings. There would, for instance, be little justification for holding a private arraignment (cf. Matter of Rudd v. Hazard, 266 N.Y. 302, 194 N.E. 764). A public reading of the charges and the defendant's plea will rarely help the defendant's case. But not every disclos......
  • Hearst Corp. v. Clyne
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • July 3, 1980
    ...in open plea proceedings. "Publicity, not secrecy, in arraignment, plea and judgment is part of our tradition". (Matter of Rudd v. Hazard, 266 N.Y. 302, 307, 194 N.E. 764, 765). Especially in modern times, when guilty pleas account for most criminal dispositions, it is particularly egregiou......
  • People v. Mollette
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New York)
    • March 22, 1976
    ...nature and definition of crimes and the procedure to be followed in the prosecution and punishment of defendants (Matter of Rudd v. Hazard, 266 N.Y. 302, 306, 194 N.E. 764, 765; People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions of Monroe County, 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386; Matter of Dodd v. Martin......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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