Rodway v. Wiswall

• Decision Date: 29 June 1970
• Citation: 267 A.2d 374
• Parties: Frank C. RODWAY v. Frank L. WISWALL et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 374

267 A.2d 374

Frank C. RODWAY v. Frank L. WISWALL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

June 29, 1970.

Herbert A. Crommett, Portland, Morton A. Glazer, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Verrill, Dana, Philbrick, Whitehouse & Putnam, by Roger A. Putnam, and Howard H. Dana, Jr., Portland, for defendants.

Before WEBBER, MARDEN, DUFRESNE, and WEATHERBEE, JJ.

WEBBER, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a decision below dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief can be granted. M.R.C.P., Rule 12(b)(6).

For our purposes the allegations of the complaint may be paraphrased and summarized as follows: On January 4, 1964 plaintiff was by contract employed by the 12 member Board of Trustees of the Maine Maritime Academy of the State of Maine to serve as Superintendent of the Academy for one year at a stated salary. The three named defendants were then and continued to be duly appointed and qualified members of the Board. Plaintiff performed the duties of his office until on April 21, 1964 he was notified by the Board that his services were terminated forthwith. The complaint avers that the defendants 'did, individually and among themselves, intentionally, unlawfully and maliciously induce, persuade and coerce through malicious means of interference, intimidation, and by false and malicious reports and accusations concerning the plaintiff, directly and indirectly, a termination' of his employment. There follow allegations of damages. The second count is like unto the first except that there is added a charge of conspiracy to do the acts described.

The Justice below properly examined the complaint in the light of several legislative enactments which are pertinent. The Academy was first created by the Legislature as the Maine Nautical Training School by P. & S. L., 1941, Ch. 37. The Board of Trustees which originally numbered nine was placed in control of the 'affairs of the school' and was specifically empowered to 'appoint and remove necessary instructors and other employees.' The name was changed to 'Maine Maritime Academy' by P. & S. L., 1943, Ch. 102. By P. & S. L., 1947, Ch. 24 the Academy was 'declared to be a public agency of the State of Maine for the purposes for which it was established.' By P. & S. L., 1949, Ch. 39 the number of trustees was increased from 9 to 12. All trustees are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Executive Council. The Justice below concluded as do we that the trustees in the exercise of their authorized powers perform quasi-judicial functions.

All agree that we must first examine the holding in Richards v. Ellis (Me.1967) 233 A.2d 37. Plaintiff urges that we reconsider and overrule Richards. As in the instant case, Richards came to us on appeal from dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The complaint sought damages from the defendant members of a town licensing board for their denial, based on alleged bad faith and malice, of plaintiff's application for a victualer's license. We first recognized that the complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. We then held that 'the members of a municipal licensing board are immune from civil liability for quasi-judicial decisions within the scope of their authority without regard for bad faith, malice, or other evil motives.' Richards was clearly a decision based upon public policy and which admittedly overruled prior case law which had applied the 'good faith' test. It was deemed to be in the public interest to permit public officials and members of boards and commissions 'with judicial or near judicial powers' to operate in an atmosphere immunized from the restraint and possible intimidation which might flow from the threat of vexatious personal suits. We see no occasion to depart from this position and therefore decline to overrule Richards.

Alternatively, plaintiff contends that even under the Richards doctrine, the defendants overstepped their authority and engaged in activity not protected and immunized as quasi-judicial functions. Plaintiff concedes that when defendants participated as trustees in the employment of plaintiff, they were engaged in a protected function, but, he argues, once plaintiff had been employed, the powers of the defendants diminished and they could not use methods tinged with malice and bad faith to induce and persuade their fellow trustees to terminate plaintiff's employment. To do so, plain...