Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. District Court of Woodbury County
Decision Date | 06 April 1937 |
Docket Number | 43836. |
Parties | HOME OWNERS' LOAN CORPORATION v. DISTRICT COURT OF WOODBURY COUNTY et al. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Certiorari from District Court, Woodbury County; F. H. Rice, Judge.
Certiorari to review an order continuing an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage, under chapter 115 of the 46th General Assembly, commonly known as the moratorium law.
Writ sustained.
John P. Tinley, Jr., of Des Moines, and Berry & Berry, of Sioux City, for petitioner.
Baron & Bolton, of Sioux City, for respondents.
On the 18th day of August, 1936, the Home Owners Loan Corporation filed its petition in equity in the District Court of Iowa in and for Woodbury County, against John Brodkey and Mollie Brodkey, praying for judgment upon a certain promissory note dated February 1, 1934, and also asked for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage given as security for the payment of the said note.
On September 21, 1936, John Brodkey and Mollie Brodkey filed a motion, asking that the court continue this cause until March 1, 1937, under the terms of the moratorium act. The Home Owners Loan Corporation on September 26, 1936, filed a resistance, setting forth that the note and mortgage sued upon are dated February 1, 1934, and that the specific terms of section 4 of the moratorium act, chapter 115 of the 46th General Assembly, do not apply to any mortgage or deed of trust executed subsequent to January 1, 1934. On October 1 1936, John Brodkey and Mollie Brodkey filed an answer to the resistance, claiming that section 4 of the act did not apply to their note and mortgage.
On the 8th day of October, 1936, the Honorable F. H. Rice, judge of the District Court in and for Woodbury County, granted the continuance. Thereafter the Home Owners Loan Corporation filed in this court its petition for writ of certiorari which writ was issued, commanding a return thereto on or before November 1, 1936.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. The note and mortgage sued upon bear the date of February 1, 1934. Section 4 of the moratorium act, passed by the 46th General Assembly, is as follows:
There is no claim in this case that any continuance had heretofore been granted.
This court has laid down some very definite rules, relative to statutory construction, that the language used in the statute must be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
In the very recent case of Smith v. Sioux City Stock Yards Co., 219 Iowa, 1142, at page 1149, 260 N.W. 531, 534, this court said: " Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, even though other meanings could be found; and the court cannot indulge in speculation as to the probable or possible qualifications which might have been in the mind of the legislature, but the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning, and cannot be extended beyond it because of some supposed policy of the law, or because the legislature did not use proper words to express its meaning, or the court would be assuming legislative authority."
In the case of Hahn v. Clayton County, 218 Iowa, 543, at page 551, 255 N.W. 695, 699, this court said: ’
There can be no doubt as to the meaning of section 4 of the moratorium...
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