McLenagan v. Karnes

• Decision Date: 30 June 1994
• Docket Number: 93-1993,Nos. 93-1992,s. 93-1992
• Citation: 27 F.3d 1002
• Parties: William R. McLENAGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John C. KARNES, Richmond Police Officer, Defendant-Appellant, and Marty M. Tapscott, Chief of Police, City of Richmond; Thomas E. Shook, Captain, Police Department, City of Richmond; Andrew J. Winston, Sheriff of the City of Richmond; Loretta Smith, Richmond Deputy Sheriff, Defendants. William R. McLENAGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew J. WINSTON, Sheriff of the City of Richmond; Loretta Smith, Richmond Deputy Sheriff, Defendants-Appellants, and Marty M. Tapscott, Chief of Police, City of Richmond; Thomas E. Shook, Captain, Police Department, City of Richmond; John C. Karnes, Richmond Police Officer, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1002

27 F.3d 1002

William R. McLENAGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John C. KARNES, Richmond Police Officer, Defendant-Appellant, and Marty M. Tapscott, Chief of Police, City of Richmond;

Thomas E. Shook, Captain, Police Department, City of

Richmond; Andrew J. Winston, Sheriff of the City of

Richmond; Loretta Smith, Richmond Deputy Sheriff, Defendants.

William R. McLENAGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew J. WINSTON, Sheriff of the City of Richmond; Loretta

Smith, Richmond Deputy Sheriff, Defendants-Appellants,

and

Marty M. Tapscott, Chief of Police, City of Richmond;

Thomas E. Shook, Captain, Police Department, City

of Richmond; John C. Karnes, Richmond

Police Officer, Defendants.

Nos. 93-1992, 93-1993.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued April 13, 1994.

Decided June 30, 1994.

ARGUED: Glen Franklin Koontz, Office of the City Atty., Richmond, VA, for appellant Karnes; Robert A. Dybing, Shuford, Rubin & Gibney, Richmond, VA, for appellants Winston and Smith. Murray Joseph Janus, Bremner, Baber & Janus, Richmond, VA, for appellee. ON BRIEF: William Joe Hoppe, Office of the City Atty., Richmond, VA, for appellant Karnes; John A. Gibney, Jr., Shuford, Rubin & Gibney, Richmond, VA, for appellants Winston and Smith. Scott W. Lechner, Bremner, Baber & Janus, Richmond, VA, for appellee.

Before HALL and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge K.K. HALL wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS and Senior Judge GODBOLD joined.

OPINION

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

In the early morning hours of May 10, 1992, the Richmond Police Department was conducting a sobriety checkpoint at a toll plaza on the Richmond Downtown Expressway. Drivers who failed a field sobriety test were taken into an office building adjoining the plaza and tested with a breathalyzer. Those who again failed were presented to a magistrate at the scene, who issued an arrest summons.

The magistrate performed her evening's duties out of an office that she had borrowed for the occasion. She carried a holstered revolver ¹ and had placed it upon a coffee can atop her desk; the weapon was visible to all who entered the office. After the magistrate had served an individual with an arrest summons, the detainee (now arrestee) was escorted from the office and seated in a large adjoining room, ordinarily a break room for plaza employees. The arrestees remained in the break room until transported via bus to the city jail.

Richmond Sheriff's Department deputies assumed custody of the arrestees. ² The deputies handcuffed the arrestees, maintained order in the break room, and drove the jail bus. All of the arrestees were handcuffed with their hands in front of their bodies ³ and remained that way until after they arrived at jail.

At about 3:00 a.m., as the police were preparing to close the checkpoint, Deputy Loretta Smith and two arrestees were seated in the break room. The magistrate exited her office and crossed the break room on her way to the main hallway and the women's restroom beyond; she was not carrying her revolver. ⁴ Moments later, one of the arrestees, still handcuffed in front, jumped from his seat and dashed past Deputy Smith into the magistrate's office. Smith did not instantly react; however, she soon realized that the magistrate had left the revolver behind.

Smith ran from the break room and turned down the main hallway toward the front door of the building, waving her arms in the air and yelling, "The man has got a gun!" several times on her way out. William McLenagan, the other arrestee who had been seated in the break room, was close behind her, hands still cuffed in front, also trying to flee the perceived danger. McLenagan was running in a crouched position because the handcuffs constricted the normal motion of his arms.

Smith, still yelling, "The man has got a gun!," ran past Richmond police officer John Karnes, who was escorting a detainee down the main hallway toward the front door, away from the break room. Karnes immediately drew his gun, wheeled and saw McLenagan almost upon him; Karnes could not see whether McLenagan had a gun in his hands. ⁵ Karnes shot McLenagan. Karnes nearly shot McLenagan a second time, but observed, as McLenagan fell, that he had no weapon. Karnes swore, ran toward the magistrate's office and, about six to eight seconds following the initial shot, fired two more bullets through the now-closed office door. Karnes's superiors quickly arrived on the scene and ordered him to leave the building. The arrestee who had dashed into the magistrate's office was eventually subdued.

McLenagan suffered serious injuries to his hands and abdomen. On April 7, 1993, he filed suit in district court against Karnes Smith, Capt. Thomas Shook (Karnes's supervisor), Sheriff Andrew Winston, and Police Chief Marty Tapscott. McLenagan alleged that the five, either by their actions at the scene or by failing to properly train and supervise their subordinates, had violated his federal civil rights "secured by the [Four]th, [Fif]th, and [Fourteen]th Amendments." McLenagan also brought supplemental (pendent) state claims for gross negligence against all five, and for assault and battery against Karnes. The complaint purported to sue Tapscott and Winston in their official capacities only, and Karnes, Smith, and Shook in both their official and individual capacities.

The "police defendants" (Karnes, Tapscott, and Shook) and the "sheriff defendants" (Smith and Winston) filed separate answers, asserting, among other defenses, qualified immunity as to the federal claims and sovereign immunity as to the state claims. The sheriff defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and all the defendants filed motions for summary judgment.

The district court ruled on the sheriff's motion to dismiss on June 16, 1993. The court dismissed only that portion of McLenagan's Sec. 1983 claim that pertained to Smith and Winston in their official capacities; the individual-capacity Sec. 1983 claims and the state law gross negligence claims survived the motion.

The court then, on July 23, 1993, conducted a joint hearing on the motions for summary judgment, after which it granted full summary judgment to Tapscott and Shook but denied immunity to the other defendants on both the federal and state claims. Remaining are the claims against Karnes and Smith (in her individual capacity only) under Sec. 1983, the gross negligence claims against Karnes, Smith, and Winston (in his official capacity only), and the assault and battery claim against Karnes.

Karnes, Smith, and Winston all appeal. ⁶ We hold that Karnes and Smith are entitled to qualified immunity on the Sec. 1983 claim, and that all three are entitled to sovereign immunity on the supplemental claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for it to enter summary judgment for the appellants on all of McLenagan's claims against them.

I.

Government officials who perform discretionary functions ⁷ are not liable under Sec. 1983 for civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not contravene "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The first step in assessing the potential civil liability of state actors under Sec. 1983 is to determine whether the plaintiff has properly asserted a violation of a clearly established right arising under either the Constitution or a federal statute. American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Wicomico County, 999 F.2d 780, 784 (4th Cir.1993) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991)).

A.

McLenagan asserts that Karnes's use of his service revolver constituted excessive force, and was thus an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as applicable to Karnes via the Fourteenth Amendment. The clearly established standard at the time of the encounter between Karnes and McLenagan was that a police officer's use of deadly force is not excessive where he has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1701, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). To ascertain whether probable cause existed for Karnes to fire his weapon, we consider "the particular circumstances confronting the official at the time of the questioned action." Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir.1991) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Regardless of whether probable cause actually existed, if a reasonable officer possessing the same particularized information as Karnes could have, in light of Garner, believed that his conduct was lawful, then Karnes is entitled to qualified immunity. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3039-40.

Slattery v. Rizzo, supra, is our leading case addressing the issue of qualified immunity in the excessive force context. Slattery was a passenger in a car parked in a lot while the driver stood nearby, making a drug deal with an undercover officer. When the police swarmed in for the arrest, Officer Rizzo approached the car from the side and could see that Slattery was holding an object in his left hand. Rizzo repeatedly commanded Slattery to raise his hands; Slattery failed to comply, instead turning his head to look at Rizzo and then returning his glance forward. When Slattery started to move his entire upper body toward the officer, Rizzo shot Slattery in the face. The object in Slattery's hand turned out to be a beer bottle.

Slattery sued, and the district court denied Rizzo qualified immunity. We reversed, holding that a reasonable officer in Rizzo's position could...