State v. Criscuolo

• Decision Date: 04 February 1970
• Citation: 268 A.2d 374,159 Conn. 175
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Albert CRISCUOLO. STATE of Connecticut v. Genevieve CRISCUOLO.

Page 374

268 A.2d 374

159 Conn. 175

STATE of Connecticut v. Albert CRISCUOLO.

STATE of Connecticut v. Genevieve CRISCUOLO.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Feb. 4, 1970.

R. David Broiles, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were Ira B. Grudberg and Howard A. Jacobs, New Haven, for appellants (defendants) in each case.

Joseph D. Harbaugh, Special Asst. Chief Pros. Atty., for appellee (state) in each case.

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, COTTER and THIM, JJ.

THIM, Associate Justice.

This court granted the defendants' petition for certification for review of their cases which were decided adversely to them by the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court. See General Statutes § 51-265. The certification was limited to a review of certain claimed errors in the trial court's instructions to the jury.

The defendants, Albert and Genevieve Criscuolo, husband and wife, were tried together on separate informations. While the issues involved differ as to the second count in each information, both defendants were charged with policy playing in violation of § 53-298 of the General Statutes in the first count of each information and were convicted on those counts.

The defendants claim that the court erred in charging the jury on § 53-298 of the General Statutes. The record before us is deficient, however, in that the finding fails to disclose the exceptions taken to the charge as required both by this court's rules of practice and by those of the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court. Practice Book §§ 635, 999, 1023. Nevertheless, the Appellate Division, apparently on the basis of the transcript and the defendants' sixth assignment of error, considered the claims of error in the charge without mentioning the deficiency in the finding. Because we saw sufficient reason in this case to grant limited certification and since the parties have briefed and argued the issues, we have decided to consider the appeal. See O'Keefe v. Bassett, 132 Conn. 659, 660, 46 A.2d 847.

Section 53-298 of the General Statutes incorporates two offenses. Maintaining a policy office and policy playing are both proscribed. The statute consists of two sentences and contains over five hundred words. Consequently, there is justification for the defendants' claim that the statute, read as a whole, would tend to confuse a jury in applying the pertinent law to the particular facts of the present case.

Despite the complexity and length of the statute, the finding reveals that the court read the entire statute to the jury without expanding upon its meaning in any substantial manner. Although it is generally proper for the court to charge in the language of a statute, the statute should be explained where the meaning of its language might be unclear to the jury. 'While the court may instruct in the exact language of the statute it should not do so where the exact statutory language might mislead the jury, as where an ordinary juror is unable to understand its meaning.' 88 C.J.S. Trial § 337a, p. 886. It is error to read a statute which requires interpretation to the jury as an instruction; 'the better practice is for the court to interpret any statute, about the interpretation of which there is or may be a difference of opinion.' St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Elrod, 116 Ark. 514, 518, 173 S.W. 836, 837; Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Parker, 200 Ark. 620, 624, 140 S.W.2d 997, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 696, 61 S.Ct. 133, 85 L.Ed. 450.

In the...