Mason v. United States

• Citation: 273 F. 135
• Decision Date: 17 May 1921
• Docket Number: 3548.
• Parties: MASON et al. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

273 F. 135

MASON et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 3548.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 17, 1921

S. L Herold and J. A. Thigpen, both of Shreveport, La. (R. L Batts, of Pittsburgh, Pa., D. Edward Greer, of Houston, Tex and Hampden Story, J. A. Thigpen, and S. L. Herold, all of Shreveport, La., on the brief), for appellants and cross-appellees.

Robert A. Hunter, of Shreveport, La., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.

Before WALKER, BRYAN, and KING, Circuit Judges.

WALKER Circuit Judge.

This was a suit in equity, brought by the United States, appellee and cross-appellant (herein referred to as the plaintiff), against the appellants and cross-appellees (herein referred to as the defendants). The relief prayed for included the cancellation and annulment of a mineral location made on March 26, 1910, by the defendants Sam W. Mason and W. W. Mason, covering a described 20 acres in section 5, township 20, range 16 west, in Caddo parish, La., and of a lease made by said Sam W. Mason and W. W. Mason to the defendant Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana; an adjudication that said land is the property of the plaintiff; the issuance of an injunction; for an accounting by the defendants for oil and gas removed or extracted from said land, and for all moneys, or things of value derived from the sale or disposition of same, and for all rents, royalties, and proceeds arising from the sale or lease of the same; and the recovery by the plaintiff from the defendants of all such sums so received by them, and all damages sustained by the plaintiff in the premises.

The court decreed the cancellation of the above-mentioned mineral location and lease, that the land mentioned is the property of the plaintiff, and that the defendants pay to the plaintiff the ascertained value of the oil produced from the well bored on the land, less the ascertained drilling and operating costs incurred. The defendants complain of the action of the court in deciding against the validity of the above-mentioned mineral location, and in not deducting as an expense of operation, from the net amount produced by the defendant Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana, the amounts paid to its codefendants as royalties. The plaintiff complains of the decree because it was not in its favor for the full value of the oil extracted and removed from the land, without deduction of the amount of costs and expenses incurred in producing that oil.

The plaintiff relied on the following order as having the effect of invalidating the above-mentioned mineral location:

'5496 A.D. Department of the Interior, General Land Office, Dmg-3fs File. Washington, D.C., December 15, 1908. Address Only the Commissioner of the General Land Office. Register and Receiver, Natchitoches, Louisiana. See, also, 1910-44655. Sirs: To conserve the public interests, and, in aid of such legislation as may hereafter be proposed or recommended, the public lands in townships 15 to 23 north, and ranges 10 to 16 west, Louisiana meridian, Natchitoches Land Office, Louisiana, are, subject to existing valid claims, withdrawn from settlement and entry, or other form of appropriation.

'Respectfully,

'Approved:

'LRS.

Fred Dennett, Commissioner. James Rudolph Garfield, Secretary.'

The defendants admitted that the plaintiff owned the land in question on and before the date of the above set out order, but contend that that order did not have the effect of invalidating the attacked mineral location. That order was 'ratified and confirmed and continued in full force and effect' by an order of the President made on the 2d day of July, 1910, under the authority conferred by the Act of June 25, 1910, entitled 'An act to authorize the President of the United States to make withdrawals of public lands in certain cases.' 36 Stat. 847 (Comp. St. Secs. 4523-4525). As the last-mentioned order was made after the date of the mineral location in question and after the boring of an oil-producing well on the land, the plaintiff must rely on the order of December 15, 1908, to sustain its contention as to the invalidity of the mineral location.

The Director of the United States Geological Survey, by several communications addressed to the Secretary of the Interior in October and November, 1908, called attention to waste of natural gas and oil in the Caddo oil field, to the fact that lands in, or in the neighborhood of, that field remained in federal ownership, referred to tracts in township 20 north, range 16 west, as 'clearly within the known productive area of this oil and gas field,' and recommended that the government take action to prevent further drilling for oil or gas in that field until effective measures be taken to prevent the waste of gas, and that public lands within and near to that field be withdrawn from entry pending the investigation then under way as to their value for oil and gas. On December 15, 1908, the date of the above set out withdrawal order, the Commissioner of the General Land Office gave notice of the withdrawal to the register and receiver at Natchitoches, La., by a telegram of the body of which the following is a copy:

'Public lands in townships fifteen to twenty-three north, inclusive, of ranges ten to sixteen west, inclusive, Louisiana meridian, withdrawn this date by Secretary from all settlement, entry, and appropriation.'

The Commissioner confirmed his telegram by a letter of the same date, which contained the following:

'Confirming my telegram of December 15, 1908, you are advised of the withdrawal on that date by the Secretary from all settlement, entry, and appropriation of the public lands in townships 15 to 23 north, inclusive, of ranges 10 to 16 west, inclusive, Louisiana meridian. Make proper notations upon your records. No right whatever can be obtained by any location or settlement made, or claim initiated, after the withdrawal, and any applications, selections, or entries based thereupon must be rejected by you subject to appeal.'

The mineral location relied on by the defendants was invalid, and conferred no right if it was inconsistent with the terms of the above set out withdrawal order. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 35 Sup.Ct. 309, 59 L.Ed. 673; United States v. Morrison, 240 U.S. 192, 36 Sup.Ct. 349, 60 L.Ed. 541. In behalf of the defendants it is contended that the use in that order of the words 'settlement and entry' was meant to refer to acquisition under the homestead law, as only acquisition under that law requires both settlement and entry, and that the use of the immediately succeeding language, 'or other form of appropriation,' was meant to cover only forms of appropriation more like the one specifically mentioned than one initiated by a mineral location. Certainly nothing in the order plainly indicates the existence of an intention to exempt from its operation any form of appropriation of public land in the townships named. The words used are consistent with the existence of an intention to cover all forms of appropriation of government land. A mineral location is the initiation of a method of appropriating public land provided for by law. If it is assumed that the words 'settlement and entry' referred only to acquisition under the homestead law, and that the making of a mineral location is to be regarded as the initiation of a form of appropriation of a distinctly different class, nevertheless the rule that where particular words of description are followed by general terms the latter will be regarded as applicable only to persons or things of like class is not to be so applied as to keep the words 'other form of appropriation' from embracing one initiated by a mineral location, when to do so gives the order of withdrawal an operation different from that intended and disclosed by the officials who made and approved it. Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U.S. 319, 39 Sup.Ct. 119, 63 L.Ed. 266.

The language of the withdrawal order is to be read with reference to the facts and circumstances connected with the making of it and the evils sought to be remedied, and in the light of the contemporaneous construction of it by the official who made it and who was charged with the duty of enforcing it. 36 Cyc. 1137 et seq. Evidence above referred to makes it plain that the order was intended to prevent the waste of gas and oil from government land and to keep the lands mentioned from passing from government ownership pending the investigation then under way as to their value for oil and gas. It is evident that the lands embraced in the order were selected for withdrawal because they were within, or in close proximity to, an area already proved to be productive of oil and gas. As lands valuable for minerals are not subject to homestead entry and are by statute reserved from sale, except as otherwise expressly directed by law (R.S. Secs. 2302, 2318 (Comp. St. Secs. 4591, 4613)), an order of withdrawal was not needed to keep the land in question from passing from government ownership in either of the just mentioned modes. The...