State v. Memoli

Decision Date03 June 1970
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Richard F. MEMOLI.

James F. Bingham, Stamford, for appellant (defendant).

Arlen D. Nickowitz, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph T. Gormley, Jr., State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before ALCORN, C.J., and HOUSE, THIM, RYAN and SHAPIRO, JJ.

ALCORN, Chief Justice.

The defendant was tried upon an information charging him with the crimes of breaking and entering a motor vehicle; General Statutes § 53-76; and larceny; General Statutes § 53-63. He was convicted by a jury and has appealed from the judgment on the verdict.

From the evidence introduced at the trial the state claimed to have proved that, in the early morning hours of December 9, 1967, the defendant and Richard Franco broke into an automobile while it was parked, with the doors locked, on a public street in Stamford and stole a sum of money which was locked in the glove compartment of the vehicle. Franco and the defendant were arrested at approximately 2:54 a.m. on the morning of the alleged crimes. They were brought immediately to police headquarters, where a police detective gave both men the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, after which the detective talked to each man separately. Franco and the defendant roomed in a building in Stamford known as the 'Clubmen's Club'. Both men consented to a search of their room at the Clubmen's Club, and Franco gave the detective a key with which to enter the building. The detective and others entered the building and searched the defendant's room, in which they found about $61 in a wooden vase under the bed and $307 in the pocket of a coat belonging to the defendant. All of the items found were admitted into evidence.

When a police detective testifying for the state began to describe his entry into the building, defense counsel interrupted and the court excused the jury. Thereupon, in the absence of the jury, defense counsel made a motion to suppress any evidence obtained during the search of the Clubmen's Club. Following a hearing held in the absence of the jury, the court denied the motion to suppress and, after the jury were recalled, admitted into evidence the fruits of the search. The defendant assigns error in this action of the court.

It is conceded that the search was made without a warrant. From the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court found that Franco and the defendant, who lived at the Clubmen's Club, were arrested, brought to police headquarters, warned of their constitutional rights, and interrogated separately by Detective Anthony J. Scalise, that 'Franco and Memoli gave Detective Scalise their consent to search their room.' that Franco gave Detective Scalise the key to the front door in order to enter, and that '(t)he rooms of both Franco and Memoli were located on the second floor of the club'. (Emphasis supplied.) To understand the finding more fully, we have examined the evidence printed in the appendices to the briefs. Quednau v. Langrish, 144 Conn. 706, 711, 137 A.2d 544; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 131. There we find that Detective Scalise testified that he asked the defendant and Franco if he could search their room and they said he could. Franco gave him a key which he said would let him into the premises, and the defendant told him their room was on the second floor. Both men said he could search their room but not the whole club. The court's finding is that, thereafter, in response to an inquiry from the court as to whether the detective had had any conversation with the defendant about going to the room, the officer testified as follows:

'The witness: There was some conversation, yes, sir. And if I remember right, he didn't give me any answer at the beginning. Then when I told him that Franco gave me it already to go down, then I believe he said it was okay to go.

'The court: You believe Memoli said it was okay to go.

'The witness: Yes, sir. But this was after I told him that Franco gave me the key, you know, to go down there already.'

Not every search made without a warrant is unlawful. A search which is made with the full consent of the defendant may be lawful provided the state affirmatively establishes that the consent is voluntary. State v. Miller, 152 Conn. 343, 347, 206 A.2d 835. The question is one of fact to be decided by the court upon the evidence and such reasonable inferences as can be drawn from it. State v. Hanna, 150 Conn. 457, 471, 191 A.2d 124. All of the surrounding circumstances are pertinent to the question or voluntariness. State v. Hassett, 155 Conn. 225, 230, 230 A.2d 553.

Both the...

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3 cases
  • Connecticut Coke Co. v. City of New Haven
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • December 2, 1975
    ...213, 363 A.2d 91; State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 55, 301 A.2d 547; Brockett v. Jensen, 154 Conn. 328, 331, 225 A.2d 190; State v. Memoli, 159 Conn. 433, 435, 270 A.2d 543; Quednau v. Langrish, 144 Conn. 706, 711-12, 137 A.2d 544. We have examined not only the evidence printed in the appendic......
  • State v. Kearney
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • November 29, 1972
    ...no claim that his several consents were the result of duress, deception or sham. See Bumper v. North Carolina, supra; State v. Memoli, 159 Conn. 433, 436, 270 A.2d 543. It appears that there was no error in these Despite the lack of error in these further assignments of error which we have ......
  • State v. Marra
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • March 7, 1978
    ...To explain the findings more fully, the evidence printed in the appendix to the state's brief may be examined. State v. Memoli, 159 Conn. 433, 435, 270 A.2d 543; Quednau v. Langrish, 144 Conn. 706, 711, 137 A.2d 544; see also Practice Book §§ 628G, 628H. The appendix, including segments of ......

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