Young v. Willys Motors, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 October 1959
• Docket Number: No. 16178.,16178.
• Parties: Forest YOUNG, Appellant, v. WILLYS MOTORS, INC., a Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

271 F.2d 209 (1959)

Forest YOUNG, Appellant, v. WILLYS MOTORS, INC., a Corporation, Appellee.

No. 16178.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

October 21, 1959.

Selden Blumenfeld, St. Louis, Mo. (James L. Zemelman and Blumenfeld & Abrams, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.

William W. Evans, St. Louis, Mo. (Evans & Dixon, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOODROUGH, VAN OOSTERHOUT and MATTHES, Circuit Judges.

WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.

This suit for damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff in an automobile upset was before this Court on appeal from a judgment of the district court which dismissed the action as to the two named defendants on the ground that it was barred by limitations. We sustained the dismissal as to the individual defendant Jessie May Hicks who owned and was driving the car, but reversed as to defendant Willys Motors, Inc., the manufacturer and vendor of it. Young v. Hicks, 8 Cir., 250 F.2d 80. On remand the action was tried to the court without a jury against that company as sole defendant.

The plaintiff alleged in her complaint as the cause of the occurrence that "the brakes on the wheels of said station wagon (in which she was riding as a guest passenger) suddenly and without any previous warning became locked thereby causing the wheels thereof to cease revolving and thereby causing said station wagon to violently skid, swerve and gyrate first to one side of the road and then to the other side thereof which violent movements and motions of said station wagon caused the driver to lose control thereof, which finally resulted in the uncontrolled station wagon skidding into a ditch paralleling said road on the west and overturning therein and injuring the plaintiff, all of which occurred as the direct and proximate result of the negligence and carelessness of the defendant in the manufacture, assembly, inspection, servicing, sale, distribution, handling, operation, and maintenance of said station wagon."

The allegations of the complaint were put in issue by defendant's answer.

At the termination of the trial the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in accord with a memorandum opinion in favor of defendant and dismissed the action at plaintiff's costs. The plaintiff appeals.

The findings and conclusions of the court include the following:

"This is a suit for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Forest Young, as a result of an automobile accident occurring on or about February 26, 1955, in the State of Tennessee. The automobile was owned and operated by the plaintiff\'s niece, Jessie May Hicks, and plaintiff was riding as a passenger therein. Jessie May Hicks was driving the automobile upon U. S. Highway No. 31 E, a public highway in Sumner County, Tennessee, when the automobile went out of control and left the traveled portion of the roadway ending up in a ditch or creek. As a result, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries.

"Jessie May Hicks had purchased the automobile a short time before the accident, receiving possession of same on or about January 8, 1955. The automobile had been manufactured by defendant, and sold to Jessie May Hicks by a retail dealer. There had been no mechanical difficulty with the automobile material to this case prior to the accident.

Plaintiff contends that the accident was caused by mechanical trouble or by a defect in the automobile itself attributable to negligence on the part of Willys Motors, Inc. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that the brakes on the wheels of the automobile became locked thereby causing the automobile to go out of control and to leave the roadway. Defendant denied any negligence on its part and at the close of the plaintiff\'s case defendant put on evidence on its behalf.

"Findings of Fact.

"The Court finds the ultimate facts to be as follows:

"1. There was no evidence that prior to and at the time of the accident in question the brakes on the automobile locked or were otherwise defective, nor was there any evidence of any other mechanical defect in the automobile. The plaintiff and her witnesses failed to establish that the automobile or the brakes thereof were defective. Witness Everett Durham testified for plaintiff that the wheels and steering mechanism of the automobile were working freely and properly after the accident, and the wheels were not locked. The Court accepts this testimony as true, and finds nothing in the plaintiff\'s case to show that the wheels ever became locked either before, during or after the accident.

"2. All of the evidence showed that this was a blacktop highway, and almost all of the witnesses for both sides agreed that it was wet at the time of the accident. The Court accepts as true the testimony of witnesses for defendant that at the time of the accident the road was slick and slippery.

"3. The Court finds that it is more probable that the driver of the automobile simply lost control of the automobile because of the condition of the slick and slippery roadway than that she lost control of it be cause of any mechanical failure or difficulty.

"4. The Court finds under the testimony in this particular case that the defendant exercised ordinary care in the manufacture, assembly, inspection and design of the particular automobile in question, and that the proof failed to show any specific defect in the automobile which the Court can infer was due to negligent manufacture or design.

"5. In view of the conclusions reached on the issue of negligence, the Court finds it unnecessary to make any findings of fact with reference to the plaintiff\'s injuries and damage or with reference to the defense of limitations interposed by the defendant.

"Conclusions of Law.

"The Court\'s conclusions of law are as follows:

"1. While the Tennessee cases have not yet flatly adopted the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, in an automobile case, the Court concludes from the cases that Tennessee would probably do so in a proper factual situation.

"2. Under the rule of the MacPherson case and of many cases subsequent thereto, the Court concludes that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to point to some specific defect in the automobile which the Court could find was due to negligent manufacture or design, and the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove that defendant was negligent with respect to said defect. The Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to prove such defect and failed to prove that defendant was negligent. Jastrzembski v. General Motors Corporation D.C., 100 F. Supp. 465, 466; Smith v. General Motors Corporation 5 Cir., 227 F.2d 210; Lovas v. General Motors Corporation 6 Cir., 212 F.2d 805; Polly Chin Sugai, et al. v. General Motors Corporation, et al. D.C., 137 F.Supp. 696; Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation 350 Mo. 431, 166 S.W.2d 575.

"3. The Court concludes that cases from Tennessee and other jurisdictions applying the rule of general negligence or res ipsa loquitur to bursting or exploding bottle cases are not applicable or controlling in this automobile case.

"4. The Court concludes that even if a case of this type might be made under general negligence or res ipsa loquitur rules that the plaintiff in this particular case would still not be entitled to recover from defendant, Willys Motors, Inc. Even in a res ipsa loquitur case or circumstantial evidence case, the burden would remain upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was negligent. In this case the proof fails to show negligence on the part of defendant. The evidence fails to point to the alleged liability

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