271 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1971), 369S41, Adams v. State

Docket Nº:369S41.
Citation:271 N.E.2d 425, 259 Ind. 64
Party Name:Charles Wayne ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
Case Date:July 19, 1971
Court:Supreme Court of Indiana
 
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Page 425

271 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1971)

259 Ind. 64

Charles Wayne ADAMS, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 369S41.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 19, 1971

Opinion Superseded 284 N.E.2d 757.

Page 426

[259 Ind. 65] Bangs, Mills & Rollo, by C. W. H. Bangs, H. D. Rollo, Huntington, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ARTERBURN, Chief Justice.

Defendant was charged in Huntington Circuit Court with the crime of first degree murder; venue of the cause was changed to Grant Circuit Court. Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge and specially pleaded that he was of unsound mind at the time the crime was committed. The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and assessed the penalty to be death.

Briefly, the facts relative to the issues presented in this case are as follows. On July 27, 1968, Burl Lyles, nicknamed Joe, accompanied by a female companion, at approximately 10:30 p. m., left a softball game they had attendedand proceeded to a rural road where they parked. After being parked for about ten to fifteen minutes a car pulled in behind their car. Someone from the second car yelled out the window and asked if they had seen a certain car go by. Joe Lyles responded that he had not. Observing that a headlight of the second car was unlit, Joe Lyles informed the driver of the condition. Having left his car Joe Lyles reentered his car, at which time a shot was fired from the second car, followed by a second shot. After the second shot the occupant of the second car approached Joe Lyles' car and told the girl to get out of the car or he would kill her. The defendant then forced her to get into the trunk of the second car. He then drove from the scene of the shooting. After approximately twenty minutes the defendant parked the car and released the girl from the [259 Ind. 66] trunk. He then led her from the car and raped her. Thereafter she attempted to flee and he stabbed her in the back with a knife. He then placed her in the car and attempted to leave but discovered his car was stuck. They spent the rest of the night in the car. The following morning the defendant went to a farm and got a farmer to pull his car out, and then took the girl to the Huntington County Hospital and left her. On the morning of July 28, 1968 Joe Lyles was found dead in his car parked on the rural road where he had parked it the night before with his girl companion. The cause of Joe Lyles' death was attributed to a bullet wound in the head. On July 31, 1968, at approximately 2:00 p. m., the defendant went to the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Dennis Brown. No one was present when the defendant arrived but later Mrs. Brown returned home with her children. The defendant forced Mrs. Brown into a bedroom and raped her. Thereafter, the defendant decided that he wanted to give himself up and requested Mrs. Brown to call the police, which she did. The first police officer to go to the Brown residence was Whitley County Deputy Sheriff Harold Lewis, who took the defendant into custody. Shortly thereafter, State Police Officers Melvin Wall and William Shockley arrived. Officer Wall arrived first and handcuffed the defendant and placed him in his police car. When Officer Shockley arrived the defendant was turned over to him, whereupon Officer Shockley read a standard warning and waiver of constitutional rights form to the defendant. The defendant was taken to the Huntington County Prosecutor's Office at approximately 3:45 p. m. at which time another alleged warning and waiver form was read to the defendant by the prosecutor in the presence of Officer Shockley. At about 6:00 p. m. the defendant was taken to the Huntington Police Station to be fingerprinted. The defendant was placed in jail overnight. The following morning at approximately 10:30 a. m., August 1, 1968, the defendant was taken before Judge Mark McIntosh, Judge of the Huntington

Page 427

City Court, where he was preliminarily charged with first degree [259 Ind. 67] murder. On August 5, 1968, the Huntington County Grand Jury filed an Indictment charging Charles Wayne Adams, the defendant, with first degree murder. In addition to a general plea of not guilty the defendant made a special plea of not guilty by reason of being of unsound mind at the time of the commission of the crime. The court appointed two disinterested physicians to examine the defendant.

