Arpaio v. Obama

• Citation: 27 F.Supp.3d 185
• Decision Date: 23 December 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–01966 BAH
• Parties: Joseph Arpaio, Plaintiff, v. Barack H. Obama, President, United States in his official capacity, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

27 F.Supp.3d 185

Joseph Arpaio, Plaintiff

v.Barack H. Obama, President, United States in his official capacity, et al., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14–01966 BAH

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed December 23, 2014

Larry E. Klayman, Law Offices of Larry Klayman, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Adam D. Kirschner, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, the elected Sheriff of Maricopa County, brings suit against the President of the United States, and other Federal officials, alleging that certain immigration policies announced by the President in a nationwide address on November 20, 2014 are unconstitutional, otherwise illegal, and should be stopped from going into effect.See Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 7. The plaintiff's suit raises important questions regarding the nation's immigration policies, which affect the lives of millions of individuals and their families. The wisdom and legality of these policies deserve careful and reasoned consideration. As the Supreme Court recently explained: “[T]he sound exercise of national power over immigration depends on the [Nation] meeting its responsibility to base its law on a political will informed by searching, thoughtful, rational civic discourse.” Arizona v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2510, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012).

The key question in this case, however, concerns the appropriate forum for where this national conversation should occur. The doctrine of standing, in both its constitutional and prudential formulations, concerns itself with “ ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’ ” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). Standing “ensures that [courts] act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2659, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013).

The refusal to adjudicate a claim should not be confused with abdicating the responsibility of judicial review. “Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 474, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). A court must refrain “ ‘from passing upon the constitutionality of an act [of the representative branches], unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.’ ” Id. (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919) ) (alteration in original). Ultimately, “[i]t is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants ... who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).

Concerns over the judicial role are heightened when the issue before the court involves, as here, enforcement of the immigration laws. This subject raises the stakes of, among other factors, “immediate human concerns” and “policy choices that bear on this Nation's international relations.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. at 2499. “[O]ur Constitution places such sensitive immigration and economic judgments squarely in the hands of the Political Branches, not the courts.” Fogo de Chao (Holdings) Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 769 F.3d 1127, 1151 n.10 (D.C.Cir.2014) ; see also United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (“The power to regulate immigration—an attribute of sovereignty essential to the preservation of any nation—has been entrusted by the Constitution to the political branches of the Federal Government.”).

The role of the Judiciary is to resolve cases and controversies properly brought by parties with a concrete and particularized injury—not to engage in policymaking better left to the political branches. The plaintiff's case raises important questions regarding the impact of illegal immigration on this Nation, but the questions amount to generalized grievances which are not proper for the Judiciary to address. For the reasons explained in more detail below, the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this challenge to the constitutionality and legality of the immigration policies at issue. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 7, is denied and the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ECF Nos. 13, 15, is granted.¹

I. BACKGROUND

A. Executive Enforcement of Immigration Laws

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme that governs immigration and naturalization. The INA establishes categories of immigrants who are inadmissible to the United States in the first instance, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182, and immigrants who are subject to removal from the United States once here, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227. Under the INA, “[a]liens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2499 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227 ).

The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is “charged with the administration and enforcement of [the INA] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Although charged with enforcement of the statutory scheme, “[a]n agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985), and indeed “[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2499. Thus, to enable the “proper ordering of its priorities,” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832, 105 S.Ct. 1649, and the marshalling of extant resources to address those priorities, the INA provides the Secretary of DHS with the authority to “establish such regulations; ... issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under [the INA].” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). Further, the Secretary of DHS is specifically charged with “establishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities,” 6 U.S.C. § 202(5), to ensure that DHS's limited resources are expended in pursuit of its highest priorities in national security, border security, and public safety.

The context in which the immigration laws are enforced bears out the need for such prioritization. DHS estimates that approximately 11.3 million undocumented immigrants residing in the United States are potentially eligible for removal. Pl.'s Mot., Ex. B (Karl Thompson, Memorandum Opinion for the Sec'y of Homeland Security and the Counsel to the President: DHS's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others at 1, (Nov. 19, 2014) (“OLC Opinion”)) at 1, ECF No. 7–2. Of those, DHS estimates that the agency has the resources to remove fewer than 400,000 undocumented immigrants. Id. In addition, DHS faces additional challenges including: demographic shifts resulting in increased costs for managing and deterring unauthorized border crossings; increased complexity in removing aliens; congressional directives to prioritize recent border crossers and serious criminals; and the humanitarian and social consequences of separating families.See OLC Opinion at 11; Defs.' Mem. Opp. Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.' Mem.”), Ex. 21 (Challenges at the Border: Examining the Causes, Consequences, and Responses to the Rise in Apprehensions at the Southern Border: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113^th Cong. (2014) (statement of Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, et al.)), ECF No. 13–21; see also Defs.' Mem. at 1.

To confront these challenges, the executive branch has long used an enforcement tool known as “deferred action” to implement enforcement policies and priorities, as authorized by statute. See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5). Deferred action is simply a decision by an enforcement agency not to seek enforcement of a given statutory or regulatory violation for a limited period of time. In the context of the immigration laws, deferred action represents a decision by DHS not to seek the removal of an alien for a set period of time. In this sense, eligibility for deferred action represents an acknowledgment that those qualifying individuals are the lowest priority for enforcement. Under long-existing regulations, undocumented immigrants granted deferred action may apply for authorization to work in the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14). These regulations were promulgated pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and have been in effect, as amended, since 1987. See Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed.Reg. 16216 (1987). Deferred action does not confer any immigration or citizenship status or establish any enforceable legal right to remain in the United States and, consequently, may be canceled at any time. See Reno v. Am.–Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (199...