Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist.

• Citation: 272 F.3d 168
• Decision Date: 15 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-3422,00-3422
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2001) RHONDA GOTTLIEB, BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AND PARENT, MARY CALABRIA, APPELLANT v. LAUREL HIGHLANDS SCHOOL DISTRICT; MICHAEL CARBONARA
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 168

272 F.3d 168 (3rd Cir. 2001)

RHONDA GOTTLIEB, BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AND PARENT, MARY CALABRIA, APPELLANT v. LAUREL HIGHLANDS SCHOOL DISTRICT; MICHAEL CARBONARA

No. 00-3422

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued May 2, 2001

November 15, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. No. 98-CV-01013) District Judge: The Honorable Donald J. Lee

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Peter M. Suwak, Esq. (Argued), P.O. Box 1, Pete's Surplus Building, Washington, PA 15301, for Appellant.

Daniel F. LaCava, Esq. (Argued), 850 Washington Avenue, Carnegie, PA 15106, for Appellee,

Before: Mansmann, Nygaard, and Rosenn, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Nygaard, Circuit Judge.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Laurel Highlands School District and its assistant principal, Michael Carbonara, on a student, Rhonda Gottlieb's, excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Gottlieb filed her S 1983 suit in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas along with a state assault and battery claim. The matter was then removed to the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and referred to a Magistrate Judge. Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Magistrate Judge recommended be granted. The District Court agreed and granted the motion on the S 1983 claims. The assault and battery claim was remanded to the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant Gottlieb contends on appeal that there remain issues of material fact with respect to appellee Carbonara, and facts ignored by the District Court, which would establish "municipal liability" with respect to her claims against the School District. We will affirm the District Court.

I. BACKGROUND

On or about February 9, 1996, Rhonda Gottlieb, then a junior at Laurel Highlands Public High School, entered the school with the intention of confronting another female student, Leah Saluga, about her relationship with Gottlieb's ex-boyfriend. Gottlieb was a disruptive student with a lengthy disciplinary record at the school. On this day she arrived late and apparently did not plan on attending classes. Upon her arrival, Gottlieb proceeded directly to Saluga's classroom. The two argued without physically engaging each other, and a school security officer arrived. The security officer instructed Gottlieb to leave the building, but Gottlieb disobeyed and continued to threaten Saluga. The security officer then escorted Gottlieb to the principal's office.

Gottlieb stood in the doorway of assistant principal Michael Carbonara's office while he spoke with a teacher. Carbonara then allegedly began yelling at Gottlieb and spoke a few words to another principal, Robert Raho. Raho then told Gottlieb that he had just been on the phone with Gottlieb's mother and that Gottlieb was not allowed in school until a parent-teacher conference took place. According to Gottlieb, Carbonara then told her to"shut up, because he didn't want to hear nothing [sic][s]he had to say" and pushed her shoulder with his hand, propelling her backwards into a door jam. As a result of this contact, Gottlieb's lower back struck the door jam. Gottlieb described the encounter in her deposition:

Q: Were you caused to fall to the floor from this being pushed?

A: No. Its [sic] not like he pushed me to try to knock me out or anything. He didn't! its [sic] not like he like hauled off [and] like cold-cocked me to knock me out. It wasn't like that. He was just in a fit of rage, and he was mad. And he was yelling, and it happened.

Q: Is it your belief that Mr. Carbonara intended to force you into the doorjamb?

A: No. Why would he just all of a sudden hit me? I never did nothing to the man.

Q: Is it your belief that Mr. Carbonara intended to hurt you at all?

A: No, I just think he was mad, and he didn't know what he was doing.

Q: And do you know why he was mad?

A: Probably because I was up there acting like an immature kid at the high school. I shouldn't have been there, and I went there.

Gottlieb alleges that she suffers chronic back pain and cramping as a result of this impact. She has been treated by several doctors and chiropractors for the injury. She has been advised to avoid strenuous activities involving her back, and she has not been able to perform various jobs or participate in some leisure activities.

Carbonara was earlier involved in a physical altercation with an opposing football coach, and Gottlieb therefore argues that the School District is liable because of its failure to address the risk Carbonara posed to students.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Gottlieb's S 1983 Claim Against Carbonara

i) The Specific Constitutional Right Allegedly Infringed

We first must "identify[ ] the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed" and determine if Gottlieb's claim should be reviewed under the Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989). Because different standards attach to the various rights, identifying the proper constitutional approach is essential. Here, the difference between reviewing Carbonara's actions under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment or the shocks the conscience standard of the Fourteenth Amendment may be determinative. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).

Because the Fourth Amendment invokes the less stringent reasonableness standard, Gottlieb argues that Carbonara's push amounts to a seizure effectuated by a government actor who "by means of physical force or show of authority,... in some way restrain[ed] the liberty of a citizen." Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures, however, does not properly cover Gottlieb's alleged injury. Courts have recognized that public schools are in a "unique constitutional position," because "[o]nce under the control of the school, students' movement and location are subject to the ordering and direction of teachers and administrators." Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia Sch Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47 J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995) (students are lawfully subject to a level of restraint that would be unacceptable if "exercised over free adults."). The Fourth Amendment's "principal concern... is with intrusions on privacy," and therefore when the infraction deals not "with the initial decision to detain an accused and the curtailment of liberty that such a decision necessarily entails, but rather with the conditions of ongoing custody following such curtailment of liberty," then the claim invokes principles of substantive due process. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674, 97 S. Ct. at 1401 (citation omitted). Gottlieb did not experience the type of detention or physical restraint that we require to effectuate a seizure. As the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania correctly stated, the "momentary use of physical force by a teacher in reaction to a disruptive or unruly student does not effect a `seizure' of the student under the Fourth Amendment," and therefore "is a scenario to which the Fourth Amendment does not textually or historically apply." Kurilla by Kurilla v. Callahan, 68 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 (M.D. Pa. 1999).

Gottlieb's action is a claim of excessive force, not of unreasonable detention. In our leading case reviewing corporal punishment in public schools under S 1983, Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988), we did not explicitly adopt the shocks the conscious standard, but rather did so impliedly, stating that the offending conduct must be inspired by malice or sadism. This led Judge Weis to state in his dissent that the majority had "apparently adopted" the shocks the conscience standard. Metzger, 841 F.2d at 522 (Weis, J., dissenting). We agree and take this opportunity to clarify the standard we adopted in Metzger, applying the Fourteenth Amendment's shocks the conscience standard to federal claims alleging the use of excessive force by public school officials. Accord, Johnson by Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001); Neal by Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1988); Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987).

ii) Application of the Shocks the Conscience Standard

The substantive component of the Due Process Clause "protects individual liberty against `certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.' " Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986)). "[T]he substantive component of the due process clause is violated by [state conduct] when it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense." County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847, 118 S. Ct. at 1717 (citation omitted). Thus, "conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Id. at 849, 118 S. Ct. at 1718.

In Metzger, 841 F.2d at 520, we cited Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), for the standard to evaluate excessive force claims:

In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or...