Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Aron
| Decision Date | 01 January 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 30030.,30030. |
| Citation | 273 N.W. 280,133 Neb. 187 |
| Parties | BANKERS LIFE INS. CO. v. ARON ET AL. MIDWEST LIFE INS. CO. v. ARON. WESTERN BOHEMIAN FRATERNAL ASS'N v. STONE. MODERN WOODMAN OF AMERICA v. STONE. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A nonexpert witness who is shown to have had a more or less extended and intimate acquaintance with a person may be permitted to state his opinion as to the mental condition of that person, if such condition becomes a material subject of inquiry, by giving the facts and circumstances upon which the opinion is based.
2. Evidence examined and held to show that the decedent was of sound mind at the time in question.
3. The burden of proof is on the party, who alleges that the insured in a policy of life insurance was of unsound mind at the time of the change of his beneficiary, to establish such fact.
Appeal from District Court, Saline County; Proudfit, Judge.
Suit by Bankers Life Insurance Company of Nebraska against Thomas J. Aron, guardian of the person and estate of Tony Kristufek, an incompetent person, and as administrator of the estate of Joseph Kristufek, deceased, impleaded with Erie L. Stone. From a judgment in favor of defendant, Erie L. Stone, defendant Thomas J. Aron, appeals.
Affirmed.
Robert R. Hastings, of Crete, for appellant.
Peterson & Devoe, of Lincoln, for Bankers Life Ins. Co.
John E. Mekota, of Crete, for Erie L. Stone.
Heard before ROSE, DAY, PAINE, and CARTER, JJ., and HASTINGS, MUNDAY, and RINE, District Judges.
The plaintiff filed a bill of interpleader to have the court ascertain who was entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy belonging to Joseph Kristufek, deceased. The proceeds were paid into court by the plaintiff.
Joseph Kristufek died November 27, 1935, leaving his widow, Tony Kristufek, him surviving. The wife has been confined in the State Hospital for Insane at Lincoln suffering from dementia praecox. The contest here is between Erie L. Stone, appellee, niece of the deceased and the beneficiary in the policy at the time of his death, and Thomas J. Aron, appellant and guardian of Tony Kristufek, the former beneficiary.
The beneficiary of the policy was changed in September, 1935, on the application of Joseph Kristufek, made on September 20, 1935. The guardian Aron contends that Joseph Kristufek was of unsound mind when the application was made and the beneficiary changed. The contention of undue influence was abandoned by the appellant.
The trial court, a jury having been waived, held that the decedent was of sound mind and competent and understood the nature and effect of his acts in changing the beneficiary of his insurance, and entered judgment in favor of the appellee.
The appellant relies upon two alleged errors for reversal of this judgment: (1) That the court erred in refusing to permit the witnesses, Mrs. Anton Daniel, John G. Franta and Mrs. Julia Aebig, to express their opinion as to the condition of the mind of Joseph Kristufek in March, 1935; (2) that the judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
We will consider these contentions in the order set out. The record shows that the opinions of these witnesses related to the condition of Joseph Kristufek's mind at a time about six months prior to the change of the beneficiary.
Joseph Kristufek was 48 years of age at the time of his death, and had been a harness maker at Crete, Nebraska, for many years, until he sold his business in February, 1935, and on March 29, 1935, went for treatment for tuberculosis to the Modern Woodmen of America Sanatorium at Woodmen, Colorado, where he remained until September 21, 1935, when he returned to Nebraska and spent most of the time in Lincoln.
It is a settled rule of law in this state that the nonexpert witness who is shown to have had a more or less extended and intimate acquaintance with a person may be permitted to state his opinion as to the mental condition of that person, if said condition becomes a material subject of inquiry, by giving the facts and circumstances upon which the opinion is based. In re Estate of Wilson, 78 Neb. 758, 111 N.W. 788;Torske v. State, 123 Neb. 161, 242 N.W. 408;Kehl v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 126 Neb. 695, 254 N.W. 397.
The question arose in this case when the opinions of nonexpert witnesses were offered to show the insanity of the decedent. Such testimony was excluded by the trial court on the ground that there was not sufficient foundation shown for such testimony by any one of the witnesses. Each of the witnesses was shown to have had an acquaintance with the deceased and some conversations with the deceased, which conversations were stated before the opinions as to the condition of mind were called for. On...
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