Pee v. United States

• Citation: 274 F.2d 556,107 US App. DC 47
• Decision Date: 25 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. 14425-14428.,14425-14428.
• Parties: Maxie Leroy PEE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. James E. CURTIS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Leroy S. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Gordon A. MAGRUDER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

107 US App. DC 47, 274 F.2d 556 (1959)

Maxie Leroy PEE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

James E. CURTIS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Leroy S. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Gordon A. MAGRUDER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Nos. 14425-14428.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued January 5, 1959.

Decided June 25, 1959.

Mr. Lynn O. Coombs, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. J. Leon Williams, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Edgar T. Bellinger, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Mr. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Mr. Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.

Mr. John E. Powell, Washington, D. C., (appointed by this court) filed a brief as amicus curiae, urging reversal.

Before PRETTYMAN, Chief Judge, and BAZELON and BURGER, Circuit Judges.

PRETTYMAN, Chief Judge.

These four appellants and one other were indicted in three counts for rape, robbery, and assault with a dangerous weapon, and appellant Johnson in an additional count for possession of a prohibited weapon. Three of appellants (Pee, Magruder and Johnson) were seventeen years of age or younger. Upon being arrested (two of these three on July 3, 1957, and the other one the next day) they were sent to the Receiving Home, maintained by the Board of Public Welfare.¹ On July 18th the Juvenile Court waived jurisdiction² as to these three and ordered them "held for trial under the proceedings of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia."³ On that same day they were taken before the Municipal Court, and thereafter preliminary examination was had and they were held for the grand jury. In due course they were tried upon the indictment in the District Court by a jury. They were found not guilty upon the charge of rape and guilty of robbery and assault with intent to commit rape. They were sentenced to serve four to fifteen years in a penal institution.

In the course of the trial the Government presented as witnesses police officers who proposed to testify concerning statements allegedly made to them by the defendants. Objections were made, and hearings were held out of the presence of the jury. The court ruled that the question of the voluntary or involuntary nature of the statements should be presented to the jury. Objection was also made that the statements were made while the defendants were in the custody of the police and had not been advised of their rights not to make a statement. The prosecutor replied, in part, that the defendants were juveniles and the Federal Criminal Rules were not applicable to them. The trial court overruled those objections.

Upon this appeal the appellants assert that the rule in Mallory⁴ applies. The Government says the Mallory-McNabb (McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819), doctrine does not apply. It states its position as being that the doctrine is not applicable to individuals within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. But the real controversy is whether the doctrine applies after the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court has been waived.

The normal treatment provided by our society for alleged offenders against its laws is a formal charge of the offense, a formal trial, and, if conviction results from the trial, then punishment or compulsory removal for a time from contact with society. Such offenses are denominated crimes, and the offenders are denominated criminals. Public records are made of such events. But from the earliest times children of certain ages have been deemed by our law to be incapable of crime. And in recent times children of certain ages have been removed from the normal treatments provided for crimes and criminals. This has been in part because of a doubt as to the capacity of children to entertain the vicious will which is an essential element of crime in our jurisprudence, but in much greater part because of a belief that the interests of society are best served by a solicitous care and training of those children shown by circumstances to be in need of such care and training. These concepts in respect to children have evolved into elaborate systems of procedure. In the event a child commits an offense against the law, the state assumes a position as parens patriae and cares for the child. Such a one is not accused of a crime, not tried for a crime, not convicted of a crime, not deemed to be a criminal, not punished as a criminal, and no public record is made of his alleged offense. In effect he is exempt from the criminal law.

Such a system for child offenders is provided by our Juvenile Court Act.⁵ That act applies to persons under eighteen years of age.⁶ It provides that, whenever any person gives an officer of the Juvenile Court information that a child is within the provisions of the act, an investigation shall be made and a "petition", if warranted, filed.⁷ Summons is issued to the person having custody of the child.⁸ The child may be taken and kept in custody by the Board of Public Welfare.⁹ Hearing is had but not in public.¹⁰ The court may place the child on probation or commit him to the Board of Public Welfare or to certain named schools, or "Make such further disposition of the child as may be provided by law and as the court may deem to be best for the best interests of the child".¹¹

The foregoing proceedings are not criminal cases.¹² The constitutional safeguards vouchsafed a juvenile in such proceedings are determined from the requirements of due process and fair treatment,¹³ and not by the direct application of the clauses of the Constitution which in terms apply to criminal cases. So far as we can ascertain, with few exceptions in a multitude of cases, this has been the ruling of the courts.¹⁴ By the same token the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to these proceedings.¹⁵

Our problem arises from the following provision in the statute:¹⁶

"If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court in this Act in conducting and disposing of such cases."

Thus, in the case of a child sixteen years of age or older charged with a felony, the Juvenile Court may either proceed with the case itself or waive its jurisdiction. We examine carefully the terms of the quoted section. 1. It requires a "full investigation". That obviously means an inquiry not only into the facts of the alleged offense but also into the question whether the parens patriae plan of procedure is desirable and proper in the particular case.¹⁷ 2. The quoted provision authorizes the Juvenile Court to order the child held for trial under the regular procedure of the District Court. Thus the Juvenile Court judge places the child in the initial stages of the procedure which will eventually bring him to trial as a criminal in the District Court. That process includes a charge, a preliminary examination, a plea, advice as to his constitutional rights, indictment, and then, in the District Court, arraignment and later trial. Once the Juvenile Court has entered its order initiating this process, the child is "under the regular procedure" of the District Court. 3. The statute then provides: "* * * or such other court i. e., the District Court may exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court in this Act in conducting and disposing of such cases." To exercise the powers conferred upon the Juvenile Court in conducting such cases and also in disposing of such cases means, briefly, that the District Court may proceed in all respects exactly as the Juvenile Court would proceed in the case. Thus, after such a child has arrived in the District Court, that court may redetermine the question whether the normal processes of the criminal law should apply to the case and to the child, or whether the plan otherwise applicable to him as a juvenile, that is, the parens patriae plan, should be applicable to him.

Quite clearly, if the District Court decides to pursue the normal criminal law processes — "the regular procedure of the court" — all the constitutional protections applicable to criminal cases and all the rules of criminal procedure in that court apply to such a case just as they apply to any other case of an alleged crime. But also quite clearly, if the District Court decides to conduct the case under the powers conferred upon the Juvenile Court, the rights of the child and the rules applicable to the Juvenile Court procedure apply.

The sum of the quoted statute requires the District Court to make a clear choice between the procedure and processes which it will apply in the case of a juvenile as to whom the Juvenile Court has "waived jurisdiction". Of course it is not necessary that the court formally make such a choice; its choice may be implicit in the manner in which it proceeds. But the District Court cannot proceed in part under its "regular procedure" and in part under the "powers conferred upon the juvenile court". It must do one or the other.

When put together, the provisions of the statute which we have quoted pose something of a procedural problem. Obviously the first time the District Court is aware of the presence of a juvenile within its jurisdiction is when the indictment is presented. Thus every child as to whom jurisdiction has been waived by the Juvenile Court has been subjected to part of "the regular procedure" of the District Court before that court has an opportunity to decide whether it will proceed in the conduct of ...