Larsen v. General Motors Corporation
Decision Date | 14 March 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 4-66 Civ. 38.,4-66 Civ. 38. |
Parties | Erling David LARSEN, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Norman W. Larsen, of King, MacGregor & Lommen, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.
Franklin D. Gray, of Cant, Haverstock, Beardsley, Gray & Plant, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.
This proceeding comes before the court on a motion by the defendant, General Motors Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "GM") for summary judgment. On February 18, 1964, the plaintiff was involved in a head-on collision with another automobile while operating a 1963 Corvair automobile owned by his passenger, one Jean Ann Reader, and manufactured by the defendant. In his complaint, the plaintiff contends that when the two vehicles collided with one another, the steering shaft and wheel of the automobile he was driving was displaced rearward striking him in the head and causing severe injuries for which he now seeks recovery. The plaintiff makes no contention that the collision itself was caused by any defect in the 1963 Corvair automobile. However, the plaintiff does allege that the defendant was negligent in its design and engineering of the Corvair and also that the defendant breached both an express warranty and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose for which the vehicle was intended.
Since there is no dispute between the parties at least in so far as the crucial facts are concerned, the only question before this Court is what was the legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The latter contends that the defendant was obligated to design the 1963 Corvair automobile so that it would protect the plaintiff and others from the forces generated by a head-on collision. The defendant takes the position that its duty was limited to designing and constructing an automobile which had no hidden or latent defects and which was fit for the ordinary purposes for which the automobile was made. Unless the defendant's duty is as broad as the plaintiff contends, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment regardless of whether the theory of liability is based on negligence or warranty. This is so because if there was no legal duty to produce a vehicle which would protect the occupants from injury in a head-on collision, no factual dispute could arise as to whether or not the duty was breached. Further, there can be no question as to whether the defendant did or did not warn the plaintiff of the dangers involved in a head-on collision if in fact there was no duty on the part of the former to do so. The only express warranty upon which plaintiff relies is the usual and customary new-vehicle warranty for the replacement and repair of defective parts issued by the manufacturer, a copy of which is attached to defendant's answer herein. This express warranty in no way avails plaintiff in this proceeding.
The recent case of Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7 Cir. 1966), is very closely related to the instant case. There, the personal representative of the decedent's estate brought an action to recover damages on the grounds that the death of the decedent was caused by the negligent design of the automobile manufactured by the defendant. Specifically, the decedent was killed in a broadside collision while operating a Chevrolet station wagon. The basis of the plaintiff's complaint was that the vehicle was designed with an "X" frame instead of a perimeter frame with the placement of the front seat at the intersection of the X. The plaintiff alleged that by failing to provide siderails, as other manufacturers did, the defendant created an unreasonable risk of harm to the occupants of the automobile in the event of an impact against the side of the vehicle. The district court dismissed the complaint and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed reasoning that the only crucial issue raised by the complaint was the nature of the duty owed by an automobile manufacturer to users of its products. In this regard, the court concluded:
(p. 824).
The court also pointed out:
Finally, the court indicated that even though other manufacturers equipped their vehicles with perimeter frames, this would not make the defendant any more culpable. The court said:
(p. 825).
It appears to this court that no material or significant difference exists between the frame of an automobile and the steering shaft and wheel at least with respect to the manufacturer's duty toward occupants of such vehicles is concerned. In Evans, the plaintiff proceeded on the theory of negligent design and breach of warranty but recovery was denied. It would seem from that case alone that recovery should be denied here also.
In Schemel v. General Motors Corp., EV 66-C-58 (S.D.Indiana 1966), the plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries suffered when the vehicle in which he was riding was struck from the rear by a Chevrolet automobile traveling at about 115 miles per hour. The defendant automobile manufacturer is alleged to have been negligent in designing and manufacturing an automobile capable of being operated at such a speed, in failing to install a governor making such a speed impossible, and in designing and making a vehicle which was more dangerous than necessary. The court dismissed the plaintiff's action with prejudice, pointing out:
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Larsen v. General Motors Corporation, 18853.
...occupy in the event of a collision. The trial court agreed, rendering summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, reported at 274 F.Supp. 461 (D.C.Minn.1967). We reverse and The plaintiff-appellant,1 Erling David Larsen, received severe bodily injuries while driving, with the consent of ......
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Burkhard v. Short
...the U. S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. This was a case originating in the Federal District Court of Minnesota in 1967, reported in 274 F.Supp. 461, in which the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer on the theory that the alleged defect in design did not ca......