Clark v. Clark

• Decision Date: 05 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 20000276.,20000276.
• Citation: 27 P.3d 538,2001 UT 44
• Parties: Linda Kay CLARK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cecil E. CLARK, Defendant and Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

27 P.3d 538

2001 UT 44

Linda Kay CLARK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cecil E. CLARK, Defendant and Petitioner.

No. 20000276.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 5, 2001.

Rehearing Denied July 26, 2001.

Suzanne Marelius, Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff.

Mary C. Corporon, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

DURHAM, Justice:

¶ 1 Defendant Cecil E. Clark (Cecil) seeks certiorari review of the court of appeals' memorandum decision in favor of plaintiff Linda Kay Clark (Linda). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of an unsolemnized marriage pursuant to section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code and reversed the trial court's granting of Cecil's motion for relief from judgment due to lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Linda and Cecil had an eighteen-year solemnized marriage, which ended in divorce on August 27, 1985. Just a few months after the divorce was granted, Linda and Cecil resumed living together in late October or early November 1985. They continued to live together for a period of eleven years until August 1996. From December 1995 until June 1996, Linda resided in a separate apartment. She moved back in with Cecil, however, in June 1996, and they continued to live together until August 28, 1996, when a final separation occurred.

¶ 3 In October 1996, Linda brought this action against Cecil to establish an unsolemnized marriage, obtain a divorce, and divide marital assets. Cecil, however, delayed in providing discovery in the matter, even after two motions to compel. Therefore, Commissioner Lisa A. Jones held a hearing on April 17, 1997, and ruled that Cecil's failure to provide discovery would result in his pleadings being stricken and a default judgment entered against him if complete discovery was not forthcoming.

¶ 4 On May 15, 1997, in response to Commissioner Jones' ruling, Linda submitted a set of findings of fact and conclusions of law, declaration of marriage, and decree of divorce, which were placed in the record, unsigned. On the same day, Linda filed a motion for entry of decree and findings and a notice to submit for decision. Commissioner Jones stayed Linda's motion on June 30, 1997, and ordered that records sought by Linda be delivered to Linda's counsel the following day. The next day, July 1, 1997, Commissioner Jones certified the case for trial for determination of, among other things, whether an unsolemnized marriage existed, and to consider Cecil's contempt for "violation of restraint on asserts." To expedite matters, Commissioner Jones suggested, in her minute entry, that the district court hold a bifurcated hearing to determine the marriage issue, noting that "the statutory limit on establishment of a marriage is looming."

¶ 5 On the date of trial, August 13, 1997, the district court found in a minute entry that "the statutory requirements have been met and a common-law marriage existed up to August of 1996 when the parties separated." However, the findings of fact and conclusions of law were not entered at that time.

¶ 6 The record indicates that counsel for Linda prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were sent to opposing counsel on August 26, 1997. The documents had to be revised, however, based on changes requested by Cecil's counsel. The revised copies were sent for approval to Cecil's counsel on September 10, 1997, but Cecil did not give approval. Thereafter, as no objection had been filed, counsel for Linda transmitted the documents to the court, which entered the findings and declaration of marriage on September 29, 1997. The findings specified that the Clarks' unsolemnized marriage had ended on August 28, 1996.

¶ 7 After the findings and declaration of marriage were entered, Cecil moved the court for relief from the judgment,¹ claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction because the court order establishing a common law marriage was not entered within one year following the termination of the Clarks' relationship as required by section 30-1-4.5. Subsection two provides in relevant part that "[t]he determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship described in subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship." Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998) (emphasis added). The district court granted Cecil's motion, concluding that it was without jurisdiction to enter the order later than one year after the termination of the relationship. Both parties appealed to the court of appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 "On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district court, and apply the same standard of review used by the court of appeals." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n. 2 (Utah 1992)). We review the court of appeals' decision for correctness. See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, ¶ 4, 978 P.2d 460

(citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995)). The correctness of the court of appeals's decision turns on whether it accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review. See Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Audit. Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997).

ANALYSIS

I. ADJUDICATION REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 30-1-4.5

¶ 9 Subsequent to oral argument to the court of appeals in this case, we decided In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074, which construed subsection two of section 30-1-4.5 as "requir[ing] only the filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year after the termination of the relationship." Id. at ¶ 30 (emphasis in original). Gonzalez raised the question of whether the legislature intended the unusual language of section 30-1-4.5 to be construed contrary to conventional statutes of limitation that limit the period to commence an action, not the period within which a court must reach final judgment. See id. at ¶ 24. We ruled that "[t]he legislature should not be deemed to have created such a potentially unfair rule without clear and convincing language evidencing its intent to do so. . . ." Id. (noting that "the ambiguities created in this statute appear to be the result of nothing more than inartful drafting"). Therefore, we turned to the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the statute. See id. at ¶ 23 ("When doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose." (citing Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999 UT 18, ¶ 25, 974 P.2d 1194)).

¶ 10 As we explained in Gonzalez, the Utah Legislature enacted section 30-1-4.5 with the aim of preventing welfare fraud by giving Utah's Office of Recovery Services an avenue to prevent exclusion of a common law spouse's income when applying for government benefits. See Gonzalez,2000 UT 28 at ¶ 21, 1 P.3d 1074 (citing Floor Debate, remarks of Norman Angus, Director of State Social Services Admin., 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 17, 1987) (Sen. Recording No. 75)). The one-year adjudication requirement was an apparent attempt "to protect the parties to a putative marriage from fraud or mistake due to long delays in adjudication." Id. (emphasis in original). It seems "the Legislature was concerned with situations in which the couple never intended to be married but where, years later, most likely at the time one of them dies, [someone not a party to the marriage] is trying to prove the existence of such a marriage." Id. at ¶¶ 21-22 (citing Floor Debate, remarks of Sen. Lyle Hillyard, 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1987) (Sen. CD No. 81B)).

¶ 11 Therefore, the legislative purpose giving rise to the one-year adjudication requirement has nothing to do with a case such as this where an individual attempts to establish an unsolemnized marriage in order to divide marital assets. See id. at ¶ 24 (noting that legislative purpose is unrelated to case where individual attempts to establish unsolemnized marriage to claim insurance benefits). We further explained that a statute of limitation not tolled by the filing of an action created potential unfairness and would be subject to constitutional challenge, because "an action filed in a timely manner could still fail the limitation period due to delays in discovery or a court's crowded docket." Id. We specifically relied on our obligation to construe statutes to avoid potential unconstitutionality. See id. at ¶ 30. The construction urged by the intervenor in Gonzalez would have raised questions of equal protection, due process, and separation of powers, all of which were avoided by our reading. If, indeed, we misconstrued legislative intent, it is to be expected that the legislature will tell us so. Therefore, under Gonzalez, an action to establish an unsolemnized marriage is timely if filed within one year of the termination of the relationship. Id.

II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF UNSOLEMNIZED MARRIAGE

¶ 12 Cecil challenges the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's finding that Linda had met the statutory requirements of section 30-1-4.5. Section 30-1-4.5(1) sets forth the following requirements to establish an unsolemnized marriage:

(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting parties who:

(a) are capable of giving consent;

(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this chapter;

(c) have cohabited;

(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and

(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband

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