New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller

• Citation: 1 N.E.2d 153,270 N.Y. 333
• Parties: NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY v. MULLER et al.
• Decision Date: 17 March 1936
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

270 N.Y. 333

1 N.E.2d 153

NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY

v.MULLER et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 17, 1936.

Proceeding in the matter of the application of the New York City Housing Authority to acquire title to certain real property in the Borough of Manhattan, City and County of New York, for the purpose of altering, clearing, remodeling, constructing and/or reconstructing dwelling accommodations for persons of low income on the real property in Borough of Manhattan, City and County of New York, against Andrew Muller and another. From a final order of the Supreme Court confirming the report of the commissioners of appraisal and from a judgment and order of the Supreme Court granting the application for condemnation and appointing commissioners of appraisal, the defendants appeal on constitutional grounds.

Affirmed.

See, also, 155 Misc. 681, 279 N.Y.S. 299.

O'BRIEN, J., dissenting. Appeal from Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County.

Charles Lamb and James A. McKaigney, both of New York City, for appellant.

Paul Windels, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (Paxton Blair, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Ira S. Robbins, of New York City, for New York State Board of Housing, amicus curiae.

Charles Abrams, of New York City, for New York City Housing Authority, amicus curiae.

CROUCH, Judge.

The petitioner, a public corporation organized under the Municipal Housing Authorities Law (Laws 1934, c. 4, comprising sections 60 to 78, inclusive, of the State Housing Law, being Laws 1926, c. 823), seeks to condemn certain premises in the city of New York owned by the defendant Andrew Muller. The public use for which the premises are required is stated in the petition to be ‘the clearance, replanning and reconstruction of part of an area of the City of New York, State of New York wherein there exist, and the petitioner has found to exist, unsanitary and substandard housing conditions.’

As part of its project the petitioner has acquired by purchase properties contiguous on both sides to the premises in question. Acquisition of the defendant's property is, therefore, necessary for the carrying out of the project. The premises consist of two old-law tenement houses. The owner resists condemnation upon the ground that the Municipal Housing Authorities Law violates article 1, section 6, of the State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, because it grants to petitioner the power of eminent domain for a use which is not a public use.

Briefly and broadly stated, the statute provides that a city may set up an authority with power to investigate and study living and housing conditions in the city, and to plan and carry out projects for the clearing, replanning, and reconstruction of slum areas and the providing of housing accommodations for persons of low income. It is empowered under certain limitations to issue and sell bonds which, however, shall not be a debt of the state nor of the city; and it may not in any manner pledge the credit of the state or city or impose upon either any obligation. It is granted the power of eminent domain, to be exercised as provided, and it is exempted from the payment of certain taxes and fees. In enacting the statute, the Legislature, after thorough investigation, made certain findings of fact, upon the basis of which it determined and declared the necessity in the public interest of the provisions enacted and that the objects thereof were ‘public uses and purposes for which public money may be spent and private property acquired.’ Section 61. The facts found were that ‘in certain areas of cities of the State there exist unsanitary or substandard housing conditions owing to over-crowding and concentration of population, improper planning, excessive land coverage, lack of proper light, air and space, unsanitary design and arrangement, or lack of proper sanitary facilities; that there is not an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons of low income; that these conditions cause an increase and spread of disease and crime and constitute a menace to the health, safety, morals, welfare, and comfort of the citizens of the state, and impair economic values; that these conditions cannot be remedied by the ordinary operation of private enterprise.’

It is true that the legislative findings and the determination of public use are not conclusive on the courts. Pocantico Water-Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N.Y. 249, 29 N.E. 246. But they are entitled at least to great respect, since they relate to public conditions concerning which the Legislature both by necessity and duty must have known. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165;People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 108 N.E. 639, L.R.A.1918A, 1124, Ann.Cas.1916D, 1059. The existence of all the conditions adverted to by the Legislature was alleged in the petition and proved with reference to the area included in the project, of which the premises in question are a part. The public evils, social and economic, of such conditions, are unquestioned and unquestionable. Slum areas are the breeding places of disease which take toll not only from denizens, but, by spread, from the inhabitants of the entire city and state. Juvenile delinquency, crime, and immorality are there born, find protection, and flourish. Enormous economic loss results directly from the necessary expenditure of public funds to maintain health and hospital services for afflicted slum dwellers and to war against crime and immorality. Indirectly there is an equally heavy capital loss and a diminishing return in taxes because of the areas blighted by the existence of the slums. Concededly, these are matters of state concern (Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 477, 167 N.E. 705), since they vitally affect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. Time and again, in familiar cases needing no citation, the use by the Legislature of the power of taxation and of the police power in dealing with the evils of the slums, has been upheld by the courts. Now, in continuation of a battle, which if not entirely lost, is far from won, the Legislature has resorted to the last of the trinity of sovereign powers by giving to a city agency the power of eminent domain. We are called upon to say whether under the facts of this case, including the circumstances of time and place, the use of the power is a use for the public benefit-a public use-within the law.

There is no case in this jurisdiction or elsewhere directly in point. Governmental housing projects constitute a comparatively new means of remedying an ancient evil. Phases of the general subject were before the courts in Green v. Frazier, 44 N.D. 395, 176 N.W. 11, affirmed 253 U.S. 233, 40 S.Ct. 499, 64 L.Ed. 878, and in Willmon v. Powell, 91 Cal.App. 1, 266 P. 1029, where the power to spend public funds for such projects was upheld. See, also, Simon v. O'Toole, 108 N.J.Law, 32, 155 A. 449, affirmed 108 N.J.Law, 549, 158 A. 543. In United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, Jefferson County, Ky. (C.C.A.) 78 F.(2d) 684, it was held that while such a project might be within the scope of a state's activities, it was not one which the federal government had power to undertake. The cases in this...