Blocker v. United States

• Decision Date: 25 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. 14274.,14274.
• Citation: 274 F.2d 572
• Parties: Comer BLOCKER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

274 F.2d 572 (1959)

Comer BLOCKER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 14274.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 6, 1959.

Decided June 25, 1959.

Mr. Howard C. Westwood, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. J. William Doolittle, Jr., Washington, D. C. (both appointed by this Court) was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. John D. Lane, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Mr. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Messrs. Carl W. Belcher and Frederick G. Smithson, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

Mr. Francis J. Ortman, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court as amicus curiae) urged reversal.

Before PRETTYMAN, Chief Judge, and EDGERTON, WILBUR K. MILLER, BAZELON, FAHY, WASHINGTON, DANAHER, BASTIAN and BURGER, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.

PER CURIAM.

Comer Blocker was indicted, tried and convicted for murder in the first degree. His defense was insanity. Three psychiatrists testified at his trial, two called by the defense and one by the prosecutor. All three were on the staff at St. Elizabeths Hospital, an institution owned by the Federal Government and operated by it for the mentally ill. Blocker had undergone observation there for some sixty days or more. The testimony of the doctors called by him was based upon that observation. The testimony of the other doctor, for the Government, was based upon a three-hour examination at the District Jail. The latter found nothing wrong with Blocker. The other two doctors concluded that he suffered from a sociopathic personality disturbance and chronic alcoholism and that his intelligence was about midway between defective and "dull normal". All three doctors testified that a sociopathic personality disturbance was not considered to be a mental disease or defect. The verdict of guilty-as-indicted was returned October 22, 1957.

On November 18, 1957, less than a month after this verdict was returned, the Assistant Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital testified in another case¹ that he and the Superintendent of the Hospital were then agreed that people suffering from sociopathic personality disturbance should be "labelled" as diseased, as mentally ill, mentally sick, suffering from mental disease. Counsel for Blocker promptly moved for a new trial on the basis of this new medical evidence. The motion was denied. We think it should have been granted. Blocker, his life at stake, was entitled to a verdict based upon the most mature expert opinion available on an issue vital to his defense.

With respect to the testimony of the experts which may occur upon a retrial, we direct attention to those portions of our opinion in Carter v. United States² which dealt with this matter. We also call attention to our admonitions in Durham v. United States³ that "We do not, and indeed could not, formulate an instruction which would be either appropriate or binding in all cases"; we included discussion and material from which proper instructions could be fashioned for a particular case. In that connection we quoted from the Royal Commission Report as follows:

"There is no a priori reason why every person suffering from any form of mental abnormality or disease, or from any particular kind of mental disease, should be treated by the law as not answerable for any criminal offence which he may commit, and be exempted from conviction and punishment. Mental abnormalities vary infinitely in their nature and intensity and in their effects on the character and conduct of those who suffer from them. Where a person suffering from a mental abnormality commits a crime, there must always be some likelihood that the abnormality has played some part in the causation of the crime; and, generally speaking, the graver the abnormality, * * * the more probable it must be that there is a causal connection between them. But the closeness of this connection will be shown by the facts brought in evidence in individual cases and cannot be decided on the basis of any general medical principle." ⁴

For the foregoing reasons and purposes the judgment of the District Court has been reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

We had oral argument in this case on April 6, 1959. On the same day, without stopping to write an opinion, my brothers summarily entered an order reversing the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial. They have now filed the foregoing opinion containing one brief decisional paragraph, which I quote:

"On November 18, 1957, less than a month after this verdict was returned, the Assistant Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital testified in another case* that he and the Superintendent of the Hospital were then agreed that people suffering from sociopathic personality disturbance should be `labelled\' as diseased, as mentally ill, mentally sick, suffering from mental disease. Counsel for Blocker promptly moved for a new trial on the basis of this new medical evidence. The motion was denied. We think it should have been granted. Blocker, his life at stake, was entitled to a verdict based upon the most mature expert opinion available on an issue vital to his defense.

"*See testimony in United States v. Leach, Crim.No. 450-57, D.D.C., and in Rosenfield v. Overholser, D.C., 157 F.Supp. 18."

The majority's precipitate action will receive the plaudits of many, for it has recently become apparent that the statute requiring the death penalty for first degree murder in the District of Columbia does not meet with popular approval.¹ But, being a statute, it is indisputably the "law of the land," as the saying goes, and must be applied so long as it is in effect, regardless of the sentiment and scruples of those who oppose it.

I dissent from the action of the majority in holding the motion should have been granted and in reversing and remanding for a new trial. My view is that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion for a new trial and that, therefore, this court has no power in the premises. But I do not base my dissent upon that ground alone. For, if the District Court could disregard peremptory provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and entertain the motion for a new trial — and my brethren implicitly hold that it could — I think the trial court correctly denied the motion and that this court has erroneously reversed its action. The several reasons which impel me to that conclusion will be discussed after the question of jurisdiction has been examined.

Before discussing these points, however, I think it well to recount the facts of the killing and the trial, because the majority have been content merely to say Blocker was convicted of murder in the first degree. The record shows he carefully planned and coldly committed a pitiless killing, and then attempted to escape the consequences by claiming it was done accidentally and that, anyway, he was a chronic alcoholic who ought not to be held responsible.

On April 5, 1957, Comer Blocker was and had been for some time separated from his common law wife, Frances Hall, by whom he had five children. He was living in Philadelphia and she was residing with several of her children in a small apartment in the District of Columbia. Evidence for the Government showed that in Philadelphia Blocker had bought a shotgun and a carrying case for it; and that, on April 5, he brought the gun with him to the District of Columbia and hid it in a wooded area. About 11:00 o'clock that night, having repossessed the gun, he knocked on the door of his wife's apartment. The knock was answered by his son Chester, then 14 years old, who attempted to prevent his father from entering when he saw him with a gun. Blocker threatened the boy and backed him into the bedroom where his mother was. As Frances attempted to close and lock the door, a shotgun blast came through it and struck her body.² Blocker then entered the room and shot his wife a second time, inflicting wounds on her face and chest.³ Almost immediately afterward, when he was apprehended, Blocker told an officer that he had come from Philadelphia to kill his girl friend and that he had done so. It does not appear that he was intoxicated that night.

At his trial, which was conducted from October 16, 1957, through October 22, Blocker contended that he had meant no harm, that the first shot through the door was caused by contact with the boy, and that the second shot in the bedroom was completely accidental. He also advanced the inconsistent defense of insanity.

Blocker introduced as witnesses in his defense two psychiatrists from the staff of St. Elizabeths, Drs. William Cody and Morris Platkin. They had examined him several times during the period of 60 days in which he was committed to the hospital for observation. Dr. Cody said:

"With respect to his mental condition, we made a diagnosis of Mr. Blocker of sociopathic personality disturbance and chronic alcoholism.

* * * * * *

"* * * The kind of personality deviation which is termed sociopathic personality disturbance has to do with what is thought of as a personality defect.

"Now, this is not the same thing as a mental defect or a mental illness. It is more a long standing personality disturbance characterized in many cases by a lack of conscience, a lack of moral responsibility, and inability to profit from experience.

"These people are frequently in anti-social difficulties, and chronic alcoholics also fall within this group. The two diagnoses are really one, the chronic alcoholism being the kind of sociopathic personality disturbance that we felt this man represented." (My emphasis.)

Dr. Platkin, who examined Blocker three times in September, 1957, found him to have a sociopathic personality disturbance and to be a chronic alcoholic, but said he did not find that Blocker had a mental disease or defect.

Lay evidence introduced by Blocker to indicate insanity consisted largely of his brother's...