State v. Fairbanks, 8045
| Citation | 65 S.D. 272,273 N.W. 188 |
| Decision Date | 15 May 1937 |
| Docket Number | 8045 |
| Parties | STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Respondent, v. WILLIAM C. FAIRBANKS, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
Appeal from Municipal Court of Watertown, Codington County, SD
#8045—Affirmed.
Tom Kirby, L. E. Waggoner, Sioux Falls, SD
Attorneys for Appellant.
Clair Roddewig, Attorney General
Herman L. Bode, Asst. Attorney General, Pierre, SD
Attorneys for the State.
Appellant was prosecuted and convicted for operating a certain music vending slot machine without having paid the statutory license fee thereon, in violation of the provisions of section 1, chapter 206, Laws 1935. Said section reads as follows:
The machine used by appellant, as described in the evidence, is a “player phonograph machine” containing twelve records and is operated by placing a nickel in the machine and moving a dial to the record the operator wishes to play. The machine will then play one of the twelve records.
A machine such as above described is not specially listed in the statute, therefore if included in the said statute at all must come within the clause, “or any other machine requiring the deposit of money or metal chips therein before operating.”
In this case, as stated by appellant in his brief, the question is, We think they do. It will be noted that the statute especially enumerates certain vending machines. Then follows the clause, “or any other machine requiring the deposit of money or metal chips therein before operating”; these machines are all subject to the payment of a license fee. Then follows an enumeration of other vending machines which are especially enumerated as exempt from the payment of license fees.
It is clear to us from the wording of this statute that it was the intent of the Legislature to deal with the whole subject of slot vending machines. The machines affected by the statute are all slot vending machines that are operated by dropping a coin or metal chip into the slot. Some of them vend gum, some of them vend candy, some of them vend matches, and still others of them vend music. While some of them vend one thing and some another, they are all vending machines and they are all slot machines.
It is the contention of appellant that the rule “ejusdem generis” applies to this case and excludes the machine in question. This phrase means “of the same kind or species,” and the rule is that “Where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase, such general word or phrase is held to refer to things of the same kind as previously enumerated.” Ex Parte Carson, 33 Okl. Cr. 198, 243 P. 260, 262. It is appellant’s contention that the machine involved in this case is only a phonograph, and therefore so unlike the objects that are specifically enumerated that it does not come within the meaning of the clause “or any other machine requiring the deposit of money or metal chips therein before operating.” With this contention we cannot agree. The machine is a slot machine; a vending machine. The only difference between it and a candy vending machine is that with one machine you drop a nickle in the slat and it passes out a package of candy; with the other you drop a nickle in the slot and it plays a phonograph record. They are both nickle in the slot machines and both belong to the same class.
Appellant cites and relies On First Nat. Bank of Anamoose v. US, 200 F. 374, 46 LRA (NS) 1139, and Ex parte Carson, supra. State v. Gardner 174 Iowa 748, 748 LRA 1916D, 767, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 239, merely holds that a statute making it a crime to resort to a house of ill-fame “for the purpose ...
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