Shumard v. General Motors Corporation, Civ. A. No. 7904.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1967
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 7904.
• Citation: 270 F. Supp. 311
• Parties: Charles H. SHUMARD, Administrator of the Estate of Donald W. Shumard, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

270 F. Supp. 311

Charles H. SHUMARD, Administrator of the Estate of Donald W. Shumard, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 7904.

United States District Court S. D. Ohio, E. D.

February 28, 1967.

Harry M. Philo, Detroit, Mich., Joseph J. Bruzzese, Samuel A. Corabi, Steubenville, Ohio, for plaintiff.

John C. Elam, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Columbus, Ohio, for defendant.

OPINION AND ENTRY

WEINMAN, Chief Judge.

This action was filed under the Ohio Wrongful Death Act as the result of the death of his decedent on January 8, 1965. The complaint states that the plaintiff's decedent was in an automobile collision with another vehicle and was killed while in a 1962 Corvair automobile which erupted into flames and killed plaintiff's decedent.

The complaint sets forth four causes of action, to-wit, (1) Negligence, (2) Strict Liability in Tort, (3) Breach of Express and Implied Warranties, and (4) Wanton and Wilful Misconduct.

The singular issue presented by the complaint is whether an automobile manufacturer has a duty to design its automobiles to be fireproof and prevent injury to occupants when such automobiles are in collision with other objects and, in this instance, with another vehicle.

An automobile manufacturer cannot construct a fireproof vehicle unless it forsakes the use of any and all combustible materials. The impracticality and unreasonableness of this suggestion is obvious. No duty exists to make an automobile fireproof, nor does a manufacturer have to make a product which is "accident-proof" or "foolproof". Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950); Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951).

The issue of negligent automobile design was raised in the recent case, Evans v. General Motors Corporation, 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir., 1966). This suit was a wrongful death action brought by the personal representative of the decedent's estate. Decedent was killed when his Chevrolet automobile was struck broadside by another vehicle. The plaintiff contended that General Motors was negligent in designing an automobile with an "X" frame rather than a perimeter frame since the "X" frame allegedly permitted the left side of decedent's automobile to collapse against him, inflicting fatal injuries when the automobile was struck broadside. As in the instant case, on this same theory of improper design, the plaintiff made claims under implied warranty and strict liability in tort.

The District Court in the Evans case dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint. In affirming the trial court's decision, the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile "accident-proof" or "foolproof" nor must he render the vehicle "more" safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all. In affirming the dismissal of the amended complaint, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated at page 824:

"The major question before us is the nature of the duty which an automobile manufacturer owes to users of its product. This presents an issue of law for the Court. * * *

"The defendant concedes that it had a duty to design its automobile to be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was made, without hiding defects which would make it dangerous to persons so using it."

The Court also stated that it was not a judicial function "to require manufacturers to construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide * * *". Imposition of such a requirement on automobile manufacturers "would be a legislative function, not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law". The extent of the manufacturer's duty in designing an auto frame is to insure that it is reasonably fit for its intended purpose.

The issue of alleged negligent design in the instant case is identical to that before the court in the Evans case. The sole distinction is that a different aspect of automobile design has been alleged as negligence. The duty of a manufacturer in the design of automobiles does not include designing a "fireproof" automobile or an automobile in which passengers are guaranteed to be safe from fire. A manufacturer has no duty to design an automobile that will not catch fire under any circumstances. The manufacturer's duty is to design an automobile which will not present a fire hazard during its normal intended operation.

As observed by the court in the Evans case, the question of duty is an issue of law for the court. In Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F.Supp. 677, 678 (S.D.Tex.,1963), the court said:

"However, who is to determine if a duty exists? Is this a matter of law or a disputed fact question itself? Certainly, there is disagreement in the instant case over whether or not the defendant had a duty to so design his vehicle that an accident like that under consideration could never happen. The very essence of plaintiff's

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