GD Searle & Co. v. Jarecki

• Decision Date: 27 January 1960
• Docket Number: No. 12747.,12747.
• Citation: 274 F.2d 129
• Parties: G. D. SEARLE & CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John T. JARECKI, former Collector of Internal Revenue, and Ernest J. Sauber, former Collector of Internal Revenue and former District Director of Internal Revenue, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

274 F.2d 129 (1960)

G. D. SEARLE & CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John T. JARECKI, former Collector of Internal Revenue, and Ernest J. Sauber, former Collector of Internal Revenue and former District Director of Internal Revenue, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12747.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

January 27, 1960.

Walter J. Cummings, Jr., Chicago, Ill., Edwin C. Austin, Middleton Miller, William M. McGovern, Jr., Chicago, Ill., Sidley, Austin, Burgess & Smith, Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for appellant.

Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tax Division, Harry Marselli, Lee A. Jackson, I. Henry Kutz, Carter Bledsoe, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Robert Tieken, U. S. Atty., Chicago Ill., for appellee.

Before MAJOR, SCHNACKENBERG and CASTLE, Circuit Judges.

CASTLE, Circuit Judge.

G. D. Searle & Co., plaintiff-appellant, referred to as taxpayer, instituted this action to recover excess profits taxes in the total amount of $3,638,238.82, plus interest, which amount it alleges was erroneously and illegally assessed and collected by the Government for the calendar years 1950, 1951, and 1952. The District Court dismissed the suit on motion for summary judgment filed by the Government. The taxpayer appealed contending the granting of summary judgment was error in that it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the pertinent Internal Revenue Code provision and that a genuine issue of material fact existed.

The pleadings, a stipulation of facts, and answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions disclose that the taxpayer is engaged in the manufacture and marketing of ethical drugs. Prior to 1950, and over a period of more than twelve months, the taxpayer incurred expenditures which resulted in the preparation and manufacture of two pharmaceuticals with the trade names of Banthine and Dramamine. During the years here involved the taxpayer derived income from sales of these drugs. Both were developed from and arose out of research activities conducted by the taxpayer before 1950. These chemical drug compounds were not in existence prior to their being prepared through experiments with various chemical formulas. The taxpayer applied for and received patents on both products.

The taxpayer claimed that the income from the sales of Banthine and Dramamine constituted abnormal income within the meaning of Sec. 456(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U.S. C. Excess Profits Taxes, § 456).¹ Section 456 is designed to afford relief from the impact of excess profits taxes in certain situations which give rise to abnormally high income during the taxable year.

The taxpayer asserted that the income from the drugs Banthine and Dramamine qualified as income resulting from "discovery" within the class of income described in Sec. 456(a) (2) (B) as:

"Income resulting from exploration, discovery, or prospecting, or any combination of the foregoing, extending over a period of more than 12 months;"

And, alternatively, the taxpayer asserted that such income is subject to classification as abnormal income pursuant to the Treasury Regulations² promulgated under the provision of Sec. 456 that:

"The classification of income of any class not described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, shall be subject to regulations prescribed by the Secretary".

The District Court held that the meaning of the word "discovery" as used in the statute, did not encompass the preparation of Banthine and Dramamine because they are products arising out of research and development, and that the Treasury Regulation, to which reference has been made, is not applicable.

The common accepted meaning of the word "discovery" includes "Finding out or ascertaining something previously unknown or unrecognized; as Curie's discovery of radium" (Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged 2d ed.) p. 745). We do not deem the maximum noscitur a sociis applicable. The wording of subparagraph (B) of the statute indicates that each word should be given significance independently of the others. It refers to "exploration, discovery, or prospecting, or any combination of the foregoing". The context in which the word appears suggests no reason to limit or qualify its commonly accepted meaning. That the statute herein involved omitted a provision of a similar World War II Excess Profits Tax Act which in defining abnormal income included that resulting from "research, or development of tangible property" does not in our opinion serve to narrow the scope of the word "discovery" as employed in the Internal Revenue Code provision here under consideration. The elimination of "research" and "development" as factors qualifying income for abnormal income classification served the Congressional objective of plugging "a potential loophole of major dimensions".³ And, absent the element of discovery, income resulting from research or development does not by reason of the latter factors qualify for treatment as abnormal income. But the plugging of the loophole which existed under a former Act because of the use of the unqualified terms "research" and "development" does not require that the word "discovery" which the Congress saw fit to re-employ in the later enactment be regarded as having taken on the limited and qualified meaning the Government would ascribe to it. Neither the context of Sec. 456 nor the legislative history demonstrates that the term "discovery" was intended to describe only the discovery of that which is already in existence i. e. natural resources. If Congress had...