D.L. v. Unified School Dist. # 497
| Decision Date | 18 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A.00-2439.,CIV. A.00-2439. |
| Parties | D.L., Individually and as Next Friend of J.L., R.L., Minors, and P.P., Plaintiffs, v. The UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT # 497, and Dr. Douglas Eicher, School Administrator, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Gregory P. Goheen, McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, KS, for Plaintiffs.
Carrie E. Josserand, Meredith Jayne Rund, W. Joseph Hatley, Lathrop & Gage L.C., Overland Park, KS, for Defendants.
Pending before the court are plaintiffs' Motion to Stay (Doc. 115), defendants' Conditional Motion to Stay (Doc. 130), defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 66), plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplement to Final Witness and Exhibit List (Doc. 165), defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 118), defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Cindy Harvel (Doc. 157), defendants' Motion to Strike and Preclude Testimony of Witnesses Not Previously Disclosed (Doc. 57), plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony (Doc. 155), defendants' Motion for Review of Magistrate's Decision on Defendants' Motion for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) Notice (Doc. 119), plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Answers to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories and First Request for Production (Doc. 137), defendants' Application for Stay of Magistrate Judge's Order (Doc. 128), defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 90), and plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 107).
As set forth below, plaintiffs' Motion to Stay (Doc. 115) is denied as moot. Defendants' Conditional Motion to Stay (Doc. 130) is denied. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 66) is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplement to Final Witness and Exhibit List (Doc. 165) is denied. Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 118) is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Cindy Harvel (Doc. 157) is denied. Defendants' Motion to Strike and Preclude Testimony of Witnesses Not Previously Disclosed (Doc. 57) is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony (Doc. 155) is denied. Defendants' Motion for Review of Magistrate's Decision on Defendants' Motion for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) Notice (Doc. 119) is denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Answers to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories and First Request for Production (Doc. 137) is granted. Defendants' Application for Stay of Magistrate Judge's Order (Doc. 128) is denied. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 90) is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 107) is granted in part and denied in part.
In their Conditional Motion to Stay, defendants request the court to stay all proceedings in this case (hereinafter "the federal court action") pending resolution of a related case, No. 01-2448, styled Unified School District # 497 v. D.L., in Kansas state court (hereinafter "the state court action"). Defendants argue that this court should stay the case pursuant to Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941) and Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' Conditional Motion to Stay is denied.
Plaintiffs R.L. and J.L. are the minor children of plaintiff D.L. R.L. is autistic and J.L. has a milder learning disability. P.P. cohabitates with D.L., but P.P. has no legal relationship to either D.L. or the children. This case arises from plaintiffs' allegations that defendants Unified School District # 497 (hereinafter "defendant U.S.D. # 497") and Dr. Douglas Eicher, a U.S.D # 497 administrator, failed to provide plaintiffs with access to educational services to which they were entitled. Furthermore, plaintiffs contend defendants improperly disclosed confidential information concerning the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert causes of action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.;2 the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Kansas state law for invasion of privacy.3
On April 18, 2000, defendant U.S.D. # 497 filed a lawsuit against D.L. and P.P. in the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas. In its state court petition, defendant U.S.D. # 497 brought a state law fraud claim and sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to Kansas state law. The petition alleged that D.L.'s children were not residents of defendant U.S.D. # 497, and sought to enjoin the children's attendance of schools in the district. The petition further stated that D.L. had fraudulently enrolled her children in defendant U.S.D. # 497 and that P.P. aided and abetted that fraud. The defendants in the state court action, D.L. and P.P., did not raise counterclaims in that action. Rather, on September 29, 2000, D.L., individually and on behalf of her minor children, along with P.P., filed the instant federal court action against defendants, asserting federal statutory and constitutional claims and a state law claim for invasion of privacy. On September 7, 2001, D.L. and P.P., defendants in the state court action, filed a Notice of Removal of that action to this court. After finding that removal was improper, this court remanded that action, Case No. 01-2448, styled Unified School District No. 497 v. D.L., to the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas on May 30, 2002.4 Having discussed the relevant procedural history, the court turns to the merits of defendants' Conditional Motion to Stay.
In their motion, defendants assert two bases upon which this court should abstain from ruling on the present case. First, defendants contend plaintiffs' claims are related to the pending parallel action in Kansas state court, and that, as a result, the federal constitutional issues in this action could be mooted by the state court's determination of Kansas state law—namely, the issue of whether the children reside within the boundaries of defendant U.S.D. # 497 pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-1046. Second, defendants allege that abstention is proper under the Colorado River doctrine, because the Kansas state court action is a parallel proceeding and "considerations of "wise administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation,' " Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236 (internal citation omitted), counsel in favor of staying the federal court action.
The court construes defendants' first argument under the abstention doctrine established in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. Although defendants label this argument as under the "first prong of the Colorado River doctrine" (Def.'s Mot. at 6), the language defendants cite from the Colorado River opinion upon which their argument is based is the Supreme Court's discussion of its prior rulings in Pullman and other cases that "[a]bstention is appropriate `in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.'" Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814, 96 S.Ct. 1236 (citing Pullman, inter alia).
The Pullman doctrine "permits a federal court to stay its hand in those instances where a federal constitutional claim is premised on an unsettled question of state law, whose determination by the state court might avoid or modify the constitutional issue." Vinyard v. King, 655 F.2d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir.1981) (citing Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)). "Where resolution of the federal constitutional question is dependent upon, or may be materially altered by, the determination of an uncertain issue of state law, abstention may be proper in order to avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations, interference with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law, and premature constitutional adjudication." Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965). Abstention is "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it," and "can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to State court would clearly serve a countervailing interest." Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959). Pullman provides that a district court should abstain if three conditions are satisfied: (1) an uncertain issue of state law underlies the federal constitutional claim; (2) the state issues are amenable to interpretation by the state courts and such an interpretation would moot or substantially narrow the scope of the constitutional claim; and (3) an erroneous interpretation of the state law by the federal court would hinder important state law policies. Vinyard, 655 F.2d at 1018 (citing D'Iorio v. Del. County, 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir.1978)).
First, the court must examine whether an unsettled issue of state law...
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