Bennett v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 02 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-2667,00-2667
• Citation: 274 F.3d 133
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2001) SALLY BENNETT, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DAVID BENNETT v. FRANCIS J. MURPHY, III, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE OFFICER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; MARK F. NOWAKOWSKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS A CORPORAL OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA FRANCIS J. MURPHY, III, APPELLANT
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 133

274 F.3d 133 (3rd Cir. 2001)

SALLY BENNETT, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DAVID BENNETT v. FRANCIS J. MURPHY, III, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE OFFICER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; MARK F. NOWAKOWSKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS A CORPORAL OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA FRANCIS J. MURPHY, III, APPELLANT

No. 00-2667

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Submitted September 10, 2001

Filed January 2, 2002

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 94-CV-00214) District Judge: Honorable Robert J. Cindrich

Vincent A. Coppola, Esquire Pribanic & Pribanic 513 Court Place First Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15219, and Victor H. Pribanic, Esquire Pribanic & Pribanic 1735 Lincoln Way White Oak, PA 15131, for Appellee.

D. Michael Fisher Attorney General, John G. Knorr, III Chief Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Litigation Section, Kemal A. Mericli Senior Deputy Attorney General, Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania Department of Justice Strawberry Square 15th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120, for Appellant.

Before: Mansmann, Rendell and Aldisert, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Mansmann, Circuit Judge

In this Section 1983 civil rights action alleging use of excessive force by a police officer in violation of the Fourth Amendment, state trooper Francis J. Murphy, III, appeals from the District Court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. In its recent decision in Saucier v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001), the Supreme Court articulated a new framework for analyzing qualified immunity claims which is applicable here: the question of whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity is distinct from whether he used unreasonable force. Because the District Court did not have the benefit of this framework when it considered Murphy's entitlement to qualified immunity, we will vacate the order of the District Court and remand this matter for reconsideration in accordance with the principles announced in Saucier.

I.

This case originated in a 1994 prolonged armed standoff between David Bennett and police officers in a field near an apartment complex in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. What began as a domestic dispute culminated in Bennett's being fatally shot by Trooper Murphy. Sally Bennett, David Bennett's mother and the administratrix of his estate, filed this action alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983.¹ The matter went to trial in September 1996 and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Murphy. One year later, Bennett filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, alleging that information in Murphy's personnel records relevant to his credibility had been withheld from Bennet during discovery. Because it was "satisfied that Bennett was prejudiced by being denied the opportunity to consider her use of this important information," the District Court found that Bennett was entitled to a new trial. Bennett v. Murphy, No. 94-cv-00214, mem. order at 14 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2000). In granting Bennett's motion, the District Court rejected Murphy's argument that a new trial was precluded by Murphy's entitlement to qualified immunity: "We must recognize... that the factfinding process in a case of deadly force is usually more complicated than that of an alleged search or seizure. We find that the facts from which we would make such a ruling must first be determined by a jury." Id. at 6.

Prior to the trial, Murphy filed a motion for reconsideration and sought summary judgment based on his assertion of qualified immunity. The District Court denied these motions. Noting that it had "informally and unfavorably addressed" Murphy's entitlement to qualified immunity in its January 7th order granting Bennett's motion for a new trial, the District Court addressed the issue of qualified immunity at length. Bennett v. Murphy, 127 F. Supp.2d 689, 690 (W.D. Pa. 2001). Concluding again that Murphy was not entitled to qualified immunity, the District Court recounted the facts surrounding the shooting in the light most favorable to Bennett.² The Court then asked whether, given those facts, it was "indisputably reasonable as a matter of law" for Murphy to have used deadly force against Bennett. Id. at 690. The District Court was unable to answer this question in the affirmative and concluded that the determination was best left to the jury: "[T]here is no clearly defined standard of reasonableness for the court to apply and... such a standard should emerge from the conscience of the community, not the mind of a single judge." Id. at 699. The District Court took the position that, as a general rule, qualified immunity is unavailable in cases involving allegations of excessive force:

[E]xcessive force cases are typically riven with factual disputes about key events. Even where they are not, the decisive question is one of the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of all the circumstances.... [T]his is a quintessential jury question.

Id. at 694. The District Court concluded that the availability of qualified immunity turned on Murphy's credibility:

[I]t is only from the mind and mouth of Murphy that we can supply the crucial "facts and circumstances confronting" our hypothetical, objectively reasonable officer. It is only from the testimony of Murphy that we can gather the information which he maintains creates the justification for the use of deadly force -- i.e., the belief that existed in his own mind that his fellow officers were in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury at the hands of Bennett.

Id. at 692. Because this credibility determination could be made only by a jury, the District Court reasoned that Murphy was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Murphy's motion was denied and this timely appeal followed.

Because this appeal involves solely a question of law and does not turn on disputed issues of fact, we have jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine under 28 U.S.C. S 1291.³ See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).

II.

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Saucier v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001), clarifying the analysis to be undertaken by district courts and courts of appeals considering claims of qualified immunity in cases alleging excessive use of force.⁴ In Saucier, the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred when it adopted an approach to qualified immunity which was very similar to the one taken by the District Court in this case: "[T]he ruling on qualified immunity requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion with the question whether unreasonable force was used...." 121 S. Ct. at 2153. Unless the qualified immunity inquiry is undertaken separately from the constitutional inquiry, it will "become superfluous or duplicative when excessive force is alleged." Id. at 2155.

The Supreme Court stressed that the qualified immunity question must be resolved "at the earliest possible stage in the litigation." Id. at 2156 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). "Qualified immunity is `an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.' " Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526 (1985). "The privilege is `an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.' " Id.

After Saucier it is clear that claims of qualified immunity are to be evaluated using a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show a constitutional violation. If the plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the officer is entitled to...