State v. Archuleta
| Decision Date | 16 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 29,976.,29,976. |
| Citation | 269 P.3d 924,2012 -NMCA- 007 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Raymond ARCHULETA, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrea Sassa, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public Defender, B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
{1} On or about February 14, 2009, Defendant was found in possession of property which the State alleged had been stolen from the home of Phillip Baca and Denise Velarde. Defendant ran from police officers, depositing a stolen watch and a syringe in a garbage bin. He was charged with burglary, possession of stolen property with a value in excess of $500, possession of drug paraphernalia, tampering with evidence, and resisting arrest. Defendant was ultimately acquitted of both burglary and possession of drug paraphernalia, but convicted of all other charges. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the district court erred in denying his motions for a continuance and to reappoint counsel after Defendant waived his right to counsel and moved to represent himself; (2) there was insufficient evidence that Defendant possessed stolen property with a value in excess of $500, a fourth-degree felony and, thus, there was also insufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence of a fourth-degree felony; (3) the admission of certain statements by one of the State's witnesses constituted fundamental error and violated Defendant's confrontation clause rights; and (4) cumulative error deprived Defendant of his right to a fair trial. For the reasons that follow, we find no error and affirm.
{2} Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motions for a continuance and to reappoint counsel. At trial, Defendant was initially represented by counsel but, on June 23, 2009, Defendant requested that he be allowed to represent himself. The court conducted an extensive inquiry, advising Defendant of the potential consequences of choosing to proceed pro se. Throughout the inquiry, Defendant continually maintained that he understood the risks and that he still wished to represent himself. The district court granted his motion, finding that Defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel and relieved Defendant's counsel from his representation. On the same date, Defendant was informed that the matter was scheduled for trial on September 10, 2009.
{3} On September 9, 2009, the day before trial, Defendant moved to continue the trial, asserting that he was unprepared because he had not been able to physically see some of the stolen items to prepare his case and because he had been able to spend only approximately one hour in the detention center library since receiving additional discovery from the State approximately two weeks earlier. The court asked Defendant what specific items he needed to see, and he identified a cell phone, sunglasses, and an earring, all being items which ultimately were not used in securing Defendant's convictions. The court asked Defendant why the inventory list and photographs that were in his possession were not sufficient, and Defendant merely maintained that he was not given full discovery because he was not able to personally see all actual items. The district court denied Defendant's motion for a continuance and found that Defendant had not provided sufficient reasons why he was unable to be prepared for trial the next day.
{4} Immediately after Defendant's motion to continue was denied, Defendant made a motion to have counsel reappointed. Defendant asserted the same arguments he made regarding his motion for a continuance, arguing that he had not had adequate time to prepare his case and that he had not received full discovery. The district court denied Defendant's motion, stressing that Defendant was making the request the day before trial when he had already waived his right to counsel and requested to represent himself.
{5} The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion rests with the defendant. State v. Sanchez, 120 N.M. 247, 253, 901 P.2d 178, 184 (1995); see State v. Perez, 95 N.M. 262, 264, 620 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1980) (). State v. Brazeal, 109 N.M. 752, 756, 790 P.2d 1033, 1037 (Ct.App.1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{6} Factors that a court considers when weighing the merits of a continuance request are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the likelihood that a delay would accomplish the movant's objectives, (3) the existence of previous continuances in the same matter, (4) the degree of inconvenience to the parties and the court, (5) the legitimacy of the motives in requesting the delay, (6) the fault of the movant in causing a need for the delay, and (7) the prejudice to the movant in denying the motion. State v. Torres, 1999–NMSC–010, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 20, 976 P.2d 20. While this was Defendant's first request for a continuance, there were various additional reasons justifying the court's denial of Defendant's motion. Defendant's request came the day before trial, after he had been previously informed and reminded on multiple occasions of the upcoming trial date. The granting of Defendant's eleventh-hour motion would have likely caused significant inconvenience to the court and the State, both of which had prepared for Defendant's trial the following day. Additionally, the factors regarding the likelihood that a delay would accomplish the movant's objectives and the prejudice to the movant hold relatively little or no weight in this circumstance. The evidence Defendant requested to physically inspect after it was viewed in the pre-trial photographs was never offered or used against him. In addition, Defendant failed to articulate how waiting one day to view the physical evidence rather than the photographs of the evidence caused him any prejudice. Finally, Defendant's reasons for a continuance failed to identify a legitimate motive that justified postponing the trial. As a result, Defendant did not meet his burden by sufficiently explaining why Defendant's limited time in the detention center library and the allegedly missing and late discovery provided compelling reasons for a continuance. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to continue.
{7} Defendant also challenges the court's denial of his motion to reappoint counsel. In State v. Vincent, we followed the lead of multiple out-of-state jurisdictions to hold that once a defendant has validly waived his right to counsel, he may not later demand the assistance of counsel as a matter of right. 2005–NMCA–064, ¶ 48, 137 N.M. 462, 112 P.3d 1119; see State v. Canedo–Astorga, 79 Wash.App. 518, 903 P.2d 500, 504 (1995) (); State v. Gallegos, 2006 UT App 404, ¶ 10, 147 P.3d 473 (Utah Ct.App.2006) (); People v. Cruz, 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 147 Cal.Rptr. 740, 747 (1978) (). However, in exercising discretion, a trial court should consider all the facts and circumstances of the case.
Because [s]elf-representation is a grave undertaking, one not to be encouraged, the request for reappointment should be granted absent reasons to deny. In some cases, however, there will be reasons to deny-for example, that the request comes on the eve of or during trial, and will delay or interrupt the trial if granted.
Canedo–Astorga, 903 P.2d at 504 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must review whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to reappoint counsel on the eve of trial.
{8} First, we now adopt the approach taken by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lawrence to provide guidance to the trial court when determining whether to grant a pro se defendant's motion to reappoint counsel. 46 Cal.4th 186, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 613, 205 P.3d 1062, 1066–67 (2009) (citing People v. Elliott, 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 139 Cal.Rptr. 205, 210–11 (1977)). There, the court suggested that a trial court should apply the following factors when faced with a defendant's request to reappoint counsel: (1) the defendant's prior history in the substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set forth for the request, (3) the length and stage of the proceedings, (4) disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to ensue from the granting of such motion, and (5) the likelihood of the defendant's effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own attorney. Id.
{9} After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Defendant's request for reappointment of ...
To continue reading
Request your trial