CA. Teachers Assoc v. State Bd. of Education
| Citation | 271 F.3d 1141 |
| Decision Date | 21 November 2001 |
| Docket Number | ASIAN-PACIFIC,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,DEFENDANTS-INTERVENORS-APPELLEES,No. 99-56784,99-56784 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 2001) CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION; NORMA STEINER; IRELLA PEREZ; KRISTIN WORTHMAN; ASSOCIATION OF MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCATORS; CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION FORBILINGUAL EDUCATION; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BILINGUAL EDUCATORS; EMILY PALACIO; ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS,, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, AND ITS MEMBERS; YVONNE W. LARSON; ROBERT L. TRIGG; TIMOTHY C. DRAPER; KATHRYN DRONENBERG; MARION JOSEPH; MEGAN KEPHART; MARION MCDOWELL; JANET NICHOLAS; GERTI B. THOMAS; MARINA TSE; DELAINE EASTIN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION;, RON UNZ; SARINA FRIAS; SYLVIA NMI MARTINEZ; ANGELINA MORFIN; CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Jeremiah A. Collins, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, D.C., for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Donald P. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, California, for the defendants-appellees.
Eric Grant, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California, for defendants-intervenors-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Edward Rafeedie, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV 98-09694-ER
Before: Boochever, Tashima, and Tallman, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Boochever; Dissent by Judge Tashima
The opinion in the above-entitled case, filed August 29, 2001, and published at 263 F.3d 888 (9th Cir.2001), is amended by adding a footnote 4 after the first sentence of the second full paragraph on page 893 of the opinion. Footnote 4 should read as follows:
We are aware that California allows federal courts to certify questions of state law to the California Supreme Court. See Cal. R. Ct. 29.5. Mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-78 (1997), we issued an order in advance of oral argument asking the parties to be prepared to address the following questions: "(1) whether any potentially determinative issue in this case should be certified to the California Supreme Court...; and (2) if so, the precise formulation of said question(s)." At argument, all parties, including the California Attorney General representing the State Board of Education, agreed that this case presented no questions of state law that should be certified, and, in fact, urged this panel to decided the case without certifying any questions of law to the California Supreme Court.
The numbers of all subsequent footnotes are changed accordingly.
Proposition 227, a California ballot initiative entitled "English Language in Public Schools," codified at California Education Code § § 300-340, restricts the use of languages other than English by educators in public schools. The enforcement provision, section 320, allows aggrieved parents to sue and hold personally liable any teacher, administrator or official "who willfully and repeatedly refuses to implement the terms of this statute." Cal. Educ. Code § 320. California Teachers Association, et al. ("Plaintiffs") argue that the terms of the initiative, and specifically the terms of section 320, violate the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to define clearly when and how much use of non-English will expose educators to personal liability. Plaintiffs request this Court to declare that section 320 is unconstitutionally vague on its face, and to enjoin its enforcement. For the reasons stated below, we hold that section 320, the parental enforcement provision of Proposition 227, is sufficiently clear to withstand Plaintiffs' facial vagueness challenge.
On June 2, 1998, California voters approved Proposition 227. The initiative mandates that "all children in California public schools shall be taught English by being taught in English." Cal. Educ. Code § 305. Unless a parent seeks a waiver pursuant to sections 310 and 311, Proposition 227 requires that "all children be placed in English language classrooms." Id. § 305. "English language classrooms" are classrooms "in which the language of instruction used by the teaching personnel is overwhelmingly the English langauge[.]" Id. § 306(b). Students who are "English learners shall be educated through sheltered English immersion during a temporary transition period[.]" Id. § 305. "Sheltered English immersion" is defined as "an English language acquisition process for young children in which nearly all classroom instruction is in English but with the curriculum and presentation designed for children who are learning the language." Id. § 306(d).
Section 320 is the parental enforcement provision. It states that "all California school children have the right to be provided with an English language public education. " Id. § 320. If a student is denied "the option of an English language instructional curriculum in public school," the child's parent or legal guardian has legal standing to sue for enforcement of the statute's provisions as well as attorneys' fees and actual damages. Id. Any educator (i.e., school board member, elected official, teacher, or administrator) "who willfully and repeatedly refuses to implement the terms of this statute by providing such an English language educational option" may be held personally liable. Id.1
Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State Board of Education, et al. ("Defendants") asserting that the parental enforcement provision of Proposition 227 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2 Plaintiffs also asserted that Proposition 227 violates other due process rights conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs appeal the vagueness issue only.
I. Vagueness Challenge
Plaintiffs contend that Proposition 227 is unconstitutionally vague in two principal respects.3 First, they contend it fails to define clearly when teachers are required to speak in English. Plaintiffs argue that section 320's mandate that educators provide an "English language educational option" is unfathomable, leaving them guessing under which circumstances the language restrictions of Proposition 227 apply.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that Proposition 227 fails to define clearly how much non-English will subject them to personal liability under section 320. For public school students in general, Proposition 227 requires that the language of instruction be "overwhelmingly" the English language. Id. § 306(b). For English learners, Proposition 227 requires that"nearly all" classroom instruction be in English. Id. § 306(d). Plaintiffs argue that the terms "nearly all" and "overwhelmingly" are inherently imprecise words, failing to provide adequate notice of what amount of non-English is permitted under the statute.
As an initial matter, we must address the scope of Proposition 227, that is, the circumstances under which the language restrictions apply. This determination affects our consideration of whether the initiative implicates First Amendment interests, whether Plaintiffs may challenge the initiative on its face, and which level of vagueness scrutiny guides the analysis. These issues are discussed in subsequent sections.
Plaintiffs argue that Proposition 227 is potentially boundless because it imposes liability based on an educator's failure to provide an "English language educational option." Plaintiffs contend that this phrase is so incomprehensible that they can only guess when they must speak in English. Defendants respond that Proposition 227 applies only on the language of "instruction," i.e., the language teachers use to present the "curriculum" to students in California public schools. We agree.
We recognize that it is solely within the province of the state courts to authoritatively construe state legislation.4 See United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). Nor are we authorized to rewrite the law so it will pass constitutional muster. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988). A federal court's duty, when faced with a constitutional challenge such as this one, is to employ traditional tools of statutory construction to determine the statute's "allowable meaning." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); Stoianoff v. Montana, 695 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1983). In doing so, we look to the words of the statute itself as well as state court interpretations of the same or similar statutes. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109-10. Moreover, before invalidating a state statute on its face, a federal court must determine whether the statute is "readily susceptible" to a narrowing construction by the state courts. American Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 397; Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 1997).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the initiative. Section 320 allows aggrieved parents to sue an educator "who willfully and repeatedly refuses to implement the terms of this statute by providing such an English language educational option at an available public school to a California school child[.]" An "English language educational option" refers to "the option of an English language instructional curriculum in public school," a phrase contained in the immediately preceding sentence. The phrase "English language instructional curriculum" is not specifically defined in section 320 or elsewhere in the initiative. However, section 320 indicates that the requirements of an "English language instructional curriculum" are ...
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