During the course of the trial, no statements or evidence obtained by use of any statements made by the defendant were introduced as evidence by the State. A .22 caliber rifle, turned over by the defendant at the time of his arrest, was introduced and admitted into evidence. State Police Officer Houck, testified that two empty cartridge cases which had been found at the murder scene were fired from the rifle which the defendant turned over at the time of his arrest. In the course of her testimony the raped girl identified the defendant as the man who had fired the shots and raped her. Mrs. Brown also identified the defendant as the man who had raped her. State Police Officer Shockley testified only that he had arrested the defendant and warned him of his rights; he offered no testimony relating to any statements made by the defendant after his arrest.

Appellant first urges that his constitutional rights were violated. Specifically, he urges that he was not given the warning as to his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, that he was interrogated while in custody immediately following his arrest and that he was not promptly taken before a magistrate following his arrest. The facts and the law do not support the appellant in this contention. The record clearly shows that appellant was fully informed of his constitutional rights when he was first taken into custody at the Brown home, where the second rape occurred. The evidence goes further to show that he was given another warning in the Prosecutor's Office although the Court for some reason excluded the testimony as to that warning. [259 Ind. 68] The evidence further shows that the appellant was taken into custody at 3:45 p. m., on July 31, 1968, and was taken before the Judge of the Huntington City Court the following morning, about 10:30 a. m., and preliminarily charged with first degree murder. This time elapse does not exhibit any unnecessary or prejudicial delay.

Finally, we point out that the record shows that the State did not offer into evidence any statements elicited from the appellant during interrogation, while in custody. The appellant, however, urges that although the statements were not used in evidence the inference may be drawn that the interrogation was helpful in gathering other evidence and therefore would constitute 'poison fruit' resulting from such interrogation. The Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 rules are exclusionary and have no application here. There is no record in the case that the appellant objected to any specific evidence being introduced as 'poison fruit' nor is there any record showing that the appellant asked her to introduce evidence as a basis for making an objection to evidence and excluding the same. We find no prejudicial error on the grounds urged by the appellant, this Court has previously stated that:

'One cannot claim error for an abstract violation of a constitutional right where he shows no injury.' Layton v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 205, 240 N.E.2d 489, 494.

The appellant next contends that the State did not prove the sanity of the defendant, and that its evidence showed only that the appellant was of unsound mind. First we note the State was under no duty to introduce evidence of the appellant's

Page 428

sanity in its case in chief, Brattain v. State (1945) 223 Ind. 489, 61 N.E.2d 462. However, the State did introduce considerable evidence on the issue of the appellant's . Although the State did [259 Ind. 69] not introduce the testimony of any psychiatrists, it did introduce considerable lay testimony on the issue. We have held that lay testimony on the issue of in is competent evidence for the trier of the fact to consider, Johnson v. State (1971), Ind., 264 N.E.2d 57. The State offered the following testimony relative to the issue of the appellant's . On July 26, 1968, two days before the murder, Dennis Brown stated that he noticed nothing different about the appellant or the way in which he was conducting himself, when he talked with him on that date. Bernice Wardwell, a waitress at a restaurant, testified that she talked with the appellant about 11:00 a. m. on July 28, 1968, the morning following the murder. She testified that the appellant quietly ate his breakfast. 'He was polite, said thank you' and just seemed normal. J. D. Meyers and William Lee Patrick, two fishermen, who talked with the appellant at the first rape scene, while the appellant's car was still stuck, testified that there was nothing peculiar or out of the way about the appellant. Cyril Burns, the farmer who pulled the appellant's car out, testified that he did not notice anything different or unusual about the appellant; he even offered to pay him for pulling him out. The girl who was raped testified that after the rape appellant was very calm and collected and seemed intelligent. That his actions were intelligent. That after the rape, he stopped to get some water for the car radiator to cool it off. That he spread sheets around the car so no one could see the blood. That on driving her to the hospital, he was calm and friendly. H. June Mishler, owner of a trout fishing pay pond, testified that on July 26, 1968, two days before the murder, the appellant was fishing at his pond...

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