Curley v. Village of Suffern
| Decision Date | 01 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,Docket No. 99-9367 |
| Parties | (2nd Cir. 2001) MICHAEL CURLEY,, v. VILLAGE OF SUFFERN, GEORGE PARNESS, LEO COSTA, FRANK FINCH, INDIVIDUALLY, JOHN GLOEDE, JOHN MCGEE, CLARKE OSBORN, LANCE WEINSTEIN, LOUIS VENTURINI, AND JOHN WILSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS POLICE OFFICERS, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Raymond G. Kruse, Nanuet, New York (Raymond G. Kruse, P.C., Nanuet, New York, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Joseph A. Maria, White Plains, New York (Andrew W. Bilinski, Joseph A. Maria, P.C., White Plains, New York, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before Cardamone, Calabresi, and Katzmann, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises from a barroom brawl. Familiarity with such disturbance of the public peace usually is a product of exposure to movies and TV, although such scenes are designed to entertain and are far removed from the violence of a real free-for-all. But the incredible confusion in such a melee, which makes it difficult to know who did what to whom, is quite accurately captured in the fictional presentation. Because of the confusion that results from a barroom brawl, when factual issues are raised on appeal we generally defer to the trial court, realizing that jurors who heard the witnesses are in a better position than an appellate court to sort out right from wrong. Thus, ordinarily we would simply affirm the order appealed from, but in this case we think it necessary to write because there is a point of law -- independent of the brawling activities -- that needs to be made. That point addresses the effect of a jury's verdict -- that finds no liability on the part of individual defendant officers -- on the liability of the municipality and on other officers who allegedly failed to intervene in due fashion to protect the plaintiff's rights.
Plaintiff Michael Curley was arrested on the night of August 9, 1994 following an altercation earlier that night at Mugg's Pub in Suffern, New York, an establishment in which he is a part owner. He was charged with assault, resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration, and disorderly conduct. After the felony assault charge against him was dismissed, a jury acquitted him of all the remaining misdemeanor counts.
Curley then brought the instant suit for alleged violations of his civil rights on August 8, 1997 against the Village of Suffern, Suffern Mayor George Parness, Suffern Police Chiefs Leo Costa and Frank Finch, individually, and John Gloede, John McGee, Clarke Osborn, Lance Weinstein, Louis Venturini and John Wilson, individually and as Suffern police officers (collectively, defendants). He claims defendants conspired to deprive him of his rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint asserts that he was arrested, without probable cause and through the use of excessive force, in retaliation for his public criticism of defendants Parness and Finch.
After the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Brieant, J.) dismissed defendant Leo Costa from the action at a pre-trial conference held June 26, 1998, the parties agreed to proceed before Magistrate Judge George A. Yanthis. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted with respect to all of the claims alleged in plaintiff's complaint, except for the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against police officers Gloede, McGee, Weinstein and Wilson in their individual capacity. A jury trial on this remaining cause of action was held before the magistrate judge and resulted in a verdict for defendants. No appeal has been taken from that verdict.
Curley's appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment brings the case before us. He raises his Fourth Amendment false arrest claim (alleging that he was arrested without probable cause) and his First Amendment claim (alleging retaliatory arrest and a chilling of his exercise of his First Amendment rights) as against all defendants, arguing that the complete grant of summary judgment as to both of these causes of action was improper. He further contends that his excessive force claim should be reinstated against the village and officers Venturini and Osborn.
Since plaintiff appeals only from the dismissal of his claims on summary judgment, we review the district court's decision de novo. Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is granted only when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the movant meets that burden, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts that demonstrate a genuine issue of fact exists requiring a trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Plaintiff's version of the events that occurred on the night of his arrest is that he tried to break up a fight at his bar. The fight started when a patron named Eric Salzman attempted to strike another patron named Mark Gidula with a glass beer mug. According to plaintiff, he attempted to swat the mug away, then grabbed Gidula and dragged him into the kitchen. As he tried to hold Gidula down, a man named Joseph Ramos ran into the kitchen. Plaintiff hit Ramos in the face with his open hand. Salzman told a different story to the police. According to officer McGee's testimony, Salzman reported that plaintiff had punched him in the arm and thrown an ashtray at him.
Despite this disagreement, plaintiff does not dispute the following: (1) Salzman approached defendant officer McGee and claimed plaintiff assaulted him; (2) after officer McGee came to Mugg's Pub and asked plaintiff to step outside to talk about the incident, Salzman arrived in the area with blood on his lip; (3) as plaintiff was talking to McGee, Salzman yelled ; (4) at the sight of Salzman and upon learning that Salzman accused him of assault, plaintiff became "very irate"; (5) in this excited state, plaintiff may have used obscenities; (6) Ramos approached the officers also yelling that plaintiff hit him; (7) plaintiff admitted to defendant officer Gloede that he did strike Ramos during the struggle in the kitchen; and (8) plaintiff gesticulated with his arms at his sides and his hands in front of him upon being told by officer Gloede -- who was about an arm's length away -- that he was under arrest.
These facts establish probable cause for plaintiff's arrest for assault, see N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(1) (McKinney 1998); id. § 120.05(2) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2001), disorderly conduct, see id. § 240.20(1) (McKinney 2000), obstructing governmental administration, see id. § 195.05 (McKinney 1999), and resisting arrest, see id. § 205.30 (McKinney 1999). Probable cause exists when an officer has "knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested." Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000). When information is received from a putative victim or an eyewitness, probable cause exists, id., unless the circumstances raise doubt as to the person's veracity, Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff tries to undermine Salzman's and Ramos' credibility by describing them as drunk on the night in question. Yet, while defendant officer Weinstein thought Ramos "appeared to be intoxicated," plaintiff confirmed to the police that he struck Ramos. Consequently, Ramos' intoxication alone cannot cast doubt on his story. With respect to Salzman, although officer McGee knew that he had been drinking in the pub, we are not told to what extent. To defeat summary judgment, plaintiff was required to come forward with more specific facts creating a genuine issue with respect to probable cause.
Plaintiff argues in the alternative that the conflicting accounts from him, Salzman and Ramos should have prompted a more thorough investigation. But, we have found probable cause where a police officer was presented with different stories from an alleged victim and the arrestee. See id. at 113, 119. Moreover, we rejected an argument similar to that made by plaintiff here in Ricciuti, where an arresting officer chose to believe the claimed victim's account of a fight based on his visible injuries, notwithstanding the alleged assailant's cries of innocence. We observed that "[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest." Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 128.
Although a better procedure may have been for the officers to investigate plaintiff's version of events more completely, the arresting officer does not have to prove plaintiff's version wrong before arresting him. See Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989). Nor does it matter that an investigation might have cast doubt upon the basis for the arrest. Id. at 371. Before making an arrest, if the...
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