People v. A. C.

Citation261 N.E.2d 620,27 N.Y.2d 79,313 N.Y.S.2d 695
Parties, 261 N.E.2d 620 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Michael A.C. (Anonymous), Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Jerome C. (Anonymous), Respondent.
Decision Date02 July 1970
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

William Cahn, Dist. Atty. (Henry P. DeVine, Mineola, of counsel), for appellant.

Matthew Muraskin and James J. McDonough, Mineola, for respondents.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Maria L. Marcus and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, New York City, of counsel), for State of New York, amicus curiae.

FULD, Chief Judge.

In each of these two cases the defendant was tried by the court alone, without a jury, and adjudicated a youthful offender. On appeal, the Appellate Division treated both defendants alike, reversing each judgment on the ground that section 913--g (subd. 3) and section 913--h of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as they require a youngster between the ages of 16 and 19 to consent to a trial without a jury in order to render him eligible for youthful offender treatment, are unconstitutional. Since Michael A.C.'s trial began after May 20, 1968, the date on which the Supreme Court decided Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 and Jerome C.'s in March, some two months before Duncan, separate treatment of each case is required.

People v. Michael A.C.

On a September day in 1967, a police officer observed the defendant, walking about the parking lot of a large suburban shopping center, looking into the windows of parked cars. The officer approached the defendant and asked him to identify himself. The latter gave the officer his name and stated that he was 18 years old. As he reached into his pocket to get his draft card or some other means of identification, he pulled out a pack of cigarettes. A small manila envelope, which had apparently been in the pack, fell to the ground--upon which the defendant immediately took off and ran into the nearby Gimbel's Department Store. The officer picked up the envelope, saw what appeared to be marijuana inside and followed the defendant into the store. Before losing him in the crowd, the officer saw him throw the cigarette package, with four more envelopes, under a clothing counter. He returned to his patrol car and broadcast the description of the defendant; his arrest occurred a short time later.

The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the second degree, a class D felony (Penal Law, former § 220.15, Consol.Laws, c. 40), punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years (Penal Law, § 70.00). The District Attorney thereafter, pursuant to the provisions of section 913--g of the Code of Criminal Procedure recommended that he be accorded youthful offender treatment. 1 The defendant thereupon executed a written form which recited that, if found eligible for adjudication as a youthful offender, he consented 'to be tried without a jury, if that should become necessary'. The consent thus given by the defendant was, of course, mandated by the statute (Code Crim.Proc. § 913--g) which also provides in section 913--h that, if the defendant is found eligible for youthful offender treatment and pleads not guilty, he is to be tried 'without a jury'. 2

The defendant, contending that the provision was unconstitutional, moved in April, 1968, for an order 'impanelling a jury'. His application was unsuccessful, as was his motion for reargument, and the case proceeded to trial without a jury on July 25, 1968. 2 The court, as already noted, adjudged the defendant a youthful offender but, on appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the judgment on the ground that the Code provisions mandating a defendant's consent to a trial without a jury were invalid (32 A.D.2d 554, 300 N.Y.S.2d 816).

On May 20, 1968, before the defendant's trial began, the Supreme Court decided the Duncan case (391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, Supra), holding that the Sixth Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment requires that defendants charged with 'serious crimes' be afforded the right to a trial by jury. Declining to 'settle * * * the exact location of the line between petty offenses and serious crimes', the court in Duncan stated that '(i)t is sufficient for our purposes to hold that a crime punishable by two years in prison is, based on past and contemporary standards in this country, a serious crime and not a petty offense' (391 U.S., at pp. 161--162, 88 S.Ct., at pp. 1453--1454). Just 10 days ago, however, the Supreme Court fixed 'the exact location of (that) line' at six months, holding that, 'where the possible penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment', the offense must be deemed sufficiently 'serious' to entitle him to a jury trial. (Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1891, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (decided June 22, 1970).) It is urged, therefore, that a youthful offender, such as the defendant before us, who is exposed to the possibility of a four-year reformatory sentence of imprisonment (Penal Law, art. 75; Code Crim.Proc., § 913--m, subd. 1, par. (d)), is entitled to a trial by jury.

The District Attorney takes a different view of the matter. It is his position that the jury trial requirement applies only to ordinary criminal cases and not to special proceedings such as the present. However, if there could have been any doubt that persons tried as youthful offenders are entitled to the fundamental protections accorded defendants in ordinary criminal prosecutions, that doubt was dispelled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, dealing with juvenile delinquency proceedings. The court there rejected the view that a juvenile's guilt did not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt even though the proceedings are designed 'to save the child,' rather than to punish him, and even though the delinquency adjudication is not a criminal conviction. After noting that it had rejected 'this justification' in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, the court went on to say in Winship (397 U.S., at pp. 365--366, 90 S.Ct., at p. 1073):

'We made clear in that decision that civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for '(a) proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.' (387 U.S.) at 36, 87 S.Ct. 1428.'

Proceedings brought against youthful offenders are even less entitled to a 'civil' label than those against juvenile delinquents. The former are clearly 'criminal' in character and form. The youthful defendant is charged by indictment (or information) with a crime and he is tried in a criminal court, albeit in a part designated as the Youth Part. Moreover, it has long been the rule in youthful offender prosecutions that guilt of the specific acts charged against the defendant must be proven in accordance with the standards applied in a criminal trial. (See People v. Sykes, 22 N.Y.2d 159, 292 N.Y.S.2d 76, 239 N.E.2d 182; People v.Shannon, 1 A.D.2d 226, 231--232, 149 N.Y.S.2d 550 555--556, affd. 2 N.Y.2d 792, 158 N.Y.S.2d 334, 139 N.E.2d 430.) In the language of the Code itself ( § 913--n, subd. 2),

'For the purposes of determining the period of the sentence, the criteria to be used, the conditions to be imposed * * * and other such incidents of sentence, the sentences provided * * * shall be governed by the provisions that would be applicable in the case of a sentence imposed upon a conviction for the criminal act for which the person was adjudicated as a youthful offender'.

In other words, as the Appellate Division observed in the Shannon case (1 A.D.2d, at pp. 231--232, 149 N.Y.S.2d, at pp. 555--556), 'Insofar as its immediate effect and consequences are concerned, the adjudication, involving as it does a finding that the defendant is guilty of a crime * * * after a plea of guilty or a trial, and carrying with it the possibility of a commitment * * * and the preservation of the defendant's finger-print records by the division of identification of the Correction Department * * * has all the essential features of a conviction as that term is ordinarily understood by lawyers and laymen alike. (Cf. Blaufus v. People, 69 N.Y. 107, 109.)' Certainly, where, as here, a defendant has been indicted for a felony and faces imprisonment for as long a period as four years, his trial, in the light of current constitutional principles, involves the prosecution of a 'serious' crime even though the judgment is termed a youthful offender adjudication.

It is true, of course, that, upon his indictment in the County Court, the defendant had a right to a jury trial if he so desired and that he 'consented' to waive that right when he requested consideration for youthful offender treatment. However, although any defendant, including a youthful offender, is free to consent to a trial without a jury if, in fact and reality, he prefers to be so tried--and knowingly waives his constitutional right--this does not mean that a State may demand that such a consent be given as an absolute precondition to affording him the benefits of youthful offender treatment. (See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138; Nieves v. United States, D.C., 280 F.Supp. 994.) In the Jackson case (390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138, Supra), for instance, the Supreme Court voided a provision in the Federal Kidnapping Act (U.S.Code, tit. 18, § 1201, subd. (a)) which, in effect, rendered only those defendants who insisted on their constitutional right to a jury trial liable to the death penalty and yet provided a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for those who waived that right. Such a provision, the Supreme Court wrote, 'needlessly...

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