Knussman v. State

• Decision Date: 26 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-2349,99-2349
• Citation: 272 F.3d 625
• Parties: (4th Cir. 2001) HOWARD KEVIN KNUSSMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, and KIMBERLY ANN KNUSSMAN, on behalf of themselves and their infant daughter, a/k/a Riley Paige Knussman, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MARYLAND; DAVID B. MITCHELL, Colonel, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent; DAVID CZORAPINSKI, Captain, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Commander of Aviation; RONNIE P. CREEL, First Sergeant, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Flight Operations; JILL D. MULLINEAUX, Defendants-Appellants, and MARYLAND STATE POLICE, Defendant. Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 625

272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001)

HOWARD KEVIN KNUSSMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, and KIMBERLY ANN KNUSSMAN, on behalf of themselves and their infant daughter, a/k/a Riley Paige Knussman, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MARYLAND; DAVID B. MITCHELL, Colonel, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent; DAVID CZORAPINSKI, Captain, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Commander of Aviation; RONNIE P. CREEL, First Sergeant, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Flight Operations; JILL D. MULLINEAUX, Defendants-Appellants, and MARYLAND STATE POLICE, Defendant.

No. 99-2349

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Argued: January 26, 2001

Decided: November 7, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Walter E. Black, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CA-95-1255-B)

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] COUNSEL ARGUED: David Phelps Kennedy, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Robin R. Cockey, COCKEY, BRENNAN & MALONEY, Salisbury, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Betty Stemley Sconion, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Deborah A. Jeon, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND, Centreville, Maryland; Sara L. Mandelbaum, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, New York, New York, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and Gerald Bruce LEE, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Williams joined. Judge Lee wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:

Howard Kevin Knussman, a trooper in the Maryland State Police, brought an action alleging that the State of Maryland and several individual employees of the Maryland State Police (collectively "the defendants") unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his gender, for which he sought recourse under 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (West Supp. 2000); and that the defendants violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), see 29 U.S.C.A. SS 2601 2654 (West 1999), for which he sought recourse under S 1983 and directly under the FMLA. Following a jury trial and various post-trial motions, judgment in the amount of $375,000 was entered against only one of the defendants -Jill Mullineaux, a civilian employee of the Maryland State Police.

On appeal, Mullineaux contends that she was entitled to qualified immunity. Alternatively, she challenges the verdict on several grounds. We conclude that Mullineaux was not entitled to qualified immunity; however, we find that the award of damages was excessive. Accordingly, we set aside the jury's award of damages and remand for further proceedings on that issue.

I.

In 1994, Knussman learned that his wife Kimberly was pregnant. At the time, Knussman held the rank of trooper first class and served as a paramedic on medevac helicopters in the Aviation Division of the Maryland State Police ("MSP"). Unfortunately, Kim's pregnancy was difficult and ultimately resulted in her confinement to bed rest in the latter stages prior to delivery. In October 1994, Knussman submitted a written request to his supervisor asking that Knussman be permitted to take four to eight weeks of paid "family sick leave" to care for his wife and spend time with his family following the birth of his child.¹ J.A. 121. Eventually, Knussman was informed by the MSP Director of Flight Operations, First Sergeant Ronnie P. Creel, that there was "no way" that he would be allowed more than two weeks. Creel testified that, at the time of Knussman's request, the Aviation Division was understaffed. According to Knussman, Creel misinformed him that if he wanted more leave, he would be forced to take unpaid leave because the FMLA did not entitle him to further paid leave. Knussman testified that he was unfamiliar with the FMLA because the MSP had failed to provide proper notice to its employees about their rights under the FMLA.

In early December, shortly before the Knussmans' daughter was born, Jill Mullineaux, manager of the medical leave and benefit section of the MSP Personnel Management Division, notified all MSP employees of a new Maryland statutory provision that allowed the use of paid sick leave by a state employee to care for a newborn. See Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. SS 7-502(b)(3), 7-508 (1994). The statute permitted "[p]rimary care givers" to "use, without certification of illness or disability, up to 30 days of accrued sick leave to care for [a] child . . . immediately following: . . . the birth of the employee's child." Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. S 7-508(a)(1). A "[p]rimary care giver" was defined as "an employee who is primarily responsible for the care and nurturing of a child." Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. S 7-508(a)(1). By contrast, a "[s]econdary care giver," i.e., "an employee who is secondarily responsible for the care and nurturing of a child," might use up to 10 days of accrued sick leave without providing proof of illness or disability. Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. S 7-508(b)(1). ² In contrast to "family sick leave," which required an employee to provide verification of a family member's illness, the new "nurturing leave" provision permitted an employee to use paid sick leave without providing any medical documentation, since this type of leave was not actually related to the illness or disability of the employee or the employee's family.³

Believing that this "nurturing leave" might afford him more paid leave than he would receive from his request for "family sick leave," Knussman contacted Mullineaux for additional information about using his accrued sick leave under S 7-508. Specifically, he wanted to know whether he could qualify as a primary care giver under S 7508(a)(1) and take 30 days of paid sick leave. According to Knussman, Mullineaux informed him that only birth mothers could qualify as primary care givers; fathers would only be permitted to take leave as secondary care givers since they "couldn't breast feed a baby." J.A. 136. Mullineaux, who testified that she was merely passing along the Maryland Department of Personnel's (DOP) view of "primary care giver," denied adopting such a categorical interpretation.⁴ In any case, Knussman's superior officers in the Aviation Division, having consulted Mullineaux about the untested nurturing leave provision, granted him 10 days of paid sick leave as the secondary care giver under S 7-508(b).

The Knussmans' daughter was born on December 9, 1994. Kimberly Knussman, however, continued to experience health problems. Before his authorized 10-day leave expired, Knussman contacted Sergeant J.C. Collins, one of his supervisors, and inquired whether his status could be changed to that of primary care giver and his paid sick leave extended to 30 days under section 7-508(a). Knussman explained to Collins that he was the primary care giver for the child because, given his wife's condition following delivery, he was performing the majority of the essential functions such as diaper changing, feeding, bathing and taking the child to the doctor.

David Czorapinski, the Assistant Commander for the Aviation Division during this time, learned of Knussman's inquiry and, unable to reach Mullineaux, gathered some preliminary information on the new law himself. Czorapinski learned that the Maryland DOP intended to take the position that the mother was the primary care giver and the father was secondary. Czorapinski passed this information down the chain-of-command and Knussman was told that it was unlikely that his paid sick leave would be extended under section 7508(a).

On the day before Knussman was scheduled to return to work, Knussman made a final attempt at obtaining additional sick leave. Sergeant Carl Lee, one of Knussman's immediate superiors, had earlier informed Knussman that although nurturing leave as a primary care giver was probably not an option, Knussman might be eligible for additional paid leave under the family sick leave provision, see Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. S 7-502(b)(2), as long as he could demonstrate that it was medically necessary for him to care for his wife. Knussman contacted Mullineaux to find out what information he needed to supply for family sick leave. ⁵ During this conversation, Knussman again discussed his eligibility for nurturing leave as a primary care provider under section 7-508(a) with Mullineaux, who explained that "God made women to have babies and, unless [he] could have a baby, there is no way [he] could be primary care [giver]," J.A. 153, and that his wife had to be "in a coma or dead," J.A. 154, for Knussman to qualify as the primary care giver.

Mullineaux denied Knussman's request for paid sick leave under S 7-508(a) as a primary care giver. Knussman returned to work as ordered and immediately filed an administrative grievance on the grounds that he had been improperly denied primary care giver status under S 7-508(a). He did not seek review of Mullineaux's denial of his request for family sick leave under section 7-502(b)(2). Once the grievance process was underway, Knussman's claim went up the MSP chain-of-command and Mullineaux's involvement ceased.

Knussman's grievance was denied at each stage of the four-level grievance procedure. By the time Knussman reached step two, which consisted of a review conference held by Knussman's Assistant Commanding Officer Czorapinski, the MSP apparently had retreated from Mullineaux's earlier, categorical classification of mothers as primary care givers and fathers as secondary providers. Czorapinski testified that prior to the grievance conference, he notified...