Jackson v. Brown

Decision Date01 November 1972
Citation49 Ala.App. 55,268 So.2d 837
PartiesRoland JACKSON v. Geneva BROWN. Civ. 13.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Bankhead, Petree & Savage, Jasper, for appellant.

James E. Wilson, Jasper, for appellee.

HOLMES, Justice.

This is an appeal by appellant, Roland Jackson, from a judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Geneva Brown, against the appellant in the amount of $7,000.

The appellee filed suit in the Circuit Court of Walker County, Alabama, the complaint consisting of two counts. Count One claimed damages for personal injuries and property damage based on the appellant's alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Count Two alleged wanton conduct in the operation of a motor vehicle. The parties reached issue by a plea in short by consent and the case was submitted to the jury under Count One of the complaint, the court giving the general affirmative charge to Count Two.

The trial court overruled appellant's motion for new trial, and appellant assigned this ruling as error.

It is not necessary to the opinion to set out all the evidence, however the following is noted:

Appellee testified to the effect that she first saw appellant's car at a distance of three car lengths coming toward appellee on appellee's side of the road. Appellee stated she blew her horn and pulled over right and stopped; however, the front of appellant's automobile collided with the front of appellee's automobile. At the time of impact appellee's head hit the windshield and broke it. Appellee further testified that she had never been in an auto wreck before and her head and face had never been injured; that she received one cut on her face requiring thirty-six stitches and had two or three stitches taken in her left knee; that her right arm hurt and she suffered with her back; and that a couple of teeth were cracked.

Appellee was taken to the hospital immediately after the wreck, the hospital records being introduced into evidence without objection.

Appellee also stated she lost four weeks from her employment as a result of the wreck, and that she gave the job up after returning to work for two weeks because she was unable to do her work. During this period of time appellee went to a doctor several times and also went to an eye specialist for her left eye. Appellee stated she had headaches and that there was an area of numbness in the general area of the scar over her left eye and she further stated she was not able to do the housework that she could do before the wreck.

Appellee's further testimony was that her medical bills included $35 for one doctor, $60 plus for the hospital, and $30 for the eye specialist. She testified that she continued to have headaches resulting, in her opinion, from the wreck and had spent $300 or $400 for headache medicine in the past three and one-half years. Appellee further testified that in her opinion the market value of her car immediately before the accident was $1,300 to $1,350 and that the automobile was worth nothing immediately after the accident.

Witnesses for appellee, an investigating police officer of the accident, and a passenger in the vehicle of the appellee at the time of the accident, testified to the effect that appellant was on appellee's side of the road when the accident occurred.

Appellant testified that when the accident occurred he was on the way to the store with his four grandchildren riding in the back seat. Appellant stated he saw two little children run across the road and behind a parked car located on his side of the road; that he pulled around the parked car while watching for the children; that when he looked ahead from looking toward the parked car, appellee's car was right in his face going, in his judgment, forty to fifty miles per hour; and that he was only going about twenty miles per hour. Appellant further stated that when he came around the parked car he did not get completely back on his side of the road and didn't have time to get out of appellee's way.

The deposition of Dr. J. S. Camp was introduced into evidence by agreement of counsel and read to the jury in question and answer form. Dr. Camp testified that he was licensed to practice medicine in Alabama and had been so practicing in Walker County since 1933. Dr. Camp testified that he had treated appellee at Peoples Hospital in Jasper, Alabama, for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Dr. Camp stated he treated appellee for lacerations of her forehead and knee, and complaint of headache, and that he saw appellee, who was complaining of headaches, four or five times at weekly intervals, subsequent to the accident. Dr. Camp also stated that he thought his fee for professional services was $35.

Appellant assigns some ten assignments of error of which two are argued and may be categorized as follows: Assignment of Error 1, Ground 6, and Assignment of Error 8 contend that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial for that the court erred in its ruling on the evidence, to wit, overruling appellant's objection to the following question propounded to the appellee: 'In your judgment is that a reasonable amount for these bills?'

Assignment of Error 1, Grounds 23, 24, and 25, contends that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial for that the appellant was irreparably harmed and prejudiced by the jury's discussion of liability insurance in that the appellant was covered by liability insurance and that the insurance company would be responsible for any verdict rendered, was openly discussed in the jury room.

Assignment of Error 1, Grounds 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, contends the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial for that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence and that the verdict of the jury was so excessive as to indicate passion, prejudice, corruption or mistake.

As noted earlier, appellant's argument to Assignment of Error 1, Ground 6, and as to Assignment of Error 8, concerns the ruling of the trial court in allowing testimony by the appellant, a woman with a high school education and who had an employment background of sales clerk and maid, to express an opinion or judgment regarding the reasonableness of her doctor and hospital bills. The transcript reveals the following examination relative to the question at hand:

'Q. To bring us back up to date, I believe you testified Dr. Camp's bill was thirty-five dollars?

'A. That's right.

'Q. The hospital bill was sixty dollars?

'A. Yes.

'Q. And the eye specialist was thirty dollars, is that right?

'A. That's right.

'Q. In your judgment is that a reasonable amount for these bills?

'MR. SAVAGE: I object to that if the Court please. This witness is not qualified to prove reasonableness of medical bills in Walker County, Alabama.

'COURT: Overrule the objection.

'MR. SAVAGE: Except.

'COURT: You may answer if you know in your opinion and your judgment.

'WITNESS: I think it is.'

Appellant's able counsel correctly states the law that testimony of reasonableness in regard to charges for surgical, medical or hospital bills does not concern subject matter of common knowledge, but that testimony of reasonableness in regard to charges for surgical, medical or hospital bills is a matter for expert opinion. Birmingham Amusement Co. v. Norris, 216 Ala. 138, 112 So. 633, 53 A.L.R. 840; Foodtown Stores, Inc. v. Patterson, 282 Ala. 477, 213 So.2d 211.

It is further the law in Alabama that before a jury may properly consider medical expenses such expenses must be proved to be reasonable. Aplin v. Dean, 231 Ala. 320, 164 So. 737. The record shows that appellee was not qualified as an expert relative to the reasonableness of the charges in question.

Therefore, this court finds the trial court's ruling on the aforementioned objection to be error.

In regard to the hospital charges, the trial court's ruling is considered error without injury (Rule 45, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of Alabama) as the reasonableness of the amount was thereafter proved. We note in particular on page 142 of the record the following affidavit:

'CERTIFICATE

'I, Celeste Hagood, hereby certify and, affirm in writing that I am Custodian of the records People(s) Hospital, a hospital organized and operated pursuant to or under the laws of Alabama, located at Jasper Alabama, and that I am custodian of the hospital records of said hospital and that the within copy of said hospital records are an exact, full, true and correct copy of said hospital records pertaining to Geneva Brown.

'I further certify that I am familiar with and know, and knew when made and charged, the reasonable value and price for the various charges made and shown in said hospital records pertaining to Geneva Brown and that said charges are in my judgment just, reasonable and proper and...

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    • United States
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    • July 29, 1988
    ...that this case falls within the "extraneous facts" exception in the case law. Although her reliance on the cases of Jackson v. Brown, 49 Ala.App. 55, 268 So.2d 837 (1972), and Weekley v. Horn, 263 Ala. 364, 82 So.2d 341 (1955), is somewhat misplaced, the issue of the extraneous facts except......
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  • Fields v. Parker
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • July 28, 1978
    ...when the trial court has refused to grant a new trial. E. g., Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 93 So.2d 138 (1957); Jackson v. Brown, 49 Ala.App. 55, 268 So.2d 837 (1972); L. & N. R. Co. v. Phillips, 293 Ala. 713, 310 So.2d 194 (1975). Those cases demonstrate the difference in the positions o......
  • Trotter v. Sumner
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • September 17, 1975
    ...ground of new trial is more carefully scrutinized or more rigidly limited than that the verdict is against the evidence. Jackson v. Brown, 49 Ala.App. 55, 268 So.2d 837. The decision of the trial court, refusing to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence......
